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Abstract
The issues and challenges facing multicultural societies around the globe could 
plausibly be argued to be similar in nature. The demand for recognition by certain 
segments or compartments in society calls for further examination of these 
demands and how the demands fit with the politics adopted by the respective 
states. However, the social, political and economic landscape of each particular 
society has a bearing on the policies formulated to address these issues and 
challenges. This has given rise to terms such as plural society, multicultural society, 
multi-ethnic and multi-religious societies to indicate the existence of such variants in 
a society. As for Malaysia, its colonial experience can be identified as one of the 
factors that contributed to the formation of a multicultural society and later to the 
formulation of policies which sustained the formation of a multicultural identity. 
Nevertheless, the main issue and challenge facing multicultural Malaysia is to 
grapple with the idea of national integration. Does this indicate that by recognising 
multiculturalism means that one has to face the issue and challenges of national 
integration? It is here that one would normally argue for an assimilationist approach 
to be adopted in order to ensure national integration. It is my hope that this 
dissertation is able to highlight the issues and challenges facing multicultural 
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Introduction
Managing and recognising cultural diversity in multicultural societies, both 
Western or elsewhere in the world, is one of the most important challenges of our 
time. This challenge is so acute, the United Nations Human Development Report 
brought out a special dossier on this issue in 2004. The International Covenant of 
Civil and Political Rights highlighted the need to preserve diversity in these 
multicultural, multi-ethnic and multi-religious societies. While most multi-ethnic, 
multi-religious and multicultural societies encounter problems relating to 
recognition and promotion of cultural diversity, it is liberal Western democracies 
which most adhere to the principle of equality and rule of law.
Although such policy measures have their foundation in the liberal 
tradition, there is no scholarly agreement on the application of multicultural 
practices in culturally diverse societies. While some scholars have called for the 
replication of the Western model in non-Western contexts or societies, others 
have argued for a more restrained approach. In this battle of ideas, the key 
question as to how non-Western, especially postcolonial, societies respond to the 
need to recognise diversity and difference appear muddled. Similarly, the 
question as to the necessary arrangements and policies which need to be 
adopted to address difference and diversity equally, is not clearly stated. The 
challenge therefore, is how we develop a cohesive scholarly position that can be 
adopted in the policy context.
Turning to Malaysia, it can be seen that this is a postcolonial society which 
faces all the problems associated with a multicultural society. However, when it 
comes to policy planning, there is neither a clear scholarly position on the issue 
nor a clear policy response to the problems arising from diversity and dissent. My 
aim in this dissertation is to highlight this particular anomaly.
Geographically, Malaysia is located in Southeast Asia, and comprises a 
Federation of 13 states with a population of approximately 28.15 million. The 
population comprises three main ethnic groups; the Malays, Chinese and Indians. 
However, these ethnic groups are categorised into Bumiputra and non- 
Bumiputra. Bumiputra comprises Malays who are Muslims and other indigenous 
people (60%), while non-Bumiputra comprises the Chinese (23%) and Indian 
(7%) (Department of Statistics Malaysia, 2010). Malaysia gained its 
independence in 1957, after more than 400 years of colonial experience under 
the Portuguese, the Dutch and the British.
The colonial experience has brought significant change to Malaysia’s 
social, political and economic landscape. However, the most significant is the 
transformation of Malaysia into a multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multicultural 
society by the colonial legacy. The definition or identification of Malaysia as a 
multicultural, multiracial and multi-religious society is based on its societal 
composition and recognition of the cultural, ethnic and religious diversity, as 
stipulated in the Federal Constitution. Article 8 of the Federal Constitution clearly 
stipulates the equality of all Malaysians before the law and their entitlement to
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equal protection, while Article 11 of the Constitution recognises the freedom of 
cultural practice and religious belief of other communities, even though Islam and 
the Malay language are officially recognised as the official religion and language 
of the Federation. Malaysia’s constitutional monarchy is led by the head of state, 
Yang di-Pertuan Agong, or His Royal Highness, who is elected from the nine 
Malay rulers on a rotational basis. As the head of the state in a parliamentary 
democracy, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong acts with government advice.
Nevertheless, as mentioned earlier, the biggest challenge for any 
multicultural or pluralist society is the delicacy and sensitivity needed for 
managing and recognising the diverse cultural, religious, racial and ethnic 
minorities that exist within the polity. This is due to the fact that the recognition of 
such diversity or plurality is that it could create cleavages, divisions, and 
compartmentalisation within the societies and, in a worst case scenario, it could 
escalate into inter-ethnic conflict, as people become more aware of their 
differences and question perceived advantages or disadvantages within the 
polity. The delicacy could be described on two levels. Firstly, whether a right to 
equality is sufficient to ensure the flourishing of diversity and, secondly, whether 
the special concentration or attention given to the various groups in order to 
maintain the diversity and plurality is justified under the banner of nation-building. 
Such is the common argument posed by those on the right wing who view 
multiculturalism as a threat and a challenge to the aspiration of nation-building.
As for Malaysia, its cultural, ethnic and religious diversity continued to be 
recognised and maintained after independence was gained from the British in
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1957. The formation of the pluralist society during the colonial period, especially 
during British rule, is nevertheless claimed to have altered the societal 
composition and, at the same time, the social, economic and political landscape 
of Malaysia, which was once an ethno-culturally homogenous society. 
Colonialism is argued to have caused the identity of the indigenous Malays to be 
diluted and, as Muzaffar (2010) describes, the Malays as becoming a community 
among communities as a result of the colonial legacy. The colonial legacy has 
turned Malaysia into a multicultural or pluralist society. However, adding to this 
argument is that the colonial legacy not only altered the societal composition of 
Malaysia, but also caused socio-economic imbalances to exist between the 
indigenous Malays and the non-indigenous, non-Malay immigrant communities, 
as a result of the economic functions attached to each ethnic group. This resulted 
in the weaker economic position of the indigenous Malays. This imbalance, 
inherited as part of the colonial legacy, became an important justification for the 
government to accord a ‘special position’ to the indigenous Malays in the Federal 
Constitution, which covers preferential quotas in the civil service, police force and 
army, a quota for higher learning institutions and public universities, and awards 
of scholarships and business licences. Apart from the constitutional guarantees, 
a policy that seeks to emphasise a special commitment to the Malay economic 
position was formulated specifically after 1969.
Policies that focus on economic growth are formulated in order to reduce 
the social and economic gap between the ethnic communities. The policies 
formulated recognise and acknowledge the need to eliminate the racial 
segregation or compartmentalisation of the colonial legacy. The race-based
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affirmative action for indigenous Malays was formulated in order to ensure the 
success of the nation-building process, since the indigenous Malays make up the 
largest number of poor and economically deprived. However, this has resulted in 
the argument that the reconciliation of citizenship rights with this special position 
undermined the nation-building initiative, whereby ethnic and racial 
consciousness was further reinforced. Additionally, racial politics became 
reinforced, even though the formation of the coalition appears to be multi-ethnic.
Therefore, in this dissertation I will highlight the issues and challenges 
facing the attempt by multicultural Malaysia to form a mature, liberal democratic 
and tolerant society as envisaged by the government in policies such as the New 
Economic Policy (NEP) and the National Vision Policy (NVP). One can clearly 
identify the issues and challenges that the government would encounter, in which 
the policy aspiration or objective would be at odds with the policy implementation. 
For instance, the aspiration of Bangsa Malaysia (or 1 Malaysia,) as the national 
identity envisaged for all Malaysians, would be at odds with the preferential, race- 
based affirmative action policies for the indigenous Malays. Therefore, the 
challenge awaiting the government is that, while diversity is being recognised, the 
sense of equality is somehow missing and the success of Bangsa Malaysia as an 
identity for all Malaysians depends on how the sense of equality is being nurtured 
in order to have a sense of belonging. The argument is that the aspiration to unity 
in diversity, as propagated by Bangsa Malaysia has a long way to go until race- 
based or ethnic politics are dismantled. This is because underlying issues, such 
as the special position and the special privileges of the indigenous Malays, are 
argued to have undermined the notion of rights to equality and democratic
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citizenship which are fundamental to nation-building. Hence, this could be argued 
to have created a skewed image of the nation envisaged.
While Malaysia’s recognition of its cultural diversity could be argued to be 
a response to its nation-building initiative, as most multiculturalism scholars 
would agree, such a nation-building initiative created a condition of conflict 
between the indigenous Malays and the non-indigenous non-Malays. This is 
because the nation-building initiative is viewed by the communities, especially the 
non-indigenous minorities, as an avenue to seek greater recognition of rights to 
equality, and strengthening of their democratic citizenship. For the indigenous 
Malays, the claim is that the recognition of the nation-building initiative would 
undermine their special position and the preferential treatment which has been an 
essential feature of their indigenousness.
When the government formulated the nation-building initiative, it outlined 
nine challenges, as stipulated under Vision 2020, one of which is, significantly, to 
establish a mature, liberal and tolerant society in which Malaysians of all colours 
and creeds are free to practice and profess their customs, cultures and religious 
beliefs, yet feel that they belong to Bangsa Malaysia or the Malaysian nation. 
However, this nation-building initiative of Bangsa Malaysia has opened up the 
debate over the recognition of rights to equality and democratic citizenship. This 
is because the objective of forming a liberal and tolerant society is challenged by 
the need to maintain the special recognition of the indigenous Malays’ special 
position and preferential policy.
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Therefore, the recognition of cultural diversity in multicultural Malaysia 
could be argued to have diverged from the liberal framework of recognition to a 
right to equality. This resulted in the nation-building process opening an avenue 
for the demand to recognition of a right to equality by the non-Malays. Hence, 
these questions could be posed: while the government recognises the challenges 
of its nation-building initiative in creating a mature, liberal and tolerant society, 
what has been done to overcome these challenges and what has been done 
since independence in order to ensure that demand for equal recognition 
between the communities is being addressed? What policy framework or 
institutional design has been formulated to sustain the multicultural recognition of 
cultural diversity within the polity of multicultural Malaysia? If such a policy 
framework exists, why there is still a demand for recognition and could that be an 
indicator that effort and policy design towards recognising integration and 
national unity has failed?
Bunnell (2002) claimed that the journey towards creating Bangsa Malaysia 
had opened up various historical fault lines, uncovered constitutional problems, 
and created a conflict between the Malays and non-Malays. This problem was 
also anticipated by the drafting commission of the Federal Constitution, which 
noted the awkwardness of the constitutional arrangements. Even though 
multicultural identity and the individual right to equality are recognised and 
protected under the Federal Constitution, the claim by the non-Malays is that 
such recognition and protection of their multicultural identity distorts the notion of 
rights to equality and democratic citizenship. While the argument for a 
multicultural orientation is based on rights to equality and the notion of
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citizenship, Malaysia’s multicultural orientation is argued to have been formed at 
the expense of the rights to equality of the non-Malay minorities. Hence, the 
argument that Malaysia’s multicultural outlook does not necessarily promote 
multiculturalism (Verma, 2003) could affect the nation-building initiative. This is 
evident with the recognition of a special position for the indigenous Malays, and 
the formulation of an affirmative action programme to address the issue of 
indigenous economic deprivation undermined the notion of rights to equality and 
citizenship. Consequently, as a result of recognising the special position of 
Malays and the formulation of an affirmative action programme, it further 
strengthened the spirit of ethnocentrism between the ethnic groups instead (Kee 
Beng, 2009).
Therefore, Chapter 1 of the dissertation will focus on the literature review 
and the development of multiculturalism within Western liberal societies and non- 
Western multinational societies.1 The argument that liberalism failed to recognise 
differences and took for granted cultural, religious and social diversity, caused the 
call for the politics of multiculturalism. Even though the development of 
multiculturalism takes place within a liberal democratic polity, the argument for 
such development must be cognisant of the reality that the recognition of a 
multicultural polity is reflected from the historical background of these societies. 
Both societies are facing the challenges of recognition of the various identities 
which exist within the polity, and hence the challenge has to be understood from 
the perspective of both non-Western multinational and Western liberal societies.
' The term non-Western multinational states and postcolonial multicultural societies w ill be used 
interchangeably in this dissertation. Colonialism also contributed to the formation o f a pluralist society and, after 
the departure o f the colonial power, these countries were left w ith the challenge o f accommodating and 
tolerating the plurality. Some states would recognise such diversity while some would coerce these pluralities 
into the dominant culture.
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Nevertheless, both societies have different historical influences which help 
to shape the recognition of the multicultural environment. This historical 
development has an impact on the approach or policies formulated in these 
societies. Hence, this historical development would therefore cause these 
societies to modify and justify the approach taken to managing their multi-ethnic 
set-up within the liberal framework. As for some non-Western multinational 
societies, the colonial legacy is argued to have caused the state to approach the 
recognition of the cultural, social and religious diversity rather differently, while 
some would recognise such diversity but with an arrangement for recognising the 
indigenousness identity that gives rise to the indigenous and non-indigenousness 
dichotomy. This, in a way, causes these cultural communities to claim that the 
notion of citizenship and right to equality has been undermined, even though 
diversity was being celebrated.
Meanwhile, for Western liberal democracies, the development of 
multiculturalism is vital in order to ensure that rights to equality and the notion of 
citizenship are being recognised by ensuring that the political, social and 
economic environment is conducive for its citizens, especially the minorities, to 
flourish and develop. Such recognition of cultural diversity in Western liberal 
societies is thus triggered by the need to extend the right to equality to the 
recognition of social, religious and cultural identities. This clearly indicates that, 
even though the right to equality is the foundation of these Western societies, it is 
insufficient until and unless various cultural, religious and ethnic experiences are 
brought into the polity to be recognised. For postcolonial societies, the
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recognition of their multicultural polity as an extension of the colonial legacy 
requires these societies to adopt strategies that would undermine the right to 
equality, to a certain extent.
As a result, some multiculturalism scholars argue that the politics of 
recognition is vital in multicultural societies, as it would stand for the recognition 
of freedom and equality of all its citizens. Hence, in order for multiculturalism to 
flourish, a democratic setting should be functionally superior (Kreuzer, 2006, p.2) 
to provide a platform for the recognition of rights to equality and the promotion 
and protection of the rights of all, irrespective of colour, racial and religious 
identity. Likewise, Friedman (2007) argued that the root of democracy is the 
maintenance of diversity, and that democracy is not solely about majority rule but, 
to an extent, also about minority rights.
Since historical development has a great influence on understanding the 
development of multiculturalism, Chapter 2 will provide an in-depth illustration 
and description of the factors that contribute to the development and formation of 
multicultural Malaysia. The historical legacy of the colonial period, especially 
under the British administration, will be described in detail in order to provide an 
understanding of the development that had been taking place prior to 
independence right up until the present day. This historical legacy witnessed 
imbalances among the ethnic groups, which caused the composition of the 
indigenous Malay group to be threatened by the British-sponsored immigration of 
Chinese and Indians (Kreuzer, 2006, p.5). This migration also placed the control 
of the economy in the hands of the migrants, especially the Chinese. Therefore,
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the economic deprivation of the indigenous Malays led to the formation of policies 
intended to address the concerns of the indigenous Malays. This concentration 
given to ethnicity has led it to becoming central in national politics. Moreover, the 
position of organising society and politics along ascriptive ethnic lines has given 
precedence to group rights before individual rights. For example, an affirmative 
action programme was launched in 1971 under the New Economic Policy (NEP) 
which, in general, focused on promoting unity and integration, with its two
objectives of poverty eradication, irrespective of race, and elimination of racial
identity in the economy. At the same time the NEP specifically promotes an
affirmative action programme for the indigenous Malays who are economically
lagging behind, in order to ensure a level playing field with the non-Malays. 
Subsequently, policies formulated after the end of the NEP in 1990, continued 
with the affirmative action approach in order to ensure the promotion and 
protection of the interest of indigenous Malays who had yet to achieve economic 
parity. The affirmative action approach, or the spirit of NEP as some call it, 
needed to be maintained to ensure indigenous Malays’ participation in the 
economy, and to finally reach the 30% equity ownership targeted since the 
inception of NEP.
While ethnicity is taking centre stage in Malaysia’s national politics and we 
can see the recognition and protection of the various cultural communities, the 
recognition of Malaysia’s multicultural set-up and its nation-building process is 
argued to have been skewed. This is because the attention or recognition given 
to the indigenous Malays created the perception among the non-Malays that 
there is a double standard of recognition, thus creating the perception of a first
l i
class and second class citizenship. A result of the preferential treatment is that 
the notion of democratic citizenship and rights to equality is undermined. Such a 
perception was further reinforced by the categorisation of indigenousness and 
non-indigenousness of its citizens. This categorisation is being continuously used 
to justify the need to maintain such special preferential treatment, and the 
recognition of the indigenous as the first nation, and the state as initially an 
indigenous nation state. All this will be elaborated in Chapter 3. Hence, with 
ethnicity taking centre stage, together with the categorisation of indigenousness 
and non-indigenousness, Malaysia’s inter-ethnic management towards unity and 
integration is a challenging task. In order to better understand Malaysia’s 
multicultural set-up and its nation-building process, a semi-structured interview 
with open-ended questions will be conducted to gather the views of the 
respondents, particularly their understanding of the notion of nation-building. 
Without a doubt, Malaysia’s recognition of various cultural identities by accepting 
the equality of all ethnic groups with respect to the needs of their identity, security 
and well-being is enshrined in the Federal Constitution. This has led to the 
development and flourishing of Malaysia’s multicultural identity, but further 
compartmentalisation and preferential treatment of the indigenous Malays has 
undermined the rights to equality and citizenship, and resulted in the stronger 
promotion of ethnocentrism.
The focus on ethnicity, along with affirmative action, continues to be 
central to Malaysia’s political agenda. Even though creating a united and 
integrated identity of Bangsa Malaysia was a new orientation since the end of 
NEP, the core issue of privileging the majority indigenous Malays is the main
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concern raised by the non-Malays. Such preferential treatment of the indigenous 
Malays had led the non-Malays to feel they lack a sense of belonging. Chapter 4 
will highlight the challenges to Malaysia’s nation-building agenda. The views of 
the interviewees will be analysed and provide the way forward for Malaysia’s 
nation-building agenda. The need to dismantle preferential treatment based on 
ethnicity was highlighted by the interviewees as an important way forward for 
unity, integration and the success of Bangsa Malaysia. Furthermore, the lack of 
specific policies or measures to address the concern of non-Malays had caused 
non-Malays to feel as though they are being discriminated against even though 
the Federal Constitution clearly stipulates the need to protect and recognise the 
legitimate interest of other communities on top of recognising the indigenous 
Malays’ interest. Affirmative action, argued the interviewees, should be applied 
across the racial spectrum; only then would Bangsa Malaysia fulfil its true 
meaning instead of being only political rhetoric.
Therefore, as a way forward, Malaysia’s multicultural set-up would have to 
ensure a call for a framework of integration that is just, equal, honest, transparent 
and forward-looking, in order to overcome the challenges to unity and integration 
under the banner of Bangsa Malaysia. The most significant step is to ensure that 
the notion of citizenship is being upheld in order to ensure the success of this 
nation-building programme. Hence, Chapter 5 will address the social, political 
and economic challenges of creating such an integrative framework, and whether 
such a policy framework would be able to convince the indigenous Malays about 
the importance of the recognition of equality of all citizens. This is because 
without the understanding and acknowledgement of the importance of such a
13
framework from the indigenous Malays, the idea of Bangsa Malaysia would only 
ever be paying lip-service to the non-Malays, and that unity and integration in 
Malaysia would be developed out of necessity for the sake of survival, which is 
artificial and calculative, rather than unity of the heart (Embong in Hefner, 2001, 
p.77).
In conclusion, recognising diversity and nation-building in multicultural 
Malaysia seems to have missed two significant points. Firstly, the recognition of 
diversity in multicultural Malaysia was based on a negotiated or bargained text 
agreed by the ethnic leaders which has, to a certain extent, ignored or 
undermined the notion of citizenship and the right to equality. Secondly, the 
nation-building agenda of multicultural Malaysia envisaged by the government 
has missed the point that nation-building would require the adherence to the 
universal recognition of a right to equality as its foundation. Nation-building could 
not be successful if the issue of a right to equality is not rectified. This is because 
nation-building would only be a success if there is a sense of belonging and 




1.1 The Multicultural Process and Development
It is hard to imagine that any society today, Western or non-Western, could be 
ethno-culturally homogenous; most modern societies are characterised by deep 
diversity and cultural pluralism, contributed to by the process of migration and the 
effects of globalisation. This has meant that modern societies face challenges in 
recognising within their polities the demands from the various religious, racial and 
cultural communities. This multiplicity of racial, cultural, religious and ethnic 
identities could be contributed to by various factors: colonisation, immigration and 
globalisation. This seems to have created a special challenge to any system of 
governance, as it can add deep cleavages to societies (Kreuzer, 2006, p.2). 
Nevertheless, such demand for respect and recognition of these identities 
marked the importance of promoting and recognising cultural liberty as a vital part 
of human development (HDR, 2004).
The demand for recognition in these societies around the globe, especially 
in Western liberal societies and non-Western multinational states, began firstly as 
a result of the attempt made to incorporate respect and recognition for cultural 
diversity and, at the same time, allow differences (which is argued to have been 
long overdue) within a framework of universal rights (Craig, Gordon & Burchardt, 
2008, p.234). The argument is that failure to recognise the differences that exist 
within the polity would undermine the rights of the individual and the group to 
which the identities are attached. Hence, the manner in which government or
15
states respond to that plurality signifies multiculturalism as a normative doctrine 
(Parekh, in Thompson, 1997, p.165).
Secondly, the demand for recognition of diversity emerged from the liberal- 
communitarian debate on the need for recognising the importance of cultural and 
religious identities or elements in the life of individuals. These two challenges, as 
we can put it, would then require recognition beyond the common rights to 
equality of individual citizenship recognised by liberal democracies, and such 
recognition would be accommodated or tolerated so as to fulfil the needs of these 
identities or minorities. Therefore, this resulted in the recognition of rights to 
equality as no longer limited to individuals, but as extended to the various social, 
cultural and religious groups and identities that exist within the polity of these 
states. This would lead to the question of what forms of cultural diversity should 
be accepted, and how should this be accommodated or tolerated to ensure that 
all individuals and communities are not being discriminated against, suppressed 
or oppressed. To accommodate and recognise such cultural diversity would be a 
challenging task, since different people have different preferences and adhere to 
different kinds of cultural and religious customs and mores. But the most vital 
challenge is to re-evaluate the notion of rights to equality which has been the 
basis of the debate over the years.
However, what comes to the centre of the debate when there is a demand 
to extend rights of equality to various groups and identities are the following: has 
the liberal democratic principle failed to accommodate and recognise the cultural 
diversity that exists within a democratic society? What makes such groups or
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cultural recognition vital? And are individual rights to equality, as propagated by 
liberal democracy, sufficient to recognise an individual’s rights to free and equal 
selection of cultural, religious and social identities and would such recognition of 
a group not be a denial of individual rights? Would it be that, to entertain such 
demand for recognition, would further segregate and compartmentalise society 
and thus disintegrate the nation state?
Nevertheless, multiculturalism scholars have argued that liberal 
democracy has, to a certain extent, failed to respond to the call for recognition of 
difference and diversity that exists within the polity of these liberal democratic 
societies. Such an argument has meant that liberal democracy is examined by 
multiculturalism scholars who are interested in ensuring that diversity is 
recognised. This has led multiculturalism scholars to justify the recognition of 
diversity within the liberal framework being extended to groups and other 
identities, through which the individual as a citizen is recognised as having 
significant human needs.
One important thing that led to the recognition of diversity within liberal 
societies is that it contributes to the development of liberal democracy itself as a 
dynamic, just, open and autonomous framework, to be further redefined to 
ensure its inclusiveness. This process of redefining has led liberal democracy to 
go beyond the focus on individual rights as the only acceptable form of human 
rights. It has triggered the consciousness of people as a cultural group or 
religious group to participate in political decision-making and thus demand more 
political and civil rights without their identity being discriminated against. Hence,
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such demands resulted in the three assertions of citizen rights - namely political, 
social and economic as the three vital elements of modern citizenship (Marshall, 
1950 cited by Verma, 2002, p.55).
Consequently, the demand for recognition of these identities highlights the 
importance of revisiting the classical liberal democratic framework adopted by 
liberal states in addressing these concerns and demands; that the framework be 
extended to all communities, especially where various cultural, religious and 
racial identities exist. This is because the notion of citizenship rights within the 
liberal democratic framework has been taken for granted as a platform that 
promotes the right to equality of all citizens, based on universal rights and so 
should be extended to groups. Therefore, what more could a liberal notion of 
citizenship rights offer other than a basket of identical rights for all its citizens. 
Unfortunately, such notions of citizenship undermined the diversity and 
differences of fellow members of society by assuming that rights of equality as 
the foundation of liberal democratic state are sufficient since all citizens are 
equal.
Therefore a way forward in addressing this concern of liberal democracy 
for cultural pluralism was mooted in order to determine the principles needed to 
govern a multicultural society. Multiculturalism scholars provided a justification for 
the recognition of the various communities that exist within the polities of these 
liberal democratic societies, based on the importance of culture in the life of 
individuals, as argued by the communitarians. The importance of the recognition 
of group rights in these liberal democratic societies paved the way to respecting,
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accommodating, tolerating and recognising the diversity of the various identities 
that exist within the polity of these societies. As a result of this, a more inclusive 
form of citizenship is demanded by multiculturalism scholars, which recognises 
the diversity and differences that exist within a liberal society. Multiculturalism 
scholars are concerned that the deprivation/non-recognition/misrecognition of 
certain identities within the liberal polity could inflict harm on the members of 
those communities and, as such, could be a form of oppression which could lead 
to a lack of self-esteem, or devaluation and seclusion of the self. This form of 
oppression is expressed by Taylor and Gutman (1994) as possibly leading to real 
damage of the self and that due recognition is required, not just as a courtesy, 
but as something that is a vital human need. Hence, this framework of 
recognising this diversity or difference has come to be defined as the politics of 
multiculturalism, politics of difference (Young, 1990), politics of recognition 
(Taylor and Gutman, 1994), multicultural citizenship (Kymlicka, 1995) or 
transnational citizenship (Baubock, 1992).
The politics of multiculturalism, which value recognition and respect for 
diversity and equality, must not, according to some scholars, be mistaken for the 
existence of plurality. Cultural plurality does not indicate that the values of 
multiculturalism prevail in society; instead we must probe further into the values 
of recognition and equality (Mahajan, 2002, p. 11). Nevertheless, what equality 
implies from a multicultural context is that respect and recognition should be 
extended to one’s origins, background or family, and that people have the 
capability to live and be what they choose, since due recognition is a vital human 
need (Taylor and Gutman, 1994, p.26). Such respect and recognition for
19
difference is to be recognised and supported in the public and private sphere of 
liberal democracies (Modood, 2009, p. 169). This is because to acknowledge the 
need for respect for difference and diversity is to recognise that citizens within 
liberal democracies subscribe to different systems of meaning and structure their 
lives differently (Parekh in Sardar, 2008, p.350). Such structures and meanings of 
life must not be discriminated against; in a democratic society, all cultural 
communities are entitled to equal status (Mahajan, 1999, p. 15) and, hence, 
multiculturalism argues that differences are not to be eliminated and washed 
away but to some extent recognised (Madood, 2007, p.39). Therefore, 
multiculturalism could also imply the proper type of relationship between different 
cultural communities in which these cultural communities possess their own 
distinct systems of meaning and significance (Parekh, 2006, p.13).
Multiculturalism and commitments to cultural diversity emerged out of this 
turbulent history of resistance, accommodation, integration and transformation 
(Goldberg, 1994, p.7). This conflict over the recognition of cultural diversity 
emerged as a result of colonialism and globalisation and the conscious move 
towards redefining democratic rule. Both colonialism and globalisation could be 
argued as processes that dilute identities and the victim would be, most likely, the 
identity of the minorities. Therefore, the demand for recognition and respect by 
the various communities is in line with the aspirations of liberal democracy that 
guarantees the rights of equality of its citizens, irrespective of colour, race or 
creed. The idea of liberal democracy, that no person is intrinsically superior to 
another and that all persons are of equal worth, guided the need for recognition 
of the various identities and communities (Song, 2007, p.43), thus ensuring the
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rights to equality as espoused by liberal democratic societies around the globe. 
However, in determining the rights to recognition, scholars differ in their views 
between the recognition of the rights of individuals and the rights of communities. 
As for Kymlicka (1995), the most significant argument in a multicultural state is 
the need to recognise a comprehensive theory of justice, which includes 
assigning universal rights to individuals, regardless of group membership, and 
also certain group-differentiated rights for the minority cultures. Hence Kymlicka 
has come up with a defence of multiculturalism as recognising minority rights 
within the liberal framework, as a response to nation-building and multiculturalism 
as communitarianism.
However, these group-differentiated rights should not in any way infringe 
individual rights. Nevertheless, such infringement of individual rights in some 
countries is being justified in the name of promoting inter-communal peace and 
harmony. Meanwhile, the argument for the importance of communal rights is due 
to the fact that it is important for cultural identities to be recognised, since it 
provides individuals with an anchor for self-identification (Margalit and Raz, 1990, 
p.447 cited by Mahajan, 2002, p.38; Kymlicka in Owen & Laden, 2007, p.27). The 
notion of citizenship in liberal democratic states should be able to recognise such 
diverse identities.
The notion of citizenship is the foundation of nation states, since it 
provides a framework for individuals to participate in a political community as 
equals, and equal citizenship is essential in developing a common sense of 
belonging (Parekh, 2000, p.54) since everyone feels that they are equally treated.
21
Moreover, citizenship provides the legal basis for the participation of its citizens 
by ensuring that all rights are equally distributed and no-one should be 
discriminated against on the basis of cultural, religious or ethnic identity. 
Therefore, the liberal notion of citizenship rests upon the appeal to universalism 
and ignores historic forms, especially ethnicity and race. This entails universal 
principles of citizenship in the public sphere, based on civil and political rights that 
allow a diversity of cultural practices, in turn based upon group loyalties and 
ethnic affinities in private matters (Verma, 2002, p.54). Thus, the need to 
incorporate respect and recognition for cultural diversity and difference within the 
framework of universal rights (Craig, Gordon and Burchardt, 2008, p.234) is 
significant in order to ensure that the communities concerned are protected from 
suffering, discrimination and marginalisation in these liberal societies.
In the political scene of today’s nation states, the demand for recognition is 
being voiced by the various cultural, religious and ethnic communities seeking 
some autonomy for their distinct traits as citizens. These overlapping concerns 
result in the social and political construct at play, including ethnicity, culture, and 
the majority versus minority binary, as each member refines his or her sense of 
self in relation to the multicultural environment (Barry, 2001, Kincheloe & 
Steinberg, 1997, Willet, 1998 cited by Raihanah, 2010, p.65). David Goldberg 
(1994) described the development taking place in multicultural societies as the 
struggle for representation, in which each member of the nation begins 
articulating his identity as possibilities for self-direction. Such struggles could be 
destabilising to unity and, consequently, could lead to the rise of ethno-nationalist 
separatist struggles which is evident in some states. This form of ethno-
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nationalist struggle would pose a challenge to the common homogenous 
orientation of these liberal democracies which require uniformity of political 
orientation and cultural homogeneity.
Furthermore, such demand for recognition would naturally indicate that the 
present liberal democratic arrangement is no longer able to confine rights to 
equality only to individuals but has to extend such rights to groups. Therefore, the 
recognition of group rights as an extension of individual rights would indicate the 
recognition of a multicultural citizenship within the polity of these states. The 
notion of a multicultural citizenship today indicates that citizenship requires not 
only loyalty or allegiance to the nation state alone, but that it also requires 
loyalties to cultural, religious and ethnic contingents, which is recognised through 
the concept of group rights. This is because a cultural community or identity has 
been used as a marker, differentiating one group from another and therefore 
used to define the attributes of ethnic group or race (Mukherji in Hassan, 2005,
p.186).
As a result of recognising this demand, the homogenous national cultural 
identity that defined legal citizenship in many countries where there was an
attempt to assimilate and accommodate ethnic and minority groups, is
disintegrating (Verma, 2002, p.53). Therefore, citizenship in its new orientation
will no longer be founded upon the basis of national sovereignty but will depend 
on a new international obligation (Andrews, 1991, p. 11 cited by Verma, 2002, 
p.53). This new obligation has stressed the need to view the politics of
multiculturalism as a vital element of nation-building, since multiculturalism which
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encourages cultural awareness and tolerance alone without intercultural or 
interculturalism cannot effectively foster national unity (Teck Gee and Gomez, 
2009, p.247). This is because the politics of multiculturalism argues that the 
importance of recognition of the various communities that exist within the polities 
provides the basis of recognising, not only similar treatment, but also differences. 
Therefore, the concept of nation-building no longer signifies only the importance 
of individual rights to equality but also group rights and thus rights to difference. 
This is vital, since recognition would not only see uniformity as complying with 
equality, but would also recognise that difference is vital too. Hence the 
development of the politics of multiculturalism complements the idea of nation- 
building, through which the various cultural communities are acknowledged and 
recognised. This is done as part of the state role in promoting a greater sense of 
belonging and also as a commitment towards its citizens.
As has been mentioned, the recognition of various cultural, religious and 
ethnic identities is relevant and vital in defining the nature of citizenship. The idea 
of multicultural citizenship, or differentiated citizenship, shows the importance of 
recognising the various cultural, religious and language identities as a significant 
marker of the diversity that exists in society. Hence the idea of citizenship, which 
traditionally denotes the equal recognition of all citizens, based on the classical 
liberal democratic principles of universal rights, could be prone to the subjugation 
and intolerance of the dominant ethno-nations towards the minority ethnic groups 
(Mukherji in Hassan, 2005, p. 184). Therefore, the argument that guaranteeing 
individual, civil and political rights within liberal democracies is sufficient to ensure 
freedom of worship, speech and association (HDR, 2004, p.7) could be
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misleading, since equality alone does not necessarily equate to similarity in 
addressing the demand for recognition. Furthermore, the argument that universal 
rights is a one-size-fits-all idea, sufficient to address group-specific minority rights 
(Kymlicka, 1995), and that cultural communities would be protected indirectly by 
guaranteeing basic civil and political rights to all individuals regardless of group 
membership, could be overestimated.
Therefore, the willingness of liberal democratic societies to extend what 
initially were individual rights to equality to groups is a good sign that culturally 
distinct groups are able to co-exist in a single society. This is because the reality 
of the present polity is that no society can any longer sustain its homogenous 
outlook and, like it or not, multiculturalism will be knocking on the door of 
societies around the globe.
1.2 Literature Review
1.2.1 The Multicultural Society and Challenges to Promoting Cultural Diversity
The literature on the development of a multicultural society, either in 
Western liberal democratic societies or non-Western multinational societies, 
centres on the need for the politics of recognition as a form of recognising the 
difference and diversity that exists within these societies. Nevertheless, this 
process of recognition would be a challenging task for multiculturalism scholars 
who are concerned about the promotion of diversity. This challenge would come 
from the attempt made by multiculturalism scholars to justify the politics of 
recognition as a form of recognising difference and diversity and hence
25
undermines the liberal notion of citizenship which has been guided by the right to 
equality of all citizens under the law. The reality of recognising difference is 
unavoidable, even if these states are some way away from recognising 
multiculturalism as a policy or official agenda. This is because, within these liberal 
polities, exists not only individual citizens with equal rights to equality, but also 
individuals who belong to certain group or communities which carry certain 
identities, or what is called the communitarian recognition of the importance of 
cultural identities in the life of individuals. The recognition of diversity of its 
members that exists within these liberal societies recognises that rights to 
equality would require the liberal framework to value and maintain such diversity. 
This principle of diversity is what multiculturalism scholars argue should be 
maintained while, at the same time, ensuring the equal recognition of culture 
without being subjected to any form of suppression or oppression.
Nevertheless, nation states have responded to the recognition of diversity 
with various forms of policy orientation. It is a fact that the nation state gives the 
utmost importance to the unity of its polity and its response towards cultural 
diversity, to a certain extent, views it as causing disintegration within the polity of 
the nation state. For this reason, historical events have proved that some 
governments have pursued various policy measures such as an assimilationist 
approach towards cultural diversity, while others might adopt an integrationist or 
accommodationist approach within the polity. Furthermore, in the worst case 
scenarios, ethnic cleansing became the policy orientation towards these cultural 
communities.
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However, coming back to the literature on multiculturalism, it has been 
identified that the formation of a present-day modern state or multicultural society 
could be attributed to two distinct patterns. Firstly, the formation of a multicultural 
society in Western liberal societies is attributed to the influx of immigrants, who 
brought along various cultural, religious and linguistic identities with them. These 
immigrants are often ‘here to stay’, and it is at this point the state would 
determine its policy orientation towards the immigrants. Nevertheless, the usual 
response of nation states towards these immigrants or newcomers would be the 
granting of citizenship with recognition of rights to equality of all its citizens. 
However, the recognition of these individuals as citizens within the polity of 
Western liberal societies initially ignored the identities which were being carried 
by or attached to these individuals, since these new members were guaranteed, 
as citizens, of rights to equality and citizenship. However, this guarantee of 
citizenship and rights to equality failed to recognise or acknowledge the 
importance of cultural, religious and racial markers that exist within the polity of 
these Western liberal societies. Therefore, acknowledging and recognising the 
failure of the rights to equality and citizenship to recognise the need for group 
recognition, multiculturalism scholars in these Western liberal democracies made 
a call for the recognition of a multicultural citizenship as a response to nation- 
building. The argument for a multicultural citizenship based on group- 
differentiated rights is vital for nurturing the commitment and sense of belonging 
of the individual and group citizens to the nation state.
As a result, these Western states had to realise the central place of 
cultural diversity in their polities (Goh and Holden, 2009, p.1). Therefore,
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multiculturalism scholars argued that Western liberal democracies should re­
examine the notion of citizenship and recognise the various cultural and religious 
beliefs that exist within the polities of these Western liberal societies. Hence, the 
term group-differentiated rights is justified and recognised under the notion of a 
multicultural citizenship which recognises the need to accommodate the various 
communities especially the minorities.
The second contribution to the formation of a multicultural society could be 
traced to the colonial period. However, the creation of postcolonial multicultural 
societies would only involve those states which witnessed heavy inflow of 
immigrants brought by the colonial powers, which caused a permanent 
transformation to the landscape of the particular state. Nevertheless, this colonial 
period witnessed the demographic transformation of previously mono-ethnic 
societies into pluralist societies with various cultural communities existing side by 
side and thus diluting the ethnic indigenous identities of the polity. Furthermore, 
the colonial legacy created racial division as a result of the influx of labour 
brought in by the colonial powers. As a result, this division of labour resulted in 
the transformation of the social, economic and political landscape and the 
racialisation of the social, economic and political sphere of postcolonial societies 
(Fraser, 1996, p.80), creating a socio-economic identification based on race or 
ethnicity. Therefore, the challenges faced by postcolonial multicultural societies 
could be argued to be greater since they face determining the form of policy 
orientation towards recognising the various cultural, racial and religious 
heterogeneity, and the principles needed to govern this newly-formed 
multicultural society, as the polity is not yet stable or mature.
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Moreover, the socio-economic disparity between the communities, 
especially between the indigenous population and the immigrants of postcolonial 
multicultural societies, would later pose a challenge to the nation-building process 
as a result of the identification based on economic function. Therefore, the 
argument in these postcolonial societies is that the absence of a mature and 
stable polity caused greater challenges for the accommodation and recognition of 
a multicultural polity. This is because the first issue of concern to postcolonial 
multicultural societies is the harmonisation of inter-ethnic cooperation, unlike 
those Western liberal societies where the polity is more stable and mature. As 
such, the development of multiculturalism, to a certain extent, is viewed by 
postcolonial multicultural societies as a Western creation to be imposed upon 
postcolonial states, whereby multiculturalism scholars treat their examination of 
the Western liberal societies as the privileged point of entry to the discussion 
(Hefner, 2001, p.3). From here, scholars began making a comparison with 
multicultural polities of postcolonial societies, without first recognising the 
underlying challenges left by the colonial legacy. Hence, such orientation would 
undermine the cultural plurality of many postcolonial societies, which possess 
their own history of pluralist challenges and their own way of tackling or devising 
formulae for their resolution (Hefner, 2001, p.3). Therefore the significant 
historical difference between postcolonial states and Western liberal societies 
should not be underestimated in determining the political formulae which address 
the problem of multiculturalism and citizenship in these two worlds. However, the 
most crucial interest of multiculturalism scholars is the extent to which society
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meets the norms of justice, individual freedom and deliberative democracy in 
these two worlds (Hefner, 2001, p.3).
For Western liberal societies, the argument among liberal scholars is to 
recognise difference and maintain diversity by extending rights to equality to the 
group which is to go against the classical liberal tradition which has always 
recognised and upheld the rights to equality of individuals. Such a difference is 
only being recognised within the private sphere of the individual. Hence, scholars 
have argued for a more expanded definition of the liberal tradition to recognise 
the equality of groups, since individual members are attached to a particular 
cultural, religious or linguistic group that requires such an extension of rights to 
equality.
Therefore, the first step taken by the multiculturalism scholar is to justify 
the need for the liberal principle to be extended to group recognition within the 
polity of liberal states. This needs to be done, since for the homogenous 
orientation of the liberal nation state, recognising the rights to equality of 
individuals was the way to ensure the success of the nation-building process 
through the uniform notion of citizenship. In addition, to see the idea of a uniform 
citizenship promoted by the state is to view nation-building as an integrative 
solution to incorporate its subjects as citizens of a modern national community 
(Canovan, 1996, p. 109). The outcome of this idea of uniform citizenship was to 
produce a national identity which normally originates from a single cultural or 
ethnic group (Yong, 2004, p.4). Nevertheless, this nation-building process can be 
argued to mobilise individual citizens behind the banner of nationhood by
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assimilating the minorities and thus denying the minorities of their rights to the 
cultural, religious and other form of identity recognition. Furthermore, such an 
assimilation approach could trigger an extreme response of separatism and the 
mobilisation of ethnocentrism, if suppression continues.
The arguments for multiculturalism came as a response to the central 
position of cultural diversity recognised in the polity of Western liberal societies. 
Such a response poses a challenge to classical liberal principles: firstly, by not 
being able to recognise diversity or difference that exist within its polity. Secondly, 
liberal democracies, some multiculturalism scholars argue, have a tendency to 
assimilate minorities into the majority or dominant culture in the public sphere. 
The concerns of these scholars would indicate the failure of liberal democratic 
principles to comprehend certain demands for recognition of diversity and 
difference. Such a failure of liberal democracies would cause injustice, as clearly 
stated by Taylor (1992), in which non-recognition or misrecognition is viewed as 
having a detrimental effect and as a form of oppression by imprisoning someone 
in a false, distorted, reduced mode of being. Such lack of respect towards 
minorities could inflict a grievous wound, saddling people with crippling self- 
hatred. Due recognition is not just a courtesy but a vital human need. 
Furthermore, the failure of liberalism to be a meeting point for all cultures would 
give the impression that, in fact, liberalism is the expression of a particular culture 
and thus would undermine difference and diversity (Taylor, 1992).
As such, liberal democracy has indeed failed to recognise the identification 
of cultural attachments of individuals and minorities that are significant to their
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well-being and development. At the same time, such expression of a particular 
culture is an indicator that liberal democracies are not neutral and unbiased 
towards any cultural, racial or religious preference. Indirectly, liberal democracies 
are inevitably inclined to promote the cultural identity of the majority, consciously 
or unconsciously. This is prevalent through, for instance, the promotion of the 
language of the majority, in which all citizens must have a level of command of 
the language in order to be recognised. As such, the effectiveness of state 
neutrality as propagated by liberalism is questioned by multiculturalism scholars. 
Scholars are equally sceptical of its receptiveness to the recognition of difference 
and diversity, even though its orientation is intended to ensure equal recognition 
of cultural, racial or religious groups.
In view of this, multiculturalism scholars in Western democracies have come 
to the defence of a liberal theory of minority rights that would recognise the 
minorities. Such a defence for minority rights indicates the sceptical view that 
multiculturalism scholars have of the liberal idea of identity as colour, gender or 
religion blind (Modood, 2009, p.176). Their argument is that liberal notions of 
citizenship have to recognise that rights to equality must not require uniform 
treatment of citizens, since citizens belong or are attached to a certain social 
group of identities. The idea of liberalism having to recognise a minority right 
would, in fact, be doing justice to the minorities in order to ensure and promote 
equality within the polities of the state. This is done within the multiculturalism 
context that promotes the politics of recognition and the politics of equality 
through group-differentiated rights (Kymlicka, 1995). The justification for such 
group-differentiated rights would justify the existence of a multicultural citizenship
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that is sensitive to the diversity and difference that exists within the polity of 
liberal democracies.
Therefore the justification for rights to equality to be extended to groups is 
part of the recognition of diversity that exists within the polity of the liberal states. 
However, the concern that arises from such recognition is that it would be in 
contradiction to the liberal principle which recognises individuals with equal rights 
under the law. Nevertheless, liberal scholars admit that denying the group rights 
to equality is also another form of misrecognition of the individual’s rights to their 
group attachment, identities and sentiments. Hence, the nature of citizenship has 
first to be understood as no longer homogeneous in its orientation. Based on this 
premise Kymlicka (1995) argued for the recognition of a multicultural citizenship 
within the liberal societal context, based on group-differentiated rights as minority 
rights. Through group-differentiated rights, Kymlicka demanded that, for the 
minorities to flourish, the state has to ensure that legal and political arrangements 
are designed to ensure that minorities are not being disadvantaged or 
discriminated against.
A group-specific right or a collective right, according to Kymlicka (1995), 
does not contradict the aspiration of liberalism if it aims at providing external 
protection to the minorities. Such external protection for vulnerable minorities 
would ensure that their interests are protected. In fact, collective rights demand 
that liberalism shows sensitivity towards minorities, especially the national 
minorities. However, one important concern that needs to be highlighted is that, 
even when group-specific rights are recognised, this should not in any way
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obstruct the individual freedom of members of the minorities, something that 
Kymlicka considers vital. This is because the idea of group-differentiated rights 
could be interpreted or perceived as being collectivist or communitarian in its 
outlook, and thus would contradict the aspirations of liberal orientation in terms of 
individual freedom and equality (Kymlicka, 1995, p.34). There is no doubt that 
group rights or collective rights are, by definition, not individual rights (Kymlicka, 
1995, p.45). However, the actual concern of multiculturalism scholars is not about 
examining the autonomous individual or communitarian debate but about the idea 
that justice between groups requires that members of different groups be 
accorded different rights (Kymlicka, 1995, p.47), since liberalism is blind to such 
differences. Nonetheless, the idea of differentiated rights, in the long run, is to 
ensure that minorities are able to integrate into mainstream society by giving 
these minorities effective control of their private autonomous cultural 
determinations and expressions at the socio-cultural margins, while maintaining a 
separate and neutral set of common values that would mediate the majority- 
minority relations at the centre (Goldberg, 1994, p.6).
The idea of a multicultural citizenship or differentiated citizenship within a 
liberal multicultural society or state (Kymlicka, 1995; Young, 1994) is to promote 
a minority rights approach, together with universal rights. Furthermore, the idea of 
multicultural citizenship is a vital part of addressing the issue of social justice 
which is at the centre of democratic citizenship (Modood, 2007). However, for 
scholars such as Kymlicka (1995), the recognition of cultural membership is a 
vital element in determining and contributing to the sense of identity. This is 
because cultural membership provides meaningful representation that identifies
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the uniqueness of the community. However, it is important to note that while 
cultural membership is recognised as giving a meaningful sense of identity, it 
must not limit individual freedom. Cultural membership and minority rights are 
valuable only if they do not restrict individual freedom, and the individual is 
considered to be the highest agent of the community that can contribute to the 
meaningful existence of the community. Therefore, the multicultural citizenship 
promoted by Kymlicka (1995) indicates that recognition of the individual alone 
would be insufficient, since these individuals are attached to the respective 
cultural membership, and that individuality is the product of social practices.
Meanwhile, the neutrality of liberal democracies is disputed by 
multiculturalism scholars, and assimilation to the dominant culture is inevitable. 
For example, multiculturalism scholars argue that the adoption of a common 
language, which is the language of the majority, is inevitable in order to ensure 
integration in all aspects, including the administration of state affairs. The 
important role played by language in integrating the citizens of states would 
ensure unity and solidarity. As such, state neutrality is unattainable and therefore 
it is vital for liberal democracies to form or adopt a common set of cultural values 
that would be recognised as essential for unity and solidarity and which, at the 
same time, would not undermine minority rights. The formation of a societal 
culture as suggested by Kymlicka (1995) is nevertheless crucial in ensuring the 
existence of a common understanding that would form the basis for integrating 
members of society, while at the same time respecting difference and diversity.
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Since multiculturalism scholars recognise that there is no absolute neutrality 
within the liberal framework, they would also have to admit that there is no single 
way of addressing minority rights. As such, Parekh (2000) suggested that 
operative public values should be adopted by multicultural states. Such public 
values are articulated within the constitution, laws and civic values of these 
societies. Furthermore, operative public values would provide a good avenue for 
dialogue in which various values are brought into a creative interplay and 
balanced with a trade-off that would yield responses to help in overcoming issues 
or disputes. The same orientation in a cultural dialogue that would result in 
productive cultural exchange through interaction, would resolve intercultural 
conflict, as supported by Seyla Benhabib (Young, cited in Laden and Owen, 
2008, p.78).
Furthermore, the basis for a set of differentiated rights is argued by 
multiculturalism scholars as recognising individual uniqueness and humanity 
(Taylor and Gutman, 1994, p.9) within the context of cultural distinctiveness. This 
is due to the interest that individuals have in culture, which gives meaning to the 
existence of the individual and thus enables them to possess a sense of 
belonging. As Taylor and Gutman (1994) argue, recognition of cultural 
particularity is vital to the individual and community, since identity is shaped by 
such recognition. The misrecognition of individuals or groups could be 
demeaning and potentially seen as a form of oppression of the individual. Within 
this argument of cultural individuality, the essence of dignity gained from the 
recognition received from the state is vital. Such recognition of cultural identity 
would signify the importance of cultural characteristics attached to the individual
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and the group. Furthermore, according to Taylor, recognising the demand for 
equal rights and entitlements avoids any inference that the society is divided into 
first and second classes. All citizens would be considered as having moral worth 
and equal dignity. Within this context of demand for recognition is what Taylor 
calls the politics of multiculturalism. The significance of cultural recognition has 
also been illustrated by Axel Honneth (Fraser, cited in Willet, 1998, p.22), in 
which the integrity of a person or community is reflected through the approval or 
recognition of other people. Misrecognition would be injurious since it would 
impair these persons in their positive understanding of self.
Recognition of the cultural rights of minorities in liberal democratic states 
would also ensure that other forms of inequality or unjust approaches are 
appropriately addressed. The concerns raised by multiculturalism scholars raise 
the question: is multiculturalism too focused on or restricted to the need to 
address cultural injustices that result in other areas? Therefore, multiculturalism 
scholars further extended multiculturalism to other areas, aside from recognising 
cultural diversity within the liberal context. Such an extension would provide an 
opportunity to confront issues concerning race, socio-economic class, gender, 
language, culture, sexual preference or disability (Kincheloe and Steinberg, 1997, 
p. 1), that pose a challenge to liberal democracies. The idea that discrimination is 
rooted in the failure to recognise cultural diversity is insufficient. Hence 
multiculturalism scholars such as Young (1990) and Fraser (2003) have further 
anticipated the need for liberal democratic states to address the issue of 
structural injustice and the politics of difference, and also the question of 
recognition and redistribution that is vital in recognising the needs of minorities.
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This is because liberalism has failed to recognise structural injustice and there is 
also the false claim of neutrality propagated by the liberal concept. Therefore, the 
idea put forward by Young is that the politics of difference would require liberal 
democratic states to accept the fact that identifying equality with equal treatment 
has caused deep material differences in social positions to be neglected (Young, 
cited in Laden and Owen, 2007, p.60). Furthermore, conflict over cultural 
toleration and accommodation in contemporary liberal democracies occurs within 
the context of structural inequality between the dominant majority and minorities 
(Young, 2007, cited in Laden and Owen, p.82). Such conflict does not restrict 
freedom of expression and association, but substantively expands equal 
opportunity for individuals from marginalised groups to develop and exercise their 
capacities, and to have a meaningful voice in the governance of the institutions 
whose roles and policies condition their lives.
As for Fraser (2003), the issue of recognition of cultural diversity is being 
challenged by the need for redistribution and concentration of cultural 
misrecognition, which has resulted in the failure to recognise other forms of 
injustices, such as socioeconomic redistribution. According to Fraser (1993), the 
root of the injustice would be socioeconomic misdistribution, while any attendant 
cultural injustices will derive ultimately from that economic root. It was argued that 
the importance of recognition of minorities should be extended to the 
redistribution of the socioeconomic injustices rooted in the political and economic 
structure of society (Fraser, 2003, p.70). Fraser adds that the problem of justice 
could be rectified through recognition, and that the strategy in addressing the 
claim for recognition is through redistribution. While some scholars such as Barry
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would maintain the idea of liberal universalism, some suggest that cultural 
diversity and the call for recognition ought to be ignored, since cultural 
attachment is a personal preference that should be left to individuals (Laden and 
Owen, 2007, p. 15). As for Wieviorka (1998), the multiculturalism context must not 
be limited to the recognition of cultural groups alone. This is to avoid the constant 
danger that, if multiculturalism is limited to culture alone, it will disappear as a 
policy in the service of groups which are already well situated socially. Therefore, 
it must be part of a wider policy that combines both social and cultural issues, 
since cultural recognition could be undermined if the cultural group is socially 
neglected (Wieviorka, 1998, pp.904-5).
While some scholars are sceptical of the modern liberal orientation, 
Kukathas (1998) argues that the classical liberal tradition would not be 
problematic for multiculturalism. This is because the liberal tradition, contends 
Kukathas, is a theory of multiculturalism that promotes cultural diversity or 
pluralism. Kukathas argues that liberalism does not engage in any activity of 
recognising or accommodating any particular culture, religion or language except 
securing peace within the political society (1998, p.696). Therefore, it is not in the 
interests of the state to promote, protect or provide any form of recognition to 
other cultural communities - especially the minorities - as long as individuals and 
groups are able to function peacefully; this is what concerns liberalism. The 
promotion of justice is vital to ensure that freedom is secured and that no-one is 
prevented from practising their cultural, religious or language identity. As such, 
liberalism to Kukathas (1998, p.691) would reflect the politics of indifference 
rather than the politics of difference in a multicultural society. Nevertheless,
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Kukathas does not deny the inclination of liberal states to promote certain 
practices or the cultural aspirations of the majority but this is done to provide unity 
within the public sphere of these societies, as long as the freedom of individuals 
to choose what constitutes the good life is not harmed.
Some scholars are sceptical of the multicultural orientation, in which it is 
argued that, since multiculturalism is concerned with the recognition of cultural 
difference and diversity, one must not strain the commitment of liberal practices 
to recognising or tolerating illiberal practices (Barry, 2001). This is because, 
argues Barry, the liberal principle should recognise and uphold individual rights 
rather than cultural diversity and it is this notion that multiculturalists actually 
highly regard. Nevertheless, the view that the liberal tradition is confined to the 
recognition of the individual’s right to equality alone, could be argued as 
restricting the right of the individual to choose or to be identified with certain 
identities which give meaning to the self.
Just as the literature on multiculturalism within Western liberal 
democracies witnessed the justification and probing of the classical liberal 
tradition and its notion of citizenship, so the literature in postcolonial states is 
heavily influenced by the historical developments which took place during the 
colonial period which affected the liberal notion of its multicultural polity. The 
argument is that the polity of postcolonialism is facing the challenge of grasping 
the need to either maintain the existing cultural plurality which has existed since 
colonial days, or to coerce all the cultural identities within the polity in pursuit of 
nation-building. This is evident from the experiences of countries such as
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Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia, grappling with the recognition of its 
multicultural polity. For this reason, the decision as to whether to accommodate 
or coerce the cultural plurality has yet to be taken, since the polity of postcolonial 
states is yet to be fully developed socially, politically and economically, unlike in 
Western liberal societies where liberal traditions have been in the background 
waiting to recognise and provide justification for the recognition of a multicultural 
polity. Postcolonial societies, however, are occupied with attending to more vital 
needs such as economic development, stability, peace and order and in such a 
pursuit, the liberal concept of recognition, to a certain extent, is being limited or 
controlled.
Hence, an historical understanding of the colonial legacy is therefore 
essential, as multiculturalism represents a spectrum of multiple ambiguities that 
are highly dependent on the historical and socio-political peculiarities of specific 
state formations (Gunew, 2004, p.40). As mentioned earlier, the formation of the 
heterogeneous polity or pluralist society in postcolonial states contributed to the 
colonial legacy, which resulted in the formation of a racialised, segregated and 
compartmentalised societal structure that is still visible today. This historical 
insight is vital in providing the understanding of both the formation of a 
multicultural society and the notion of citizenship adopted in these postcolonial 
states, and the approaches or framework adopted in accommodating the 
minorities.
However, the biggest challenge for these postcolonial states was in 
accommodating or recognising the various divisions existing within their polity
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before independence could be granted. In fact for some postcolonial states, it 
was a prerequisite set before independence could be granted that the various 
ethnic groups were recognised through political representation. Since 
postcolonial states had been structured racially, ethno-nationalist movements 
became the prime mover for liberation from colonial rule, and there was a notion 
that an ethnic group had a divine or natural right to a definite geographical area; 
this provides primordialism with a defining factor to be used for unification 
purposes (Kee Beng, 2009, p.451). Such a strong presence of ethnocentrism 
would breed ethnocentrism in others (Kee Beng, 2009, p.449), and this has 
prevailed in postcolonial states up until today. Ethnocentrism, along with 
primordialism, would also influence the liberal response to be adopted in these 
postcolonial states, which would witness an undermining of individual rights. The 
undermining of individual rights indicated a clear recognition of the cultural 
marker represented by ethnic groups and, to an extent, justifies the multicultural 
set-up in postcolonial states. Nevertheless, the use of such cultural markers to 
highlight the celebration of a multicultural set-up could be misleading, since the 
arrangement of such recognition skewed the multicultural orientation of 
recognising the right to equality of both individual citizens and groups.
The colonial legacy that contributed to the formation of a pluralist society, 
as described by Furnivall (1956), poses a challenge to managing inter-ethnic 
relations in these postcolonial states. This is because these societies, which were 
once homogenous, underwent a forced heterogeneity face-lift under colonial rule 
with the influx of migrant workers (Raihanah, 2009, p.64), who brought with them 
their respective social and cultural heritages. At the same time, the colonisers
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made no attempt to help to integrate the diverse populace (Hefner, 2001; 
Shamsul Amri, 2000, cited in Raihanah, 2009, p.64). The absence of integration 
efforts led to the formation of enclave communities or a compartmentalised 
society (Hefner, 2001, p.19; Yunas Samad, 1997, cited in Raihanah, 2009, p.64) 
that had little or no common will (Furnivall, 1956, cited in Raihanah, 2009, p.64). 
Questions of whose culture should be recognised, and what approach or 
framework should be adopted for recognising minorities, are pertinent to the 
debate on the formation of newly independent states. This challenge could be 
added to that of the need for acknowledgement and recognition arising from the 
presence of various nations2 under colonial rule. This is because, during the 
colonial period, the existence of various cultural communities was not restricted 
by the colonial masters but was, in fact, welcomed, and thus they permitted all 
cultural communities to maintain their identity. This would create a contest 
between the indigenous and immigrants whereby the indigenous would argue 
that the overflow of immigrants resulted in the dilution of the indigenous nation 
state, along with its indigenous identity.
However, the biggest dilemma or challenge faced by postcolonial states is 
how to recognise, accommodate and tolerate plurality within a notion of 
citizenship that has existed since the colonial period. The formation of the nation 
state would be contested by these various cultural communities who were 
demanding recognition or, in other words, the contest between the indigenous 
population and immigrants. As for the indigenous population, the argument for
2 Colonial rule saw the existence o f cultural diversity in the pluralist society as witnessed by Furnivall. As such, 
for postcolonial states, the challenge was to accommodate the various nations that were previously formed 
during the colonial period. The term ‘ nation’ is used since each ethnic group was autonomous to their own 
cultural, religious and linguistic identity.
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recognition of indigenousness is of importance in order to retain the polity of 
indigenous nation state and that the polity after independence should recognise 
this indigenousness. For the immigrants, the recognition of their cultural identities 
was vital to their continuity from the colonial period and these immigrant 
communities would want such assurance after independence was gained.
Nevertheless, this overlapping struggle would lead to the politics of 
recognition which multiculturalism scholars consider vital for cultural 
communities, especially the minorities (Taylor, 1994 cited by Raihanah, 2009, 
p.65). Furthermore, the contest is further escalated since there is an absence of a 
unifying or integrating factor left by the colonisers. As such, when independence 
was gained, it created a space for the contest of politics between members of 
competing ethnic communities who did not feel that they enjoyed the feeling of 
being part of a joint nation (Raihanah, 2009, p.65).
Hence, non-Western multinational societies which had experienced 
communal separatism or isolationism, now had to embark on a journey of 
national unity and integration while, at the same time, having to face the 
challenge to accommodate and recognise other identities and communities. 
Furthermore, the communal separatism, along with the development of ethno- 
nationalist movements in these postcolonial states, would also pose another 
challenging task to integration. These ethno-nationalists would demand that the 
culture of the majority was recognised, since it was absent during colonial rule. 
Moreover, the failure of the colonisers to integrate these communities has caused
44
further difficulties in the aim of creating a common understanding for unity and 
integration.
Unlike in Western liberal democracies where the dominant culture has 
existed within its polity and where the issue of recognition was more from a need 
to respond to the upholding of liberal democratic principles, postcolonial states 
have to contend with recognising various identities on one side, and ensuring 
integration on the other, since a totally a new polity is formed after gaining 
independence. Therefore, the orientation of non-Western multinational states in 
integrating and recognising the various identities and communities would differ 
from one state to another in their pursuit of nation-building; some would adopt an 
assimilationist policy and some an accommodationist/integrationist policy.
Nevertheless, the multicultural polity in the non-Western multinational 
states faces a greater task of dismantling racial identification within its polity. This 
is due to the fact that cultural diversity in postcolonial societies has been 
recognised through the context of race-based identities. Although cultural 
identities have been paramount, the issue of recognition of equality of these 
cultural identities has resulted in the strengthening of racial or ethnic 
consciousness. Hence, the effort of recognising the equality of cultural identities 
had a contradictory effect in some postcolonial societies. This is evident in 
postcolonial societies when the state implemented affirmative action programmes 
for a particular ethnic group at the expense of equal or fair treatment for other 
cultural identities.
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1.2.2 Multiculturalism within the Liberal Framework
Liberalism has been celebrated as the theoretical framework which gave 
primacy to freedom, equality, rights and the autonomous individual self. Hence 
this made liberalism accepting of diversity, plurality of culture and religion. It is 
therefore contested whether there is a need to recognise diversity of culture, 
religion, race, indigenous and minority identities, since to what extent does this 
promotion and celebration of diversity under a liberal framework ensure that all 
cultural, religious, and racial identities exist and are recognised equally
Nevertheless, such recognition of diversity would witness the liberal theory 
to be defined as accommodating and tolerating the politics of difference, politics 
of recognition, liberal-egalitarian multiculturalism, multicultural constitutionalism, 
dialogical multiculturalism and libertarian multiculturalism, which signifies the 
justification for group rights, differentiated citizenship or multicultural citizenship 
by multiculturalists. However, such a view by multiculturalists is argued to be 
associated with a retreat from the enlightenment principles of reason and 
universality, with a commitment to preserving cultural diversity at the expense of 
liberalism’s most fundamental commitment to individual rights and the moral 
equality of all human beings (Murphy, 2012, p.3). This is mooted by the fact that 
liberalism, in its celebration of rights to equality, and the state, as providing a 
neutral arena, had actually resulted in the exclusion, marginalisation and 
assimilation of the minorities within the liberal polity. As a result of this, a more 
inclusive form of citizenship is demanded by multiculturalism scholars which 
recognises the diversity and differences that exist within the liberal society. A 
need for an inclusive citizenship would then require the liberal notion of
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citizenship to be re-evaluated. Multiculturalism scholars are concerned that the 
deprivation/non-recognition/misrecognition of certain identities within the liberal 
polity could inflict harm on the members of the communities and is a form of 
oppression and suppression, which could lead to a lack of self-esteem, 
devaluation and seclusion of the self. This form of oppression is expressed by 
Taylor (1994) as potentially leading to real damage of the self and that due 
recognition is not just as a courtesy but as something that should not be denied 
as a vital human need. This politics of recognition (Taylor, 1994) is essential; it 
provides meaningful existence, since the existence of the individuals within the 
social, cultural, religious and communal group is shaped by recognition.
The question of multiculturalism arises out of the liberal-communitarian 
debate which argues that liberalism fails to recognise the diversity that exists 
within the liberal state. This is because for the communitarian, cultural identities 
have a significant role in the life of individuals and the liberal state has 
undermined this factor by assuming that the political community is a culturally 
homogenous nation state. Such an assumption would question the idea of 
modern societies as being culturally, religiously and socially diverse, and that 
cultural pluralism is a fact that cannot be denied. Hence, multiculturalism within 
the liberal framework could be argued to be defined as the politics of recognition, 
the politics of redistribution or the politics of minority rights, in which all processes 
of recognition are aimed to provide a justification for a differentiated type of 
recognition within the liberal framework or, in other words, equal rights does not 
mean equal or similar treatment.
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Therefore, when recognition for group identities was raised within the 
liberal concept, it was argued by the communitarians that the primacy of the 
community or group should be recognised. This is because the meaning and self- 
worth of the individual is constructed through the identities or traits recognised by 
the community. As such, this primacy of the community became the social thesis 
of the communitarian argument. This is due to the fact that cultural identities are 
important to recognise, since they provide individuals with an anchor for self- 
identification (Margalit and Raz, 1990, p.447 cited by Mahajan, 2002, p.38) and 
confer identity on the individuals (Parekh, 1999; Young, 1999). Moreover, these 
social, cultural and religious identities form part of the identities which are 
constructed within the individual self (Young, 1990) and, therefore, due 
recognition should be given to such social groups or identities, since such groups 
are represented by equal, free and autonomous individuals. Modood (2010) and 
Parekh (1999) argue that these cultural identities have a anchoring factor that 
should not be misrecognised since it provides moral strength to the individuals; 
the recognition of culture within the liberal concept is vital since these cultural 
identities are considered as a way of life that has normative authority and is 
binding upon the individual to an extent which simply cannot be denied or 
undermined. At the same time, a culture structures its members’ perpetual and 
moral world, gives meaning to their activities and relationships, and helps make 
sense of their existence. Furthermore, it promotes the well-being of individuals by 
giving a sense of rootedness from which identities are derived, making each 
identity unique (Raz, 1994).
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As for Kymlicka (1995), the significance of cultural identities is in providing 
autonomy to the individual. This is because culture provides a moral value to the 
individual’s significance and autonomous life since it is an intergenerational 
community, more or less institutionally complete, occupying a given territory or 
homeland, sharing a distinct language and history (Kymlicka, 1995, p.18). From 
Kymlicka’s recognition of cultural identities as providing an autonomous life, the 
liberal concept of the individual, according to Kymlicka, is having the autonomy to 
decide a ‘good life’ within the community and, at the same time, an external 
protection is recognised in order to avoid coercion of the community. Therefore, 
for the external protection of the community and for rights to equal recognition 
within the liberal concept, Kymlicka (1995) responded with the idea of group- 
differentiated rights. Hence, such an argument for multiculturalism within the 
liberal concept must witness the autonomy of the individual self within the 
community which has provided a moral basis.
Nevertheless, in discussing the recognition of cultural diversity as 
propagated by multiculturalism within the liberal framework, multiculturalism 
scholars have argued over which path liberalism should take in recognising the 
significance of diversity and autonomy within the polity to avoid multiculturalism 
from being labelled as promoting division, compartmentalisation and social 
disintegration. Some scholars would argue that the liberal framework has 
provided a space for the recognition of autonomy which presides in the individual 
self to make choices as to the selection of cultural, social and religious identity 
while, for some scholars, it is the recognition of the diversity over autonomy which 
is important, since liberalism should reflect that there is diversity that exists within
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the liberal polity and that people are not coerced into being part of the dominant 
culture.
The debate among multiculturalism scholars is to what extent the liberal 
democratic principle can recognise the various identities that exist within the 
polity of liberal democratic states. This is because all modern liberal democratic 
societies, which have equal recognition of citizenship rights under the liberal 
notion, have come to terms with the fact that, within the polity, various identities 
exist that are marked by diversity and difference, be they social, religious, cultural 
or communal. Nevertheless, these various diversities and differences pose a 
challenge for the liberal framework in recognising these identities within a single 
polity. Such recognition, as some would argue, would disintegrate the liberal 
polity, stripping its ideal of recognition of rights to equality of all citizens, and give 
rise to a conflicting and problematic polity.
Multiculturalism scholars have to justify the need to recognise cultural, 
religious or communal diversity, and why it matters. For this purpose, a 
multiculturalism scholar would probe the sensitivity of the liberal framework 
regarding the recognition of cultural diversity through a policy framework and an 
institutional arrangement as an empirical justification for recognising and 
tolerating cultural diversity. The classic liberal framework imagines individuals as 
separate, atomised selves, de-linked from their cultural context; it sees 
individuals as autonomous persons whose moral agency lies in their ability to 
make choices (Mahajan, 2002, p.37). The classic liberal democratic principles 
adopted by liberal states provide both the highest level of freedom to the
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individual and the autonomy of the self to choose and make decisions that suit 
the individual self. Such emphasis on individual freedom to choose the concept of 
a good life within liberal societies provides autonomy for a person to express a 
social, cultural, religious or ethnic identity that is not the concern of the state.
However, the argument for liberalism to recognise the importance of such 
cultural or religious identities associated to individuals is because liberalism 
regards highly the basic values of liberty, equality, rights, neutrality and autonomy 
attached to individuals, as stipulated within the notion of citizenship. As a result of 
this it would provide the individual, as a citizen within the liberal state, moral 
worth and dignity within these societies. This is to recognise that cultural, 
religious and communal groups provide meaning and significance to the 
existence of the individual and thus creates diversity within the polity. At the same 
time, the individual who is considered to be free, equal and autonomous within 
the liberal framework could be detached from cultural, religious and social 
groups, indicating that the equal, free and autonomous self is still highly regarded 
as the end to all the means of recognition.
Since the liberal notion of citizenship has been viewed sceptically in its 
failure to attend to identities which are not considered to be part of the liberal 
tradition, it is therefore vital for multiculturalism scholars to justify the need for a 
more inclusive form of citizenship. This is to ensure that cultural, social and 
religious differences are recognised and tolerated. This form of inclusive 
citizenship is still being guided by the universal principle, but there is a need for a 
differentiated approach, compared to the original notion of citizenship. This
51
because such differentiated citizenship (Lister, 1998 cited by Squires in Kelly, 
2002, p.116) would also include those cultural identities which have been ignored 
by liberal traditions. However, in order to ensure that these cultural, religious and 
communal identities are recognised within the liberal polity, there is a need for a 
group-differentiated set of rights within this notion of multicultural citizenship 
(Kymlicka, 1995). This is to ensure that due recognition for these identities or 
communities is acknowledged within the liberal polity by an institutional structure 
or constitutional design. In return, this arrangement would provide the individual 
with the internal freedom within the social, religious and cultural identities while, 
at the same time, these religious, social and cultural identities are being protected 
externally.
For Rawls (1993), the liberal framework has to first ensure that justice is 
the most crucial principle which needs to be promoted within the polity. This is 
vital to the liberal framework since justice ensures the rights, liberty and 
autonomy of all its citizens. By providing a just polity it could also ensure that the 
problems of inequality of wealth and distributive justice were overcome. Rawls 
also argued that the state as a neutral entity must be free from providing or 
determining the concept of good; this argument by Rawls had actually excluded 
or undermined the importance of cultural diversity, even though justice could be 
the basis of promoting diversity. Nevertheless, a liberal framework, by promoting 
justice, could be justified as focusing more on the individual free, equal and 
autonomous principles, uniformly applied within the society, and thus would not 
be able to accommodate or tolerate differential treatment (Parekh, 2006, p.90).
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The liberal concept, multiculturalism scholars argue, also fails to ensure 
the unequal power relationship that exists within the liberal polity. Since this 
would lead to imbalances and disparity between cultural communities, and would 
affect the moral worth of the community, multiculturalism scholars have
highlighted the need of the liberal concept to recognise the rights to equal 
opportunity. This is vital since opportunity is socially constructed; social groups 
provide the context in which our identities are shaped and hence, the way the
social group is treated within the liberal polity has a bearing on the treatment of
the individuals that identifies with a given group. This would definitely be 
interpreted as creating a juxtaposition between the advantaged and the 
disadvantaged. Hence, the need for a redistributive action plan to overcome this 
and ensure equality of opportunity within the liberal concept is justified (Young, 
1990; Fraser 2003) so as to ensure group proportionality.
The sceptical view that scholars of multiculturalism have towards
liberalism is contributed to by the fact that cultural discrimination and 
misrecognition has remained unattended to, and thus undermines difference and 
cultural diversity. For Western liberal democracies, the importance of defending 
the fundamental rights of an individual’s freedom and equality, propagated by 
liberalism, would be the ultimate principle to be recognised, and that state 
neutrality would provide the means for such freedom and equality. The universal 
principle that each individual is to be treated equally without discrimination, 
irrespective of colour, sex, religion, or social status is paramount. However, while 
communal rights are also being recognised in Western democracies, such rights 
must not in any way restrict the fundamental individual rights. Therefore the
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multiculturalism context in Western democracies, based on liberal principles, 
acknowledges the rights of individuals to revise or re-evaluate their cultural 
orientation. At the same time, multiculturalism, based on the liberal principle, 
should provide external protection for group cultural rights, especially of the 
minorities, by recognising group-differentiated rights. Nevertheless, such group 
rights must not be used to suppress individual members of the cultural group. In 
other words, there should not be any internal restriction by cultural groups on 
their members, since such restriction is viewed as illiberal and, at the same time, 
providing external protection for such group difference and cultural diversity.
However, recognition of communal rights also triggered debate within the 
multicultural liberal concept, especially communal recognition over individual 
rights in postcolonial states. For most postcolonial states, cultural attachment or 
identification such as with religious, linguistic and cultural identity are considered 
as a vital primordial identity that must be recognised as the collective concept of 
a good life and this has justified the multicultural expression of these postcolonial 
societies. Such recognition of fundamental primordial rights marks the primacy 
over individual rights in most postcolonial states. The justification for communal 
recognition was that cultural, religious, linguistic and racial identification are 
significant to individual existence. It is these identities that give a hallmark to an 
individual and what makes an individual meaningful. Furthermore, some of the 
primordial identities attached to the group help the survival of the individual and, 
in return, these individuals would be protected and recognised.
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The recognition of the primordial identities within the liberal concept in 
postcolonial multicultural societies has led to an essentialist perception of cultural 
identities. If the liberal concept in Western liberal societies considers cultural 
identities and values as self-chosen practices of the good life by individuals, in 
postcolonial societies cultural identity has primacy over the individual rights, since 
such an attachment gives a strong moral, social, political and economic anchor. 
The liberal concept during colonial days was not based on a recognition of rights 
to equality but was based on the recognition of communal identities and rights, 
and this orientation has been retained up until today. Nevertheless, the pluralist 
society, as described by Furnivall (1956), could be argued to have been 
transformed into a multicultural polity with the recognition of these cultural 
communities. The constitutional contract is a manifestation of the construction of 
a multicultural polity. This attempt to liberalise the notion of citizenship from the 
primacy of communal rights to individual rights to equality was faced with 
resistance from ethno-nationalist groups.
Nevertheless, the primacy of communal rights over individual rights to 
equality was argued to have undermined individual rights to equality in 
postcolonial states. This resulted from the perception that recognising the liberal 
concept of individual rights to equality would undermine and dilute the cultural 
identity of indigenousness of the community. Furthermore, the view that the 
liberal concept of individual rights to equality would result in the undermining of 
the communal rights to certain privileges and special positions and, hence, 
communal rights should be defended at all costs. This is because the recognition
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of communal rights in some postcolonial societies has a bearing on the 
justification of a policy framework to preserve the indigenousness identity.
Theoretically speaking, the liberal framework in the multicultural polity of 
Western liberal democracies and postcolonial societies is significantly different in 
its recognition of cultural identities. This is because, within the polity of Western 
liberal societies, recognition of the individual became paramount rather than the 
recognition of cultural and group identities, even though social, cultural and 
religious identities could be the basis for recognition. For postcolonial societies, 
the pluralist set-up formed during the colonial period became the premise for the 
liberal concept to recognise the formation of a multicultural polity by maintaining 
the recognition of various cultural communities after independence. Even though 
individual liberty is recognised within the polity of postcolonial societies, 
communal identity is paramount and this is evident from the policies formulated in 
postcolonial societies.
Therefore, the liberal concept within the multicultural polity of both Western 
liberal societies and postcolonial societies could provide an empirical justification 
through the examination of the recognition of cultural identities as the social 
thesis of group recognition, manifested through the policy framework, and 
institutional and constitutional design.
As Glaston (1995) has outlined, the liberal concept could be divided into 
two parts; reformation liberalism and enlightenment liberalism. The former 
recognises that individual freedom and autonomy is significant within the liberal
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concept, while the latter recognises that the liberal concept could be further 
extended to understanding the importance of differences of individuals and 
groups over matters related to the good life, moral authority, reason versus faith, 
and others. Therefore, for liberalism to give primacy to the autonomous self 
alone, without recognising cultural identities which resulted from the freedom to 
choose one’s inclination or association would make the liberal concept illiberal. 
Furthermore, the argument for the recognition of diversity propagated by 
multiculturalism must therefore accept and recognise such diversity through 
mutual toleration within the framework of civic unity. This is the reason why 
Kukathas (2005) argues that the liberal concept had actually been generous in 
the recognition of multiculturalism, since this concept allows the freedom to 
individuals to choose the good life based on what one desires. And the way of life 
chosen by the individual is to be accommodated and tolerated as long as such a 
path does not cause harm to other chosen ways of life.
Hence, what is required is that multiculturalism as a field of inquiry is 
guided by the liberal concept to provide the justification for the need to recognise 
cultural groups or identities, as it is the duty of liberal states to recognise the 
rights and obligations of people as citizens constitutionally and legally, in order to 
avoid the creation of de facto majorities and minorities of first class and second 
class citizens (Nagata in Henders, 2004, p.227).
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1.3 Multicultural Malaysia: Challenges to Recognising Diversity
As a result of the colonial legacy, the literature on multicultural Malaysia is 
illustrated by a strong presence of ethnocentrism, compartmentalisation, a 
majority-minority connotation in ethnic terms and the institutionalisation of race- 
based politics (Lijphart cited by Choudhry, 2008, p.28; Shamsul, 2001; Yunas 
Samad, 1997, p.241 cited by Raihanah, 2009, p.64; Ganeson, 2009, p.138 in 
Baogang and Kymlicka; Rahman, 2009, p.204). This brought ethnic identity to the 
fore of politics, reflecting the fact that the British, as colonial rulers, as many have 
argued, created colonial Malaysia as an ethnicised state (Fenton, 2003, p. 137, 
cited in Raihanah, 2009, p.65). This is supported by the literature on multicultural 
Malaysia, which reinforces the image of postcolonial Malaysia as maintaining the 
structure of a pluralist society which continues to separate racial groups under a 
single political roof (Raymond, 2004, p. 123), thus sowing the seed of separatism 
(Fook Seng, 1975).
This colonial legacy of ethnic segregation or compartmentalisation was 
further strengthened by the economic identification attached to each ethnic 
group, which resulted in the Malaysian polity not only being divided socially but 
also economically. Such a division posed a challenge to Malaysia’s nation- 
building and created a state of steady tension (Shamsul, 1996). Therefore the 
colonial legacy created divisions, which caused the indigenous Malays to argue 
for recognition of their special position which would uphold Malay primacy by 
ensuring that non-Malays, particularly the Chinese, would not have equal political 
rights or access to citizenship (Puthucheary, 2008, p.3).
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As a result of the conflict between ethnic groups, the notion of citizenship 
rights became a bargaining tool between the majority indigenous Malays and the 
Chinese and Indian immigrants; this led to a compromise between the leaders of 
the various ethnic groups in the Alliance. The negotiations over the allocation of 
citizenship rights witnessed citizens being accorded different civil rights, based on 
their ethnic background (Puthucheary, 2008, p.19). This historic bargain3 
(Osman, 1990) among the elites of the ethnic parties took centre stage and 
became the foundation of Malaysia’s multicultural/pluralist orientation, which 
witnessed recognition of the citizenship granted to the Chinese and Indian 
minorities based on the principle of jus soli, or birthright citizenship. At the same 
time, the granting of citizenship to the Chinese and Indian minorities was made 
with an understanding that the special position of the majority indigenous Malays 
would be recognised and thus signified the recognition of the indigenous nation 
state of Malaysia. Nevertheless, such bargaining could be argued to have 
resulted in the preservation of diversity in religious and cultural practices in the 
public domain (Verma, 2004, p.55), with ethnocentrism continuing to prevail and 
being justified for the promotion of diversity.
This strong ethnic paradigm, promoted by the British, led to the demand 
for an exclusive recognition of the majority Malays’ cultural and religious identity 
in return for the formation of Malaya. Such recognition of the Malays’ special 
position during the colonial period was justified by the safeguarding of Malay 
ethnic primordial ties or parochial interests in their dealings with others, especially
3 The negotiation between the leaders o f the ethnic parties that formed the Alliance is referred to as the historic 
bargaining, since agreement was reached for the exchange o f citizenship for the recognition o f the Malay special 
position. It was considered as historic since the bargaining became the foundation o f Malaysia’s multicultural 
set-up today. However, this historic bargaining was conducted behind closed doors and no offic ia l documents 
were recorded.
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non-Malays (Hussin Mutalib, 1990, p.1, cited in Verma, 2004, p.23). This 
fundamental importance saw the attachment or identification of the Malay 
primordial identity to the ruler or monarch, culture and religion and it is this 
principle of recognising the Malays’ special position which continues today. 
Hence, this resulted in Malaysia’s notion of nation-building being contested, as 
there was no clear direction or interpretation of what unity and integration 
underpins. While unity and integration are constructed out of commitment and 
sense of belonging, the scenario is somehow different in Malaysia, and this, 
argued Vasil (1980), is contributed to by the view that the Malays had of Malaysia 
as belonging to the Malays; these special rights and positions could only be 
maintained through continuous control of the government by the Malays.
As mentioned, apart from the social compartmentalisation of the ethnic 
group, another significant colonial legacy in which certain economic functions 
were identified with each ethnic group; this caused suspicion between the ethnic 
groups because of the inferior economic position of the Malays compared to the 
immigrants, especially the Chinese,. This is evident through the economic 
function of the Malays as peasant farmers, Chinese as traders and miners, and 
Indians as estate workers. This economic identification created by the colonial 
legacy had further made the indigenous Malays feel threatened, since the land 
was now considered to have been occupied by the immigrants and this resulted 
in a call to ensure the protection of the indigenous Malays and the promotion of a 
special position and rights. The argument among the indigenous Malays was that 
these two factors could have subjected the indigenous Malays to the tyranny of 
the minority. As such, the state introduced an affirmative action policy to address
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the issue of Malay economic deprivation. The underlying argument for such 
affirmative action by the state was that racial identification with economic function 
had to be eliminated. This socioeconomic redistribution by the state through 
affirmative action was intended to enable Malays to integrate with the 
economically dominant immigrants, especially the Chinese. While such 
recognition would be viewed as awkward in terms of a liberal principle or 
orientation, protection of the Malays’ special position did not in any way lead to 
the disappearance of other ethnic communities’ religious and cultural identities 
(Verma, 2003, p.55).
As a result of the imbalances created by the colonial legacy, the year 1969 
witnessed a race riot which led to the transformation of policies to address this 
issue of imbalance and move forwards towards unity and integration. The 
formulation of the New Economic Policy (NEP), along with the provision of an 
affirmative action programme specifically targeting the majority indigenous 
Malays, resulted in the ascendancy of a Malay nationalist orientation, which 
justified the demand for preferential treatment of the Malays as necessary to 
close the economic gap between the Malays and non-Malays (Puthucheary, 
2008, p. 12). This Malay-centred nationalist orientation, rather than any ideas of 
individual freedom, was the major organising principle during the formative period 
of modern Malayan and Malaysian history, and thus explains the reason why 
race conscious group rights took precedence over individual liberties 
(Puthucheary, 2008, p.20).
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The affirmative action in Malaysia was introduced to ensure that the 
indigenous Malays would not be misrecognised or side-lined in the economic 
stakes; it was to provide the indigenous Malays with a handicap in order to 
compete in a level playing field. The implementation of affirmative action, which 
should be recognised as a temporary measure, needed to form an egalitarian or 
colour-blind society (Kymlicka, 1995, p.4), has now been perceived as a right by 
the indigenous Malays.4 Therefore the Malays, through their special position, 
demanded that their economic deprivation be recognised in order to guarantee 
that economic inequalities would not hinder them from integrating in the new 
society, and to further avoid minority tyranny. This demand was made with the 
view that economic deprivation would lead to the unequal treatment of the Malay 
community, and thus would be a stumbling block towards integration. The 
justification for preferential policies to address the Malay inferior economic 
position, and the liberal provision of citizenship extended to the non-Malays, 
became the inter-domain equation in the original formation of ethnic policies in 
Malaysia (Abraham, 1999; Crouch, 2001 cited by Haque, 2003, p.246). However, 
scholars (Jomo, 2004; Osman Rani, 1990) argue that such policy orientation has 
generated greater ethnic resentment and suspicion between the groups, and is 
insufficient to promote ethnic integration, since the affirmative action was targeted 
at a specific ethnic group (which unfortunately was the majority). Economic 
deprivation and national integration were used to justify a series of preconditions 
for admission and special privileges for the Malays, who were, in fact, the 
numerical majority (Verma, 2004, p.80). Therefore, what has happened in the
4 The decision to remove affirmative action by the state is perceived by the indigenous Malays as infringing 
their special rights and position. For instance, the suggestion to remove discounts for purchasing high-end 
properties was heavily criticised as infringing the indigenous rights. As such, affirmative action has been 
considered the right o f the indigenous Malays.
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application of affirmative action in Malaysia is that the state, instead of affirming 
the equality of all citizens as equal members of the nation, has implemented a 
compensatory measure to restore or create a balance between the ethnic groups, 
thus removing certain historical socioeconomic disadvantages and inequalities 
experienced by its citizens who are in the majority (Puthucheary, 2008, p. 19).
Even though citizenship was granted to the Chinese and Indian ethnic 
minorities, the multicultural/pluralist set-up in Malaysia continues to witness a 
demand for recognition and rights to equality from the minorities. This is 
contributed to by the fact that the basis of providing a common nationality for all 
the people of the Federation did not rest on the norms of egalitarian membership 
of all communities (Verma, 2004, p.80). Therefore, these continuous demands 
pose a challenge to Malaysia’s nation-building. The recognition of communal 
membership in defining citizenship in Malaysia could be seen as encouraging 
diversity but, at the same time, the principles of citizenship in Malaysia reveal that 
a pluralist society composed of several separate and segregated thriving cultures 
might not foster multiculturalism (Verma, 2004, p.81). As such, the notion of 
citizenship in Malaysia can be viewed as enabling diversity through the granting 
of citizenship to minorities, alongside the recognition of the need to protect the 
Malays’ special position. This idea of facilitating diversity through recognition of 
communal membership, while at the same time disabling or restricting certain 
equal political and civil rights in order to recognise the protection of the Malays’ 
special position, resulted in the multicultural space created to be questioned of its 
overall objective; whether such division or compartmentalisation would be 
continued to justify diversity, while at the same time undermining unity.
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Furthermore, such an orientation towards promoting diversity would 
actually undermine unity, since members of the society (especially the minorities) 
would feel detached and lack a sense of belonging towards the state as a result 
of the different or preferential treatment targeted at the indigenous majority. 
Meanwhile, the justification for accommodating cultural rights, including 
language, beliefs and culture, resulted in the side-lining of individual civil and 
political rights (Verma, 2004, p.81) which are vital in Western liberal democratic 
states. The liberal notion of individual rights propagated in the Western 
multicultural model indicates the supremacy of the individual as a cultured entity, 
in which recognition of individual civil and political rights is vital. On the other 
hand, the communal approach adopted by postcolonial societies in managing the 
multicultural set-up required that recognition of communal interests supersedes 
individual rights. Such orientation, which led to the importance of preserving 
certain communal rights at the expense of individual rights, is justified on the 
pretext of preserving harmony to avoid unrest. Nonetheless, the other central 
observation is whether such a demand by the minorities in Malaysia would be 
justified, since recognition of the minorities’ cultural and religious rights is clearly 
protected under the constitution. Is multicultural space sufficiently served by 
preserving only cultural diversity?
There is no doubt that the ethnocentrism promoted in the struggle of 
liberation from colonial rule undermined the multiculturalism that was taken as a 
given fact of Malaysian life (Kee Beng, 2009, p.448). The ethnocentrism that 
exists in Malaysia was further strengthened by the notion of significant
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attachment that an ethnic group has to a certain area, making this a basis for the 
unification against ‘outsiders’, who are not from the area (Kee Beng, 2009, 
p.451). Nevertheless, the strong sense of ethnocentrism which had undermined 
multiculturalism in Malaysia, was turned around with the promotion of the notion 
of Bangsa Malaysia, or 1 Malaysia, a strategy of nation-building launched by the 
state under the National Vision Policy (NVP) in 1991. While such a strategy for 
nation-building could be viewed sceptically by Western liberal societies as 
moving towards the promotion of assimilation or coercion of the minorities, this 
idea of nation-building was, however, welcomed and viewed positively by the 
non-Malays in Malaysia, since multiculturalism underscores the idea of Bangsa 
Malaysia (Kok Wah, 2002, p.34). Therefore, the idea of nation-building in the 
context of multicultural Malaysia would complement the recognition of diversity 
which has been the foundation of Malaysia since independence. This would be 
taking multiculturalism as a strategy (Kincheloe & Steinberg, 1997, p.1) for 
promoting and recognising equality in Malaysia’s nation-building. The question or 
challenge that arises from this development of nation-building is: what would be 
the multicultural context necessary to ensure the establishment of an egalitarian 
society in Malaysia? Would there be a need for a policy re-orientation in 
accommodating the demand for recognition and equality?
Therefore, with the idea of Bangsa Malaysia nation-building, Malaysia’s 
multicultural set-up would witness a contest between the demands for an 
egalitarian set-up from the minorities, against the ethnocentric set-up adopted 
since independence. After the launching of a new initiative called 1 Malaysia, 
which was introduced recently as a platform to provide a free and open forum to
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discuss issues that matter to the nation, a call was made for the unification of the 
indigenous Malays.5 Therefore, my contribution to this area of inquiry is to look at 
the challenges of multiculturalism and how it would respond to the Bangsa 
Malaysia notion of nation-building. This is because recognising multiculturalism 
within the context of Malaysia’s nation-building could be interpreted differently by 
the indigenous Malays and non-Malays. The argument that the notion of Bangsa 
Malaysia as a move towards establishing an egalitarian society by upholding 
rights to equality based on the principle of a liberal democratic society was 
something that the non-Malays accepted eagerly. This is because, after more 
than 50 years of independence, cultural diversity has been maintained through an 
arrangement by which rights to equality were not fully implemented, hence this 
notion of Bangsa Malaysia as the best platform to establish the true meaning of 
unity in diversity. However, for the indigenous Malays, such a move is viewed as 
an attempt to dilute the special position of their indigenousness and the privileges 
which they have enjoyed over the years. Any attempt to dismantle the special 
position was argued by the indigenous Malays as jeopardising and diluting their 
primordial identity which is embedded in the King, Islam and indigenous nation 
state identity.
1.4 Research Methodology
To determine the best research method to be adopted for this study was 
quite a challenging task since it would involve questions involving ethnicity and 
rights to equality which are considered sensitive to a certain extent. This is
5 This idea o f l Malaysia was launched by the sixth Prime M inister o f Malaysia, Najib Razak, to complement 
and expedite the formation o f  Bangsa Malaysia. The idea o f l Malaysia is to preserve unity in diversity which is 
considered as the p illa r and strength o f Malaysia.
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because after the 1969 race riot, issues pertaining to the citizenship rights of non- 
Malays and the special position of Malays could no longer be openly debated in 
order to avoid future racial tension. However, in addressing the issue of nation- 
building and the recognition of a multicultural polity, these issues are inevitable 
and require an in-depth examination. This is because, as mentioned earlier, 
Malaysia’s nation-building initiative is being challenged by issues which have 
apparently been ‘settled’, such as its constitutional design; this has affected the 
view that one community has of the other as a result of race-based affirmative 
action programmes. Therefore, the first question that arose was: which method 
should be applied in order to conduct the observation of the challenges posed in 
Malaysia’s multicultural context, and how have they impacted upon the notion of 
nation-building? Malaysia’s historical factors, contributed to by the colonial 
legacy, posed a challenge which has required the state to formulate or devise 
meaningful formulae for its resolution. At the same time, certain restrictions 
imposed on the discussion of the issues or topics related to this research resulted 
in the reluctance of interviewees to be recorded or dictated.
Therefore, in order to provide a critical analysis of this issue of nation- 
building and the recognition of multiculturalism within the Malaysian polity, this 
research conducts personal interviews with political leaders, community leaders, 
scholars and ordinary Malaysian citizens in order to obtain their views on the way 
forward for Malaysia: to undertake the challenges of preserving its cultural 
diversity, and the contest for equality, which is taking its toll on nation-building. 
The interviews conducted with the present party members of the coalition were 
essential in order to know how the members of the coalition interpret
67
multiculturalism and the notion of Bangsa Malaysia in realising the idea of nation- 
building.
A set of semi-structured questions was posed to the interviewees; 
however, as the interview continued, open-ended questions could be posed to 
interviewees as a response to the views given by the interviewees. This was 
being done in order to ensure that interviewees were not put into a stressful 
situation, taking into consideration the sensitivities of the issues that interviewees 
might raise during the interview. Therefore, the idea of adopting this kind of 
responsive interviewing (Rubin and Rubin, 2005) is to gather personal experience 
and understanding of the interviewees’ views of the nature of Malaysia’s 
multicultural set-up, the nation-building process and the challenges posed in 
maintaining unity in diversity. The responses gathered from the interviewees 
would provide a deeper understanding of the issues of nation-building. The 
interview method adopted in this research of posing open-ended questions would 
be central in order to make sense of this idea of nation-building in Malaysia 
specifically, and how it affected or impacted the lives of Malaysians in general. 
The term interview society (Atkinson and Silverman, 1997) indicated that 
understanding the conduct of the individual and the society would be more 
meaningful only through in-depth views provided by the interviewees.
Meanwhile, the views gathered from interviewees would provide an outline 
of the concept of nation that each interviewee imagined. This is because each 
interviewee might have a different experience and their own understanding and 
interpretation of the process of nation-building in Malaysia’s multicultural context.
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As Anderson (1983) argued, the idea of a nation is being imagined by members 
of the nation because the members of the nation would never know one another 
but in each and every one of them the image of their communion exists. 
Therefore, the imagination of the Malaysian nation is embedded and influenced 
by the recognition of ethnic identity which has taken centre stage in Malaysia’s 
polity and is protected by the constitution. At the same time, the policies 
formulated to ensure the promotion of the multicultural orientation and nation- 
building have impacted the imagination of the nation. The justification for 
adopting this research methodology is to acquire in-depth views, which could be 
considered personal views, of Malaysia’s multicultural orientation and how they 
affect nation-building. The hypothetical argument put forward in the questions is 
whether or not Malaysia has failed to create a multicultural space for all 
communities concerned, especially the minorities. Moreover, what would be the 
ideal multicultural framework that Malaysia should adopt in addressing or 
supporting its nation-building efforts? The views gathered from the interviews 
would provide recommendations and suggestions regarding Malaysia’s nation- 
building process, and the challenges brought about by multiculturalism in 
realising this process. This is because the idea of nation-building has been 
viewed positively by the non-Malays as the beginning of recognition to equality. 
On the other hand, the idea of nation-building is viewed sceptically by the 
indigenous Malays as in having to surrender special rights in the interest of 
nation-building and rights to equality as the basis of unity and integration.
Together with the information gathered from the interviews, an analysis of 
the policies formulated by the state in recognising its multicultural set-up and the
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process of nation-building will also be critically analysed, in order to determine 
whether there is a universal formula to be used in addressing issues of 
multiculturalism and nation-building between the postcolonial societies and 
Western liberal societies. Among the most significant challenges facing 
Malaysia’s multicultural set-up is that, even though ethnic segregation and 
compartmentalisation had resulted in the promotion and recognition of a 
multicultural space, ethnocentrism has been the dominating force within the 
polity, and this repudiates the idea that the state is in the possession of a single 
national group (Craig, Gordon, Burchardt, 2008, p.56). Therefore, with such an 
orientation, how could nation-building which envisages unity and integration be 
achieved?
However, one constraint that needs to be highlighted is the reluctance of 
interviewees to be interviewed or consent to their interviews being recorded. This 
is because of the sensitivity of the subject, which would involve questions on 
citizenship rights, the special position and constitutional issues which are 
recognised as ‘non-negotiable’. This is because the discussion of the Malay 
indigenous rights, along with the citizenship rights of the Chinese and Indian 
ethnic minorities, is considered to be an issue that should not be discussed, as it 
could stimulate unnecessary unrest. Since the 1969 race riot, the recovery 
programme for the nation involved the removal of sensitive issues from the realm 
of public discussion. These issues pertaining to the status and powers of Malay 
rulers, the special position of the Malays and the citizenship rights of the non- 
Malays, the status of Islam as the official religion and the status of Malay as the 
national language are considered unquestionable. As such, the reluctance of
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interviewees to address these issues should be expected; as a result of these 
sensitivities, discussion could be liable to prosecution since it is argued that it 
triggers ethnic unrest.
However, for the purpose of this research, the issues related to the rights 
of the indigenous majority, the citizenship rights of the minorities, the legal 
structure, policies and institutions of multicultural Malaysia must be addressed, 
since it is inevitable that these issues are discussed in order to provide the way 
forward in Malaysia’s nation-building agenda. The interviews, whether recorded 
or unrecorded, would be an effective avenue to gather the reactions of people 
with regard to this issue. Hence the outcomes of the interviews would not be as 
useful as desired, because open discussion and deliberation on these issues 
could not be much expected. Even though intercultural dialogue without 
guarantees (len Ang, 2009) and open-ended discussions would be the way 
forward in a multicultural and democratic society, due to the sensitivity of the 
issues, such effort could be undermining rather than assisting. Nevertheless, 
continuous dialogue and open-ended discussion would be an avenue to support 
the nation-building process.
Apart from this, it is claimed that people are quite reluctant or not really 
interested in discussing issues pertaining to nation-building and the recognition of 
multiculturalism in Malaysia because the reality of achieving nation-building and 
recognising the multicultural polity still takes the racial/communal perspective. For 
instance, what does Bangsa Malaysia imply, and how do we talk about or discuss 
such notions if certain issues are considered ‘sensitive’? Furthermore, how could
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such an agenda materialise if the concern is still focused on racial or communal 
survival instead of recognition of citizenship? Hence, the challenge for me is to 
ensure that the interviewees are comfortable in expressing their views in an 
atmosphere of intellectual discussion in which the racial identification of 
interviewees would not be reflected.
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Chapter 2
2.1 The Development of Politics of Ethnicity: From Mono-ethnic to Pluralist 
Society
‘Let me say a few words about the most delicate problem in the politics of 
Malaya. Any realist can see where the main difficulty lies. It lies in the mutual 
suspicion between different communities especially between different racial 
communities especially between the Malays who are the indigenous people of 
this country and the Chinese who have played an immense part in its 
development.’ (Malcolm MacDonald, Governor General of Malaya)
As mentioned earlier, the demographic transformation of societies around 
the world could be attributed to a number of factors. The process of migration is 
one of the factors contributing to the demographic change which has resulted in 
the formation of a multicultural, multi-religious and multi-ethnic society. For 
postcolonial states, however, the demographic transformation can be argued to 
have resulted from the colonial ethnic immigration and stratified labour policy. 
(Hilley, 2001, p.23) Thus, this demographic transformation was regarded as 
having been ‘forced’ upon the country by colonisers in this formerly racially and 
ethnically homogenous society, and this has meant that present day postcolonial 
states have to accept this colonial legacy.
As for Malaysia, it has had its share of colonial legacy under the 
Portuguese, Dutch and the British. Historically, Malaysia’s colonial experience 
can be traced from the fall of the Malacca sultanate to the Portuguese, and it was 
colonised by the Portuguese from 1511 until 1642. The interest of the Portuguese
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at that time was to control the trade route of the East Indies, as Malacca was 
strategically located and was labelled by traders as the ‘Venice of the East’. 
Unlike the Dutch and British colonisers who had a political interest, the 
Portuguese presence was solely confined to controlling the trading activities 
taking place at the port.
After 130 years under Portuguese rule, Malacca was then colonised by the 
Dutch from 1642 until 1786. Again, the Dutch interest in Malacca was oriented to 
the control of trading activities. However, the Dutch interest in formalising its 
pursuit of trade was made more effective with the formation of the United East 
India Company in 1602. This corporation pursued an economic policy of 
monopoly by signing treaties with local rulers, especially with regard to the 
purchase of tin. However, the colonisation experience under the Portuguese and 
Dutch did not have any significant impact on the demographic profile of Malaysia, 
since they were not involved in any labour-intensive activities, apart from trading.
The most significant colonial impact on Malaysia was during the British 
colonial rule. British colonial rule resulted in a demographic impact with the inflow 
of Chinese and Indian immigrants to serve the economic interest of the British. 
This inflow of immigrants left a colonial legacy, which maintained the basic 
concepts of ethnic division and communal politics as ‘primordially’ given rather 
than being products of the colonial state (Hilley, 2001, p.23). The presence of 
these immigrants to serve the economic interest of the British was viewed as an 
asset because of the economic wealth they generated for the British by working 
in the tin mines (the Chinese) and on estates (the Indians). While some would
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argue that early migration of the Chinese and Indian traders would have caused 
the demographic transformation, it was actually during colonial rule from 1911 to 
1931 that a massive influx of workers from China and India resulted in the Malay 
indigenous population being outnumbered, and this triggered worry among the 
indigenous Malays about the dilution of their identity and also the land as an 
indigenous nation state.
2.2 British Colonial Rule: Formation of a Pluralist Society
Unlike the Portuguese rule and the Dutch rule, the British colonial rule was not 
limited to controlling trading activities, but expanded to the labour-intensive 
economic activities of tin-mining and plantations in Malaya. The British intention 
was to transform the economy from subsistence agriculture to a key producer of 
primary goods and raw materials for the British and European market (Hilley, 
2001, p.23). The rich natural resources of Malaysia and its fertile land had 
caused the British to expand colonial activities, which were purely economically 
oriented, in Malaya. In supporting the labour-intensive economic activities, the 
British encouraged an open door policy of ethnic immigration and stratified labour 
relations as part of an export-led strategy (Hilley, 2001, p.23). Such a policy 
witnessed the subsidising of the immigration of Chinese and Indian labourers into 
the country (Yong, 2004, p.39) and resulted in the emergence of the so-called 
pluralist society with separate economic spheres, divided by language, customs, 
religion, dietary laws, marriage and funeral ceremonies (Verma, 2002, p.26). 
Hence, this transformation into a pluralist society, communities living side by side 
without mingling, had a tremendous effect on countries in Southeast Asia, since 
these countries had earlier been identified as indigenous state nations
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(Suryadinata, 1997, p.5); racial identity would be the factor that would haunt 
contemporary Malaysia (Hirschman, 1987, p.570 cited by Milner, 2011, p.120). 
Malaysia would see its nation-building process taking place in the post­
independence period based around the strengthening of the identification of a 
polity of an indigenous state nation and recognising the primordial identities of the 
indigenous Malays.
The significant participation of the Chinese and Indians in economic 
activities resulted in the indigenous Malays being side-lined from active 
commercial involvement, and set in motion the identification of race with 
economic activity (Verma, 2002, p.26). This caused the indigenous Malays to be 
economically dispossessed in their own country (Yong, 2004, p.37) and to be 
portrayed as a dysfunctional part of the colonial mode of production. With the 
indigenous Malays detached from commercial activities, the British 
acknowledged the necessity to extend appropriate respect and recognition to the 
Malay Sultans in order to avoid any unnecessary conflict, since the British knew 
the influence that the Malay rulers had over the indigenous Malays. The signing 
of treaties between the Malay rulers and the British resulted in the acceptance of 
a British officer whose advice must be asked and acted upon on all questions 
other than those touching on Malay religion and custom (Vasil, 1980, p.12). 
Furthermore, a pro-Malay privilege was retained for a select class of Malay civil 
servants as a means of co-opting the feudal aristocracy (Hilley, 2001, p.24). The 
protection and promotion of the Malays was firmly recognised by the British who 
insisted that the Malay states formed the country of the Malays and who 
maintained this position, consciously, subconsciously and unconsciously, by
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preferential treatment. British policy had been dictated by a conscientious regard 
for the binding quality of treaties, a recognition that its economic policies had 
flooded the country (Malaya) with aliens, and a realisation that, without 
protection, Malaya would soon cease to be a country of the Malays and would, in 
fact, become what a casual observer had mockingly called another province of 
China (Jones, 1953, pp.136-7, cited by Vasil, 1980, p.14). The recognition of the 
Malay rulers had resulted in the British according the Malays the status of the 
only Bumiputra and thus witnessed the Malays enjoying political pre-eminence, 
compared to the non-Malay immigrants (Vasil, 1980, p.12).
With the recognition of the indigenous Malays’ position, it was sensible for 
the British to enhance their administrative control by recruiting members of the 
ruling class of the Malays into their administration. The Malay Administrative 
Service was set-up and employees recruited from well-established families 
(Yong, 2004, p.33). The involvement of the ruling Malays in the British 
administration resulted in the segregation and compartmentalisation of the races, 
based on specific economic and administrative functions. This was best 
described by Furnivall (1956) in which a colonial economy had given rise to a 
social order segmented by race and the customs of a pluralist society (Hilley, 
2001, p.23), in which different sections of the community live side by side but 
separately within the same political unit and in the economic sphere; this caused 
a division of labour along racial lines. Furthermore, the economic functions 
attached to the respective ethnic groups prevented unity among these groups 
(Syed Hussin, 2009, p.130; Sarji, 1989, Stockwell, 1982 cited by Haque, 2003, 
p.244). Moreover, such divisive situations caused ‘the suspicion between the
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Malays who are the indigenous people of this country and the Chinese who have 
played an immense part in its development.’ (Malcolm MacDonald, Governor 
General of Malaya, 1947-1954)
There was an absence of any mechanism or policy to control the influx of 
immigrants which caused the indigenous Malays to be outnumbered, and no 
attempt was made by the British to integrate the various ethnic groups into a 
united political establishment. The failure of the British to create a sense of 
unitary allegiance caused the immigrants to think of themselves as a member of 
a transient community and they were treated as aliens, since local birth was not 
an infallible index of intention to settle in Malaya (Gullick, 1969, p.79 cited by 
Yong, 2004, p.52). The British stand towards the non-Malays was that, as long as 
the non-Malays did not cause any threat to British interests and authority and did 
not interfere in the affairs of the Bumiputra they were left to earn their livelihood 
and thus the British saw no special responsibility to protect or recognise them 
(Vasil, 1980, p.12).
Table 1 indicates the population percentage, which witnessed the numbers 
of Chinese and Indian immigrants gradually outnumbering the indigenous 
Malays, while Table 2 indicates the population number based on ethnic groups. 
This indicates that the indigenous Malays, who were once the dominant 
population, had been outnumbered due to the demographic transformation of 
British economic policy. As a result, a pluralist society was formed which saw the 
Malays as a dominant group, but not constituting a majority, while the Chinese
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and Indians were the minority groups, but substantial minorities (Yong, 2004, 
p.52).
Table 1: Changing Population Distribution of Ethnic Com m unities, 1911-57 (%)
Year Malays Chinese Indians Others
1911 58.6 29.6 10.2 1.6
1921 54.0 29.4 15.1 1.5
1931 49.2 33.9 15.1 1.8
1947 49.5 38.4 10.8 1.3
1957 49.8 37.2 11.7 1.3
Source: Fong Chan Onn, 1989, The Malaysia Economic Challenge in the 1990s; Transformation 
for Growth, Singapore: Longman, p.12, cited by Terence Gomez, 2004, p.171.
Table 2: Population of the Federation of Malaya
Year Malay Chinese Indian Other
1948 2,457,014 1,928,965 536,646 64,802
1951 2,631,154 2,043,971 566,371 75,726
Source: Annual Report on the Federation of Malaya 1951, cited in C.C. Chin and Karl Hack, 
Dialogues with Chin Peng, pp.380-81.
The pluralist society continued until 1946 when the British came back to 
rule Malaya after the Japanese occupation in 1945. When the British returned to 
rule Malaya, they realised that a uniform structure was missing from the 
administration of Malaya. The divide and rule policy of the British - which had 
ensured that Malay rulers were kept happy - discouraged engagement between 
Malays and non-Malays, and ensured no concerted attempt at self-rule (Yong,
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2004, p.56). This actually made it difficult for the British to introduce any form of 
reformation to its rule. Therefore, upon returning to Malaya, the British 
immediately met the Malay Sultans and sought approval for the formation of the 
Malayan Union. The Malayan Union was an attempt to unite all the Malay states 
into one central governing body for the very first time. Under the Malayan Union, 
the British planned an administrative arrangement to be organised across racial 
or ethnic boundaries, which was to constitute a democratic reform of a political 
system and to be the precursor to self-government (Hilley, 2001, p.27).
Another significant event which happened during the Japanese occupation 
was that the Japanese had fostered nationalistic bias among the Malays against 
the Chinese, and stirred up nationalist and anti-colonial sentiments that could be 
directed against the British once they returned to Malaya (Verma, 2002, p.28). 
The nationalist spirit instilled by the Japanese among the Malays would be the 
main stumbling block to the British-supported claims for equal political rights by 
the other communities, as proposed by the Malayan Union. At the same time, the 
Malays viewed such support by the British as undermining the approach of 
recognising the sovereignty of the Malay Sultans (Verma, 2002, p.28).
2.3 Malayan Union: Building an Integrated Malayan Society
The British had realised the need for a unitary system, based on a
democratic political system, and mooted the idea of the Malayan Union in 1946.
The main objective of the Malayan Union was to create a more efficient
government organisation and to promote a sense of unity and ‘Malayanness’
among the different people of Malaya, based on an egalitarian principle (Vasil,
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1980, p. 17). Moreover, the objective of the Malayan Union was to give non- 
Malays a fair deal by abolishing the special position enjoyed by the Malays with 
regard to the issue of citizenship (Vasil, 1980, p. 19). However, what the British 
would not have realised was that there was a lack of understanding of such a 
democratic political system, as a result of the failure of the British to introduce 
such an administration prior to 1946; each ethnic group was considered 
autonomous and there was no need for integration, since it never occurred to the 
indigenous Malays that the ethnic Chinese and Indians immigrants were going be 
granted citizenship and recognised as part of the polity after independence.
Throughout the period prior to 1946, the British had employed the Malays 
to fulfil administrative duties and functions while not involving the Chinese or 
Indian immigrants in the political administration of Malaya. Such an orientation 
was a clear indication that the Chinese and Indians immigrants were basically a 
transient group without having any significant attachment to Malaya. 
Furthermore, the Malay nationalism triggered during the Japanese occupation 
was overlooked and underestimated by the British; this resulted in the rejection 
by the Malays of the Malayan Union. The Japanese occupation had contributed 
significantly to the alteration of the political and communal scene. As mentioned, 
Japanese occupation had influenced the rise of Malay nationalism, in which the 
Japanese arrival was viewed by the Malays as an avenue to put an end to the 
economic and political encroachments of the Chinese on the Malays’ preserve. 
(Purcell, 1956, p.37 cited by Vasil, 1980, p.16) As a result of this, the Chinese 
were brutally treated and developed anti-Malay feeling. This development had an 
influence over the British perception of the Chinese and the Malays, in which the
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British had an admiration of the Chinese resistance to the Japanese, while the 
Malays’ collaboration with the Japanese, caused British policy-makers to have 
more of an anti-Malay sentiment (Vasil, 1980, p. 18).
Therefore, when the British came up with the idea of a Malayan Union in 
1946, the Malays were not prepared for such an egalitarian form of integration, 
and perceived such ideas as an act of betrayal by the British of their special 
position which had been agreed during the earlier period of British rule; for non- 
Malays, such ideas were well-received, even though there was no outright 
support for the Malayan Union from the Chinese. The most significant point in the 
idea of the Malayan Union was that common citizenship rights were to be given 
to the Chinese and Indian immigrants. The common citizenship rights proposed 
by the British were based on the principle of jus soli and would have resulted in 
83% of the Chinese and 75% of the Indians being eligible to become citizens 
(Ratnam, 1965, p.75 cited by Yong, 2004, p.60). They would have outnumbered 
the indigenous Malays. Such citizenship rights were viewed as an important 
factor for integration since there was an absence of such a system throughout 
British colonial rule, and common citizenship would mean that Malays and non- 
Malays were to be treated equally; this would eliminate the Malays’ special 
position and the indigenous nation state identity.
However, what actually happened as a result of the Malayan Union idea, 
was the mobilisation of Malay nationalist groups to oppose such egalitarian 
measures, which would undermine the indigenous Malays’ special position and 
would dilute the indigenous nation state identity. The opposition towards the
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Malayan Union was led by the United Malay National Organization (UMNO), 
mobilising the Malays under the slogan ‘long live the Malays’ or Hidup Melayu\ 
they staged demonstrations to oppose the idea. The formation of UMNO 
represented the crystallisation of Malay nationalism, which managed to galvanise 
support across the board and was later translated into a political programme 
(Yong, 2004, p.65). UMNO made it clear to the British that their struggle was for 
the Malay cause in not only demanding independence from the British, but also to 
uphold the supremacy of the Malays by ensuring that non-Malays - and most 
importantly the Chinese - would not have equal rights or access to citizenship 
(Puthucheary, 2008, p.3).
UMNO’s opposition to the Malayan Union proved highly successful and it 
was replaced by the Federation of Malaya Agreement on 1 February 1948 (Ooi, 
2006, p.46). UMNO continued its effort of highlighting the sentiment that, under 
the Malayan Union, the position of the Malay Sultans would be undermined, and 
the Malay ‘sovereignty’ would be lost (Horowitz, p.405) as a result of the nature of 
citizenship to be granted to the Chinese and Indians; this triggered the Malays’ 
awareness of the issue of their survival. The Federation of Malaya Agreement 
included a common form of citizenship to be extended to those who regarded the 
said Federation or any part of it as their real home and the object of their loyalty 
(Federation of Malaya Agreement, 1948 cited by Vasil. 1980, p.209). However, 
the Chinese and Indians did not get the full citizenship rights as originally 
proposed under the Malayan Union (Hilley, 2001, p.27) and, in fact, had to fulfil 
certain criteria of residence in their application for citizenship. Meanwhile, the rule
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of the Malay Sultans and the special position of the Malays were secured, and 
the country was maintained as Tanah Melayu or Malay Land (Vasil, 1980, p.209).
The Chinese were not that receptive towards the idea of the Federation 
and had viewed it as an obvious threat to their aspiration for equal treatment 
(Horowitz, 2000, p.399). However, the frustration of the Chinese was due to 
Chinese apathy and lack of support for the idea of the Malayan Union, which 
would have enhanced and protected their political rights in post-independence 
Malaya (Gomez, 2004, p. 175). Nevertheless, the reluctance of the British to grant 
independence with only UMNO on board, triggered the Chinese desire to 
mobilise themselves and this led to the formation of the Malaysian Chinese 
Association (MCA) by Tan Cheng Lock in February 1949. The MCA was led 
mainly by wealthy Chinese businessmen and anti-communist leaders whose 
main concern was to protect their economic establishments (Heng, 1988, p.57 
cited by Gomez, 2004, p. 175). The formation of the MCA was welcomed since it 
would provide an alternative avenue for the Chinese in their struggle for 
recognition and, as such, would undermine the influence of the Malayan 
Communist Party (MCP). The MCA as a political establishment was also 
recognised and supported by the British, since it could provide an alternative to 
the Chinese and thus undermine the MCP. The formation of UMNO and the MCA 
marked the beginning of ethnic politics in the Malayan political scene.
Meanwhile, for the Indian immigrants, the mobilisation was represented by 
the formation of the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC) in 1946 by John Thivy. The 
mobilisation of the Indians was initially to provide support and solidarity to fight for
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Indian independence from British colonial rule in India. At the same time, MIC 
was also oriented towards preserving and protecting Indian interests in political, 
social and economic areas in the Malay states, in order to cooperate with other 
races in the struggle to better the Malay states and to represent a united Indian 
view.
What could be interpreted from the formation of the Federation of Malaya to 
replace the Malayan Union was that it actually triggered the formation of political 
parties which were communally located and thus would indicate the recognition of 
the political representation of these ethnic groups, especially the minorities. With 
the Malay special position secured under the Federation, the stricter citizenship 
for the Chinese and Indians caused the Federation negotiation to be organised 
around a communal agenda instead of a Malayan-centred agenda (Terence 
Gomez, 2004, p. 173). Nevertheless, the communal agenda represented by 
UMNO, the MCA and the MIC had enabled the respective cultural groups to 
maintain their communal identity and cross-sectional base while still retaining an 
elitist form of multiracial cooperation (Terence Gomez, 2004, pp. 175-6). The 
communal agenda brought by UMNO, the MCA and the MIC at the same time 
formed a single anti-colonial front that witnessed the retention of the original 
ethnic divisions, manifested through the formation of political parties (Verma, 
2002, p.24).
Nevertheless, UMNO, the MCA and the MIC as a communal party were 
challenged by non-communal parties such as the Independent Malaya Party 
(IMP) and the All Malay Council of Joint Action (AMCJA) in the state elections,
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and later parties such as the People’s Progressive Party (PPP), the People’s 
Movement Party (Gerakan) and the Democratic Action Party (DAP). The AMCJA 
- represented by Malay, Chinese and Indians - was opposed to the idea of the 
Federation and instead called for independence on a structure based on 
universal citizenship and power-sharing arrangements with inbuilt Malay rights 
and retention of the Malay monarchy (Hilley, 2001, p.28). The IMP’s formation 
came after the failure of the founder of UMNO, Onn Jaafar, to de-communalize 
UMNO from communal politics and to open up UMNO’s membership to all 
Malayans. IMP, with its slogan ‘Unity, Freedom, Independence and Equality for 
AH’, had suggested that UMNO should be open to non-Malays, and this would 
allow UMNO to represent all races under the name United Malayan National 
Organisation instead of the Organisation confining itself to the Malays. Such an 
orientation, Onn argued, was necessary, and the slogan ‘Malaya for the Malays’ 
had to be changed to ‘Malaya for all Malayans’ in order to instil a sense of 
belonging and allegiance to the state. However, Onn’s ‘advanced’ outlook could 
not be accepted and was blocked by members of UMNO, fearing that it might 
dilute the Malay character of UMNO (Yong, 2004, p.73).
2.4 The Alliance and the Road to Independence
With the ethnic groups now organised and represented by their respective 
political parties, the British agreed for elections to be held at the state and 
municipal level in preparation for self-rule. The Kuala Lumpur council election in 
1952 provided the first opportunity to test the acceptance of the people of the 
type of political orientation they desired. The IMP’s non-communal approach was 
put to a test against the UMNO and MCA communal approach, and the result
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clearly showed that communal politics was still the preferred choice, with victory 
secured by UMNO and the MCA. UMNO and the MCA secured further victory in 
the other municipal and state elections. The UMNO-MCA alliance was governed 
by the principle of parity, in which the Malays - a minority at the municipal level - 
had cooperated with the MCA in securing the votes and vice versa (Horowitz, 
2000, p.406). Such voting patterns, which took place in the municipal and state 
elections, indicated that communal politics was unavoidable and that the Alliance 
provided a realistic and practical approach to mobilising political support in a 
pluralist society (Yong, 2004, p.78).
The outstanding performance of the Alliance in the federal election was an 
endorsement of the communal orientation, in that such an orientation would be 
retained in years to come. The Alliance adopted a consensus-based approach, 
which witnessed a level of cooperation and interdependence in which the MCA 
provided easy access to funds in the running of the Alliance. For UMNO, the 
support received from the Malays would ensure that the MCA would also be able 
to survive in Malay voter areas under the Alliance with influence from UMNO. 
Such an inter-ethnic cooperation model adopted by the Alliance would be difficult 
to challenge by the poorly financed but more ideologically oriented multiracial 
organisations (Terence Gomez, 2004, p.176).
The victory of the Alliance in the 1955 General Election had also proved to 
the British that these three ethnic groups had formed a very strong understanding 
for cooperation to attain independence. With this victory, the Alliance formed the 
independence mission to the United Kingdom, comprising eight delegates, four
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representing the Malay rulers and four representing the Alliance. After 
deliberative discussions with the British between 18 January and 8 February 
1956, the British agreed to grant independence from 31 August 1957 (Jawan, 
2007, p.43). With the date for independence in sight, it was also agreed that the 
new constitution of the independent Federation of Malaya be formulated. The 
period of formulating the new constitution was the most difficult period in the 
history of the Alliance (Yong, 2004, p.83), in which negotiations and bargaining 
took place between leaders of the Alliance, and this period is sometimes referred 
as the ‘historic bargaining’. Among the key issues negotiated by the Alliance were 
citizenship, the special position of the Malays, religion, language and education.
The negotiation on these issues was strategic, which led to the ‘historic 
bargaining’ that gave birth to the Merdeka Constitution, led by the Reid 
Commission. The Alliance had come to an agreement on the issue of citizenship, 
whereby UMNO had agreed that the principle of jus soli was to be applied, not 
retrospectively, but for those who were born on or after 31 August 1957. For the 
non-residents, citizenship could be applied for based on certain requirements, 
especially if they could demonstrate their understanding of the Malay language 
and were willing to take an oath of allegiance. In short, the outcome of the 
constitution favoured the indigenous Malays. This was because the thrust of 
nationalism had come from the Malays and the recognition of the Malays by the 
British who witnessed the signing of the treaties with the Malay Sultans in 1874 
made it an obligation for the British to protect the interests of the indigenous 
population, thus:
‘the British government had been firm in its insistence that the Malay states 
formed the country of the Malays and had maintained the position, consciously, 
subconsciously and unconsciously by preferential treatment. Its policy had been 
dictated by conscientious regard for the binding quality of treaties, a recognition 
that its economic policies had flooded the country with aliens and a realisation 
that without protection Malaya would soon cease to be the country of the Malays 
and would in fact become, what casual observation had mockingly called it 
another province of China’. (Jones, Public Administration in Malaya, pp.136-7, 
cited by Vasil, 1980, p.14)
At the same time there was also a need for the British to recognise and 
accommodate the Chinese and Indians as they had now forged a centralised 
political structure in the road to independence (Bunnell, 2002, p. 109). The 
outcome of the constitution and the inter-ethnic cooperation became possible 
through the ‘historic bargaining’, in which an unwritten understanding was 
achieved between the ethnic leaders, especially between UMNO and the MCA 
(Kam Hing in Suryadinata, 1997, p.86) and, as observed by Vasil (1980), the 
relationship was characterised by a genuine give and take towards each other’s 
interest. The unwritten understanding was that the Malays would have political 
power while the Chinese would retain economic influence. Such an unwritten 
understanding misled the Chinese who conceived Malaya to be a new nation 
whose cultural identity was to be created within the evolving entity of other 
cultural communities, on the principle that equality of status is the right of all 
citizens (Kam Hing in Suryadinata, 1997, p.86). Unfortunately, as illustrated by 
Harper, the citizenship did not amount to nationality and citizenship rights for the
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non-Malays and in no way impinged upon the special rights of the Malays 
(Harper, 1996, cited by Bunnell, 2002, p.109).
Nevertheless, the outcome of the agreement was made with an 
understanding that non-Malays were to accept the provisions relating to the 
special position of the Malays, mainly:
i) Malay reservation land for Malay use;
ii) Reservation of positions for Malays in the public service;
iii) Granting of licences and permits for certain businesses; and
iv) Granting scholarships for education and training purposes (Yong, 
2004, pp.83-4).
and thus endorsing the Malay hegemony in the constitution (Verma, 2002, p.29). 
The understanding was that this special position of the indigenous Malays, as 
stipulated under Article 153 of the Constitution, was to be reviewed 15 years after 
independence. However, this decision was dropped after the late Tun Razak 
convinced the other members of the Alliance that the Malays might be able to 
catch up with the non-Malays over a couple of years, thus making this revision 
unnecessary (Vasil, 1980, p.46). While the constitution favourably recognised the 
position of the indigenous Malays, important concessions for the non-Malays were 
also made, in which citizenship conditions for the non-Malays were liberalised, 
and this agreement resulted in the proportion of non-Malay citizens increasing 
significantly. Furthermore, another significant principle agreed was that non- 
Malays were allowed to continue to use their language and to practice their
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cultural customs, including freedom of religion (Kam Hing, in Suryadinata, 1997,
p.86).
Nevertheless, a controversy arose about the issue of the special position 
of the Malays: whether the special position should be permanent or if a time 
frame was needed. The late Tun Dr Ismail, former Deputy Prime Minister, had 
argued that ‘the question be left to the Malays themselves, because I felt that as 
more and more Malays became educated and gained self-confidence, they 
themselves would do away with this “special position” because in itself this 
“special position” is a slur on the ability of the Malays, and only to be tolerated 
because it is necessary as a temporary measure to ensure their survival in the 
modern competitive world; a world to which only those in the urban areas had 
been exposed.’ (Ooi, 2006, pp.82-3)
Furthermore, this issue of the special position of the Malays was argued to 
have been misinterpreted by the Malays. Such misinterpretation of the special 
position resulted in the Malays thinking that they were primus inter pares among 
the citizens. Tun Dr Ismail again urged caution about such misinterpretation: ‘I 
regard the special position of the Malays as a handicap given to the Malays with 
the consent of all the other races who have become citizens of this country so as 
to enable the Malays to compete on equal footing for equal opportunities in this 
country. That and that alone is the only aim of the special position of the Malays. 
But unfortunately the Malays themselves have tended to give the impression 
consciously or unconsciously that the special position of the Malays is a sign that 
the Malays are placed in a superior position to the other races in the country.
91
Perhaps, the biggest mistake that the Malays made, of course, was to coin the 
term Bumiputra because this term tended to convey an entirely different meaning 
to what was intended for the special position of the Malays. By coining the term 
Bumiputra the non-Malays suspected the Malays of wanting to classify 
themselves as first class citizens while they were relegated to second class’ (Ooi, 
2006, p. 225). Moreover, the classification or categorisation of the indigenous and 
non-indigenous population had further strengthened or reinforced 
compartmentalisation within the Malaysian polity.
However, with regard to the issue of the sustainability of the Malay special 
position, the constitutional commission was in an awkward position (Vasil, 1980, 
p.41) whereby it was a challenge to reconcile the protection of the special 
position of the Malays by granting special privileges permanently to one 
community over the other while, at the same time, recognising a common 
nationality in which all citizens, irrespective of race, creed or culture should enjoy 
certain fundamental rights, including equality before the law (Report of the 
Federation of Malaya Constitutional Commission 1957, p.71 cited by Vasil, 1980, 
p.42). Even the Commission was of the view that the Malay special position at 
that point of time was necessary, but it clearly stated that:
‘But, with the integration of the various communities into a common nationality 
which we trust will gradually come about, the need for these preferences will 
gradually disappear. Our recommendations made on the footing that Malays 
should be assured that the present position will continue for a substantial period, 
but that in due course the present preferences should be reduced and should
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ultimately cease so that there should then be no discrimination between races or 
communities’ (Report of the Federation of Malaya Constitutional Commission 
1957, p.71 cited by Vasil, 1980, pp.42-3).
With regard to the issue of religion, the Alliance agreed that Islam was to 
be recognised as the official religion and that each Malay Sultan would be the 
head of the religion in his own state, while the rights and practices of other 
religions were to be guaranteed. As for the issue of language and education, the 
Alliance had to deal with concerns raised by the Malays and non-Malays. The 
argument for a national education system was supported by the Malays, in order 
to ensure the Malay language was the sole medium of instruction. This was 
contested by the non-Malays, who argued for a vernacular education to be 
recognised, consistent with the right of the non-Malays to preserve and sustain 
their cultural identity (Yong, 2004, p.85). In spite of this, an agreement was 
reached between the Alliance that the Malay language to be made the national 
language and used as the medium of instruction, in order to develop a common 
identity and nationality. Vernacular education would be continued, provided that 
the Malay language was offered as a compulsory subject.
The ability of the Alliance leaders to solve pressing issues brought the 
leadership closer together, and leaders drew from this the lesson that many of 
their differences could be resolved in a spirit of reciprocity and goodwill (Horowitz, 
2000, p.408) and also behind closed doors via negotiation or discussion among 
the elites. Such levels of maturity portrayed by the leaders of the Alliance had 
further convinced the British that Malaya was ready for independence on 31
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August 1957. Nevertheless, the ‘historic bargaining’ which was agreed by the 
Alliance was exploited by other opposition parties, casting doubt on its fairness, 
and exploiting the fears and suspicions of the electorate (Yong, 2004, p.89).
2.5 Formation of Malaysia and Strengthening of Race-Based Politics
When independence was gained in 1957 it was without the Borneo crown 
colonies and Singapore, even though the idea of merging the Malay States, the 
Straits Settlement, and the Borneo crown colonies was mooted by the British as 
early as 1882. However, the merger materialised when Tunku Abdul Rahman, 
the first Prime Minister of Malaya, made the following remark on 27 May 1961:
‘Sooner or later Malaya would have an understanding with Britain and the 
peoples of Singapore, North Borneo, Brunei and Sarawak. It is premature for me 
to say now how this closer understanding can be brought about, but it is 
inevitable that we should look ahead to this objective and think of a plan whereby 
these territories can be brought closer together in political and economic 
cooperation.’ (Willard A. Hanna, 1961, p.7 cited by Jawan, 2007 p.47)
The reason for the merger could be interpreted firstly, as a strategy to
contain communism and secondly, to balance the population (Jawan, 2003,
p.46). The second reason was argued to be of significance, since the merger to
form Malaysia would have implications for its ethnic composition, especially with
Singapore joining Malaysia. Table 3 below illustrates the population distribution in
Malaya, Singapore, Sabah, Sarawak and Brunei. The merger with Singapore
would further increase the Malays’ fear of the increasing population of Chinese,
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who were already a significant minority in Malaysia. However, with the merger of 
the Borneo states of Brunei, Sabah and Sarawak,6 the indigenous Malays would 
still remain the significant majority.
Table 3: Population Distribution in Percentage
Ethnic Malaya Singapore Sabah Brunei Sarawak Total
Population 6.9 1.5 0.5 0.08 0.7 9.7
Malays 50 14 18 49 18 42
Indigenous 1 - 50 28 50 11
Chinese 37 76 24 19 31 38
Others 13 11 9 5 1 10
Source: Willard A. Hanna, 1964, p.10, cited by Jawan, 2006, p.49.
A study on the formation of Malaysia was undertaken by the Malaysia 
Solidarity and Consultative Committee (MSCC), formed in July 1961 with 
representatives from the Malay states, Singapore, Sabah, Sarawak and Brunei. 
The aim of the MSCC was to gather opinions and views from potential member 
states, to disseminate information, to initiate and encourage discussion, and to 
promote activities that could help realise the formation of the Federation of 
Malaysia.
Singapore agreed with the merger by August 1961 and put forth the terms 
for the merger, referred to as the Singapore White Paper, in which firstly, 
Singapore would become a new state within the Federation. Secondly, it would 
have 15 seats in the Federal House of Representatives and two seats in the
6 The population o f Sabah and Sarawak comprises various tribes which are considered as the indigenous 
inhabitants. These tribes could either be Muslims or non-Muslims and their indigenousness is acknowledged 
and stipulated in the Federal Constitution. Brunei, however, did not jo in  Malaysia when it was formed in 1963.
95
Senate. Thirdly, it would have wide-ranging state power over education and 
labour, more wide-ranging than any other states in the Federation and fourthly, 
Singaporeans would have dual citizenship: Singapore and the Federation. 
Finally, Singapore’s Head of State would continue to be called Yang di-Pertuan 
Negara or President and he would be appointed by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong 
(the King), in consultation with the Singapore Prime Minister (Jawan, 2006, p.57).
As for the North Borneo States, the Cobbold Commission, which was 
formed in January 1962 to ascertain the views of the people of Borneo, published 
the following statement:
‘About one third of the population in each territory strongly favoured...Malaysia 
without too much concern about terms and conditions. Another third, many of 
them favourable to the Malaysia project, ask with varying degrees of emphasis, 
for conditions and safeguards varying in nature and extent...The remaining third 
is divided between those who insist on independence before Malaysia is 
considered and those who would strongly prefer to see British rule continue for 
some years to come.’ (Report of the Commission of Inquiry to North Borneo and 
Sarawak, 1962 in B. Sumandjuntak, 1969: 143 from Jawan, 2006, p.58).
There were also some recommendations made by the Cobbold 
Commission and the MSCC with regard to Borneo: firstly, the existing Federation 
of Malaya Constitution would be the basis of the new constitution, taking into 
consideration amendments to include safeguards as agreed; secondly, the use of 
Malay and English as the official language; thirdly, the control of immigration by
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the central government, subject to approval of the state government concerned; 
fourthly, no right to secede; fifthly, Borneonisation to proceed as quickly as 
possible (but British officers to remain in the state civil services until their 
replacement can be found from peoples of the Borneo territories) and, finally, 
complete religious freedom and no official religion for the Borneo states (Jawan, 
2006, p.58).
After taking into consideration the views of the member states, the 
Federation of Malaysia was formed 15 September 1963 with Sabah, Sarawak 
and Singapore as members. Brunei, however, did not join the Federation.
The membership of Singapore in the Federation proved destabilising, 
since Singapore had failed to understand the essence of the historic bargain, as 
some would argue, which had been agreed by the Alliance. The political style 
brought by the People’s Action Party (PAP), the Chinese-dominated multiracial 
party ruling Singapore, was considered by the Malays to be jarring and 
incompatible with the consensus style of Malaysian politics (Yong, 2004, p.99). 
Furthermore, PAP played an aggressive role as the representative of the 
Chinese, since the MCA had failed to represent the Chinese, which resulted in 
the unequal treatment of the Chinese in Malaysia. This had undermined the role 
of the MCA in the Alliance as representative of the Chinese, making PAP the 
alternative party for the Chinese in Malaysian politics. For instance, in the 1964 
General Election, the PAP represented itself as the Chinese party representing 
the Chinese and belittled the MCA’s role by accusing the latter of being 
subservient to UMNO and Malay interests (Jawan, p.61). PAP leaders called for
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the Chinese electorate to vote PAP in order for the party to be able to effectively 
deal with the uneven social and economic treatment by the federal government. 
The aggressive racial sentiment promoted by PAP caused two riots between July 
and September 1964 (Jawan, 2006, p.61). The PAP’s aggressive manoeuvring 
was further intensified when Lee Kuan Yew, Prime Minister of Singapore, 
launched the campaign ‘Malaysian Malaysia’ in April, 1965. ‘Malaysian Malaysia’ 
instilled the idea of opposing the continuation of Malay special rights, supported 
the recognition of English, Chinese and Tamil as official languages and 
demanded equal treatment for all citizens. However, the best description of the 
idea of ‘Malaysian Malaysia’ is provided by Bellow (1970):
‘A Malaysian Malaysia means that the nation and the state is not identified with 
the supremacy, wellbeing and the interests of any one particular community or 
race. A Malaysian Malaysia means in theory as well as in practice, educating and 
encouraging the various races in Malaysia to seek political affiliation not on the 
basis of race and religion but on the basis of common political ideologies’.
Later, in May 1965, a Convention on Malaysian Unity was launched and 
this campaign attracted the Chinese; in response the Malays launched the call for 
Malay Unity. This development soured the relationship between Malaysia and 
Singapore in the Federation. Various steps were taken to address and resolve 
the differences, but these proved futile. This ultimately led to the secession of 
Singapore on 9 August 1965.
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The departure of Singapore from Malaysia left a political legacy that paved 
the way to enable a challenge to the basic understandings of the historic bargain 
or Merdeka Compact (Yong, 2004, p.100). The campaign of Malaysian Malaysia 
was further promoted by the DAP, a political party formed by supporters of PAP. 
This idea of Malaysian Malaysia was also supported by other parties such as the 
PPP and the People’s Movement Party (Gerakan). The idea of Malaysian 
Malaysia also became a platform for these parties in the 1969 General Election. 
As for the Malays, such a political platform was viewed as an attempt to 
undermine that which had been agreed in the historic bargain. The Pan Malaysia 
Islamic Party (PMIP), which took a pro-Malay and pro-Islam line, represented 
itself as an alternative for the Malays and criticised UMNO as giving in to the non- 
Malays on issues affecting Malay rights and privileges (Yong, 2004, p. 100).
Therefore, the 1969 General Election took on an increasingly high 
communalistic tone, and racial tension reached a new high; the whole exercise 
assumed the form of a communal showdown. Communalism was rampant, the 
Malays and non-Malays were pitted against each other, and it was natural that 
the outcome was seen in terms of victory for one and defeat for the other (Vasil, 
1980, p.175 cited by Yong, 2004, p.101).
2.6 The 1969 Race Riot and Formulation of the New Economic Policy
As mentioned earlier, the 1969 General Election rapidly acquired a
communalistic tone, as Singapore had left a legacy of questioning the historic
bargain of the Alliance and called for the equality of all citizens. The urging of a
more equitable inter-ethnic settlement was viewed as a threat to the indigenous
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Malays’ special position. This aggressive demand had made the Malays 
especially uneasy. Parties such as PPP, DAP and Gerakan, which echoed the 
tone for social justice and rights to equality, had managed to attract the support of 
the non-Malays.
Therefore, the 1969 General Election witnessed a poor performance by 
the Alliance for the first time, when they only managed to secure 66 out of the 
104 contested parliamentary seats. The defeat of the Alliance saw the switching 
of a number of states to the opposition and the big winners were parties that had 
appealed to the non-Malay vote (Yong, 2004, p. 102). The result of the 1969 
General Election was argued by non-Malays to be an endorsement of their 
demand for a review of the historic bargain, while the Malays viewed such victory 
by the opposition as threatening their political dominance of the country (Yong, 
2004, p.102).
The victory of the opposition was celebrated on the streets of Kuala 
Lumpur on 13 May 1969 and this created a very tense situation when supporters 
of the respective parties started to chant racially-based remarks at one another. 
As the situation spiralled out of control, the government had to declare a state of 
emergency; the government was suspended, and the National Operations 
Council (NOC) was formed as the administrative body to govern the country from 
1969 to 1971. The period under the NOC witnessed significant changes such as 
the creation of new institutions and constitutional amendments. The weakening of 
the MCA and the dominance of UMNO was also apparent (Kam Hing, in 
Suryadinata, 1997, p.90). During this period, the NEP was introduced, which
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would empower the indigenous Malays through an affirmative action programme, 
which would give a more Malay character to the state, and new symbols of loyalty 
were insisted upon, especially on the part of non-Malays (Kam Hing, in 
Suryadinata, 1997, p.90). This was because, prior to the 1969 race riot, there 
was a failure on the side of the government, especially the Malay leaders, to 
translate the special position of the Malays into an improvement of the Malays’ 
economic position (Bunnell, 2002, p.109).
The 1969 General Election result paved the way for the restructuring of 
Malaysian society, as it provided the nation’s new emergency leadership with the 
opportunity to change the nature and terms of the formative inter-ethnic bargain 
by ‘re-engineering’ the institutional arrangements which had evolved since 
independence (Puthucheary, 2008, p. 11). Nevertheless, it was argued that the 
economic disparity between the Malays and non-Malays had contributed to the 
race riot, and the government had failed to realise that this economic disparity 
between the races would be a stumbling block to national unity. Tun Razak, the 
second Prime Minister of Malaysia, argued that, for race relations to improve, it 
would require at least some equivalence in the economic conditions of its citizens 
(Yong, 2004, p. 107). Up until 1969, the number of poor Malays was still higher 
than the number of poor Chinese and poor Indians, and such a condition had 
been dominant since the British colonial period; over time, the identification of 
poverty with a specific ethnic community had become a structural feature of the 
economy. Race became identified with economic status (Yong, 2004, p. 107). 
Table 4 illustrates the household income of the ethnic groups, which indicates the
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lagging of the Malays with RM179 per household compared to RM387 and
RM310 for the Chinese and Indians, respectively.
Table 4: Monthly Household Income by Race In 1970 in RM
Income Range Malay Chinese Indian Other Total
1-99 84.5 9.6 4.9 1.0 100
100-199 60.8 24.9 14.0 0.3 100
200-399 40.3 46.0 13.5 0.2 100
400-699 31.6 55.7 12.1 0.6 100
700-1,499 23.2 61.4 12.5 2.9 100
1,500-2,999 14.0 62.1 13.6 10.3 100
3,000 and 
above
12.1 52.0 17.3 18.6 100
% of total 
households




178.7 387.4 310.4 950.5 268.7
Source: Hung Hung Yong, 2004, 5 Men & 5 Ideas, Building National Identity, Kuala Lumpur: 
Pelanduk Publications, p.108.
As mentioned earlier, while the Malays’ special position was recognised, 
no specific policy measure was formulated by the government to address the 
economic disparity between Malays and non-Malays, despite the steady 
economic growth and low inflation recorded after independence. The lack of 
government initiatives for the Malays was also recognised by the MCA which 
stated, ‘the twelve years following Merdeka (Independence) did not in fact bring 
forth the wealth and power which the Malays had expected. They found 
themselves still to be the rural people with the control of the towns very much in
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the hands of the non-Malays.’ (Verma, 2002, p.63). The economic imbalances 
were not challenged or addressed by the government with any specific policy 
measures, as the Alliance government, which was led by the late Tunku Abdul 
Rahman, the first Prime Minister, was more concerned about multiracialism 
rather than with structural changes to remove interracial poverty (Verma, 2002, 
p.62). As a result, the non-Malays were seen to further control the economy, and 
the lack of government initiatives for the Malays contributed to the escalation of 
the racial tension that finally led to the 1969 race riot.
It was only because of the 1969 race riot that the government decided that 
there was a need to look at economic disparity as a stumbling block to achieving 
unity and, at the same time, eliminating the uneasiness of the Malays towards the 
economic success of the non-Malays, especially the Chinese. Therefore, under 
the premiership of Tun Razak, the second Prime Minister, a new way forward of 
managing Malaysia’s diversity was needed, in which the economic perspective 
was addressed. Based on the advice of James Puthucheary, a member of the 
National Consultative Council, a body formed in 1970 that involved 
representatives of various social groups -  political parties, the professions, 
religious groups, the press, the public services, trade union and minority groups -  
in discussing the riots and finding permanent solutions to the racial problem (Ooi, 
2006, p.219), it was commented that state intervention through public 
corporations was required if the imbalances resulting from the colonial economic 
structure and their lasting effects on inter-ethnic relations were to be rectified. 
(Puthucheary, 1998, pp.30-31 in Ooi, 2006, p.216)
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As a result, in 1971, the New Economic Policy (NEP) was launched and 
affirmative action became a public policy instrument to restructure society to 
create greater equity between the races (Yong, 2004, p.97). However, even 
though the formulation of the NEP was for the betterment of the position of the 
Malays, it was not in any way accomplished at the cost of the Chinese or Indians 
(Kreuzer, 2006, p. 16). The NEP, which was to be implemented for the period of 
20 years from 1971 until 1990, had two central aims, namely to eradicate poverty 
irrespective of race, and to restructure Malaysian society to reduce and 
eventually eliminate the identification of ethnicity with economic function (Syed, 
2009, p.20). At the same time, the restructuring was to be made only in the 
context of a rapidly expanding economy without restricting the potential of non- 
Malays to gain economically (Yong, 2004, p. 111). However, the ultimate goal of 
the NEP was clearly stated in paragraph 155 (i) of the Second Malaysia Plan, 
1971-1975 for the emergence of a fully-fledged Malay entrepreneurial community 
within one generation (Siddique and Suryadinata, 1982, p.675).
The objectives of the NEP were to be accomplished through the 
distribution of opportunities and equity ownership; the Malays were targeted to 
own and operate at least 30% of commercial and industrial activities. The target 
for non-Malays would be increased from 37% to 40%, while the share of 
foreigners would be reduced from 61% to 30%, as illustrated in Table 5. 
Nevertheless, this idea of creating Malay capitalists was criticised since it would 
only benefit a small number of Malay entrepreneurs, while the funds could be 
invested and could go to projects to relieve unemployment among rural Malays 
(Alatas in Siddique and Suryadinata, 1982, p.682).
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Table 5: NEP Restructuring Targets Share Capital of Limited Companies 1970 and 










Total 5,289 102.6 1,978.5 3,207.9 46,821 14,075.5 18,796.5 13,949.0
% 1.9% 37.4% 60.7% 30.1% 40.1% 29.8%
Source: Hung Hung Yong, 2004, 5 Men & 5 Ideas, Building National Identity, Kuala Lumpur: Pelanduk 
Publications, p. 111.
At the start, the special position of the Malays, together with the affirmative 
action policy, had caused resentment between the communities and thus 
exacerbated tensions between Malays and the Chinese (Muzaffar, 1987, 24 cited 
by Hefner, 2001, p.30), since they perceived the formulation of the NEP as only 
assisting the Malays, while neglecting the bulk of Malaysians, who were as poor 
as or even poorer than the Malays. Nonetheless, the Chinese, with strategic ties 
to UMNO and the Malay elite, did well as NEP business partners, and the attitude 
of much of the Chinese elite changed (Gomez 1999, 153; Searle 1999 in Hefner, 
2001, p.31). It was the aim of UMNO from the start with the introduction of the 
NEP to bring a new class of Malay capitalists into existence, apart from 
alleviating poverty, and this was made known to other leaders of the Alliance. 
Given the impressive breadth and duration of Malaysia’s economic boom, the 
Chinese middle class has prospered too, although this has not prevented many 
ordinary Chinese and Indians from feeling that they are a lesser category of 
citizen (Hefner, 2001, p.31). Similarly, the Malays and the Chinese slowly began 
to regard the NEP as a major source of inter-ethnic peace (Embong in Hefner, 
2001, p.74). Therefore, in order to convince the Chinese and Indians that the 
NEP was formulated to address the specific issue of economic disparity, a
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timeline was set. This would convince the Chinese and Indians that this form of 
affirmative action programme for the Malays was designed with an objective for 
the Malays to be integrated economically, and thus would ensure national unity.
Meanwhile, the structure of the Alliance also faced a significant 
transformation after the 1969 race riot. Since independence, UMNO, the MCA 
and the MIC were the most prominent members of the Alliance and each party 
was recognised as representing the ethnic interest of their respective community. 
However, after the 1969 race riot, UMNO leaders decided to further expand the 
membership of the Alliance, replacing it with Barisan Nasional or the National 
Front. The National Front would no longer represent the coalition of UMNO, the 
MCA and the MIC but a new form of arrangement that would provide a multiracial 
fagade around the Malay core to be led by UMNO (Vasil, 1980, p.205). Such a 
move witnessed the PMIP, the PPP and the People’s Movement Party (Gerakan) 
joining the coalition of the National Front. Hence, the dominant role of the MCA 
and the MIC as sole and permanent representative of their respective 
communities was no longer vital, especially for the MCA after the defeat of its 
candidates in the 1969 General Election.
Along with the NEP, the government also formulated the Rukunegara or 
Articles of Faith of the State. The Rukunegara, formulated by the Department of 
National Unity provided the moral direction (Ooi, 2007, p.242) for the state by 
outlining the principles that all Malaysians adhered to. The Rukunegara 
represented a national consensus and a commitment to the task of creating a 
united, socially just, economically equitable and progressive Malaysian nation
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(Hitam, in Tambunlertchai & Gupta, 1993, p.175). Moreover, the Rukunegara 
could be argued as providing the platform for unity, while the NEP provided the 
strategy to achieve such unity, by recognising and addressing the need of the 
Malays.
However, another significant event that took place as a result of the 1969 
race riot was that the government decided that the freedom to indulge in excess 
needed to be restrained. This was because the 1969 General Election campaign 
had raised communal tensions to an unprecedented level, with parties 
questioning the foundation of the historic bargain agreed by the Alliance. 
Therefore, a number of ‘sensitive issues’ related to i) the status and powers of 
Malay rulers, ii) the special position of the Malays and the citizenship rights of the 
non-Malays, iii) the status of Islam as the official religion, and iv) the status of 
Malay as the sole official national language were removed from the realm of 
public discussion (Yong, 2004, p.104). These issues were considered as ‘non- 
negotiable’, and the sedition law was amended to make it an offence to question 
or discuss any of these issues if these discussions produced, or had the 
tendency to produce, racially-based hatred (Yong, 2004, p. 105).
2.7 National Development Policy and Bangsa Malaysia
When the NEP ended in 1990, a new policy orientation was needed. The 
ethnic consciousness that was reinforced during the implementation of the NEP 
now had to be tackled with a more all-embracing policy that would eliminate 
identification along racial lines. However, it was argued that the Malays had not
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manage to fulfil the 30% equity ownership and that a further affirmative action 
policy was required. Obviously, a decision to continue the affirmative action policy 
was viewed sceptically by the non-Malays. In fact, such a continuation was seen 
by the earlier leaders of UMNO as an insult to the Malays, since such special 
privileges were not meant to be permanent (Ooi, 2006, p.217).
Nevertheless, the government decided that an extension to the NEP was 
needed in order to assist the Malays, so the National Development Policy (NDP) 
was introduced in 1991, with a cornerstone of privatisation as an agent for 
growth. Privatisation would enable Malaysia to achieve the status of a fully 
modern nation by 2020, with a united Malaysian nation or Bangsa Malaysia. 
Nevertheless, the essence of the NDP was still committed to the eradication of 
poverty and to continuing with the restructuring of the Malaysian economy. 
However, the only difference was that, under the NDP, no specific time frame 
was allocated for the target of equity ownership for the Malays to be achieved.
The orientation of the NDP (1991-2000) focused more on the qualitative 
aspects of Bumiputra participation (Kok Wah, 2002, p.43). The achievement of 
the NEP was to produce a new middle class Bumiputra, while the NDP stressed 
the importance of cooperation between this new middle class Bumiputra with the 
non-Bumiputra. The introduction of a privatisation strategy under the NDP further 
enhanced the Bumiputra and non-Bumiputra cooperation. Even though there was 
no specific time frame for equity ownership, the shift of the NDP orientation, 
along with the privatisation strategy, provided opportunities for both the 
Bumiputra and non-Bumiputra to be involved in the rapid development of the
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country. This opportunity was considered as a win-win situation for both, even 
though there still existed the requirement to address the economic needs of the 
Bumiputra under the NDP.
Since the NDP would be continuing with the affirmative action policy for 
the Malays, the government needed to ensure that this continuation would not 
deprive the Chinese and Indians, and therefore a statement goal, titled Vision 
2020, was also launched with the NDP. The target of Vision 2020 is for Malaysia 
to achieve a developed status by 2020, and Vision 2020 outlined the challenges, 
including establishing a united Malaysian nation with a sense of common and 
shared destiny, a nation at peace with itself, territorially and ethnically integrated, 
living in harmony with full and fair partnership made up of Bangsa Malaysia with 
political loyalty and dedication to the nation. This idea of the Bangsa envisaged 
by Mahathir would help the nation to be confident, democratic, liberal, tolerant, 
caring, and instilled with strong moral and ethical values (Kam Hing, 1997 in 
Suryadinata, 1997, p.80). While some other challenges were also outlined in 
Vision 2020, this challenge of establishing a united Malaysian Nation gave hope 
to the non-Malays that they would be treated as full citizens and their cultural 
autonomy would be fully recognised (Ong, 2004, pp. 189-98 cited by Segawa, 
2007, p.32).
The aim of Bangsa Malaysia to create an integrated and united Malaysian 
society was viewed, especially by non-Malays, as possibly being the source of 
integration and unity, and received undivided support. The integration and unity 
which was the aim of the NEP could be said to be contradictory to an affirmative
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action policy for the Malays. Therefore, when the idea of Bangsa Malaysia was 
launched in 1990, the non-Malays viewed it as a turning point in Malaysia’s 
nation-building process, thus creating a sense of nationhood.
With the end of the NDP in 2000, the National Vision Policy or NVP (2001- 
2010) was launched by combining the strategies from the NEP and the NDP. 
The basis of the NVP is guided by the policy of Vision 2020. The aspiration of 
Bangsa Malaysia to be the uniting factor could be directed to achieving political 
loyalty to the state and thus fostering unity in diversity (Segawa, 2007, p.34). In 
fact, the concept of creating one cohesive Bangsa Malaysia living in harmony and 
fair partnership is an integral part and the ultimate objective of Vision 2020 
(Segawa, 2007, p.35). Furthermore, the idea of Bangsa Malaysia and the NDP 
received undivided support from the non-Malays, since it did not enforce or 
promote any assimilationist agenda and recognised that, to achieve Vision 2020, 
not only was inter-ethnic unity vital, but the role played by the economically 
dominant Chinese was also vital for Malaysia to progress towards a fully 
developed and industrialised nation (Kam Hing, in Suryadinata, 1997, p.113). 
Therefore, the idea of Bangsa Malaysia, coined by former Prime Minister 
Mahathir, embraces the fact that Malaysia’s unity in diversity is a vital character 
to be recognised, and that multiculturalism is a way forward (Kam Hing, in 
Suryadinata, 1997, p.81).
The idea of Bangsa Malaysia provided a way forward for unity and 
integration, and such an idea was welcomed by the non-Malays. On the other 
hand, the Malays viewed the idea of Bangsa Malaysia as undermining the special
n o
position and the affirmative action policy which had been beneficial to the Malays. 
Such a view could be a stumbling block towards building a united Malaysia and 
thus undermining Bangsa Malaysia. The biggest challenge to forming Bangsa 
Malaysia would be how to convince the Malays that nation-building within 
democratic principles requires the upholding of the principles of equality, justice 
and non-discrimination by the state towards its citizens, thus creating a sense of 
belonging.
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2.8 Islam Hadhari and the Rights of the Minority
The argument that is of concern in a multicultural society, especially in a 
Western liberal democracy, is to what extent should the public space be free and 
neutral so as to ensure that no specific culture, belief or identity is being 
promoted and recognised by the state. The belief in Western liberal democracies 
is that a secular state provides the best public space for equality and tolerance. 
But to what extent can this neutral position of public space be guaranteed, as the 
even the most secular of Western liberal democracies cannot be denied its 
identification with certain cultural or religious identity.
As far as Malaysia is concerned, the Malaysian Federal Constitution 
Article 3 clearly stipulates that Islam is the official religion of the Federation and, 
at the same time, Article 11 clearly outlines the liberty of freedom of religion. 
These two articles clearly indicate that, while Malaysia recognises Islam as the 
official religion of the Federation, since the majority of its population are Muslims, 
other cultural and religious practices or professions are equally recognised. 
Furthermore, the recognition of Islam is significant for the recognition of the state 
as a Malay-Muslim state, since the identification of Malays in Article 160 of the 
Federation Constitution clearly defined them as being Muslim, as speaking the 
Malay language and practising Malay culture. The multicultural identity is visible 
in Malaysia with various religious institutions established and celebrated in line 
with Article 11. The celebration of various cultural festivals and declaring those 
days as public holidays by the state signifies the recognition of the diverse 
cultural and ethnic communities that exist in Malaysia.
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While Article 11 of the Federal Constitution is viewed as promoting 
multiculturalism in Malaysia, it has, to a certain extent, contradicted Article 3, 
which recognises Islam as the official religion; this clearly indicates that the state 
is not as liberal and neutral when it comes to the recognition of certain religious 
or communal values as most multiculturalism scholars would have expected. It is 
here that Malaysia recognises Islam as the dominant religion of the state but, at 
the same time, freedom of profession and celebration of other religious or 
communal identity is being recognised. This, to a certain extent, diverges from 
the expectation of a Western multicultural society where the liberal and secular 
state is expected to recognise the minority religious and communal identity.
The conflict that exists is in the interpretation and recognition of Malaysia 
as either an Islamic state that fully complies and implements the Shari’ah law, or 
a secular state that only recognises Islam as its official religion and adopts certain 
Islamic principles to govern the majority Muslims in Malaysia. Although the 
recognition of Islam in multicultural Malaysia continues to be contested, the fact is 
that, to date, Shari’ah law has never been implemented as the law governing 
Malaysia as a whole by the present National Front Coalition, even though certain 
Shari’ah law is implemented for Muslims which covers issues related to family 
matters, marriage and conversion. This is due to the fact that the multicultural 
set-up of Malaysia requires this issue to be presented, especially to non-Muslims, 
in an acceptable manner through discussions and dialogue. While Shari’ah law is 
only binding to Muslims, it has created some conflict, especially for those Malay- 
Muslims wanting to leave Islam. This is due to the fact that such cases can only 
be heard in the Shari’ah court in which the decision to allow such conversion as a
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result of mixed marriage could be turned down and that this decision cannot be 
challenged. The argument for the supremacy of the Shari’ah court is that all 
issues pertaining to Muslims are referred to the Shari’ah court. This dilemma 
faced by the Malay Muslims continues to be a challenge within multicultural 
Malaysia, where the notion of individual liberty in a multicultural society does not 
necessarily ensure the right of the individual to flourish, as group rights would 
restrict such preferences of the individual. Such scenarios could best be ascribed 
to Kymlicka’s idea that multiculturalism in its essence must not allow internal 
restrictions on members of cultural or religious groups and must allow external 
interaction.
The conflict between the Malay dominant party, UMNO, and the Islamic 
party, PAS, has demonstrated the need to balance the promotion of Islam, which 
will be appealing to the Malay Muslims, with the promotion of the agenda of non- 
Muslims. Hence, the multicultural set-up of Malaysia would require these two 
dominant Malay Muslim parties to promote their agenda in a moderate way, since 
non-Muslims would be the determining factor in the political survival of these two 
parties in their respective coalitions.
The idea of an Islamic state propagated by UMNO advances the Malay 
agenda. This is visible with the Islamisation agenda or other projects introduced 
by UMNO which have an apparent inclination towards advancing the Malay 
agenda, such as the former Prime Minister Mahathir’s promotion of Islam as 
associated with economic progress (Lee, 2010, p. 16). This is because the
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promotion of economic progress has been the agenda of the NEP which is 
targeted at improving the economic condition of the Malays.
As mentioned earlier, Malaysia recognises Islam as the official religion of 
the Federation but Shari’ah law has never been implemented. Therefore, the 
issue of Shari’ah as a stumbling block in promoting a multicultural identity in 
Malaysia is really a non-issue since the implementation of Shari’ah is restricted to 
the Muslims. Furthermore, the liberal and moderate approach adopted by the 
Malay founding leaders since independence has, to a certain extent, convinced 
non-Muslims that freedom of belief, profession and religious identity is to be part 
of Malaysia’s multicultural identity. However, there is a concern raised by non- 
Muslims that any move to implement the Shari’ah law in its totality will have a 
detrimental effect on non-Muslims.
The propagation of Islam either by UMNO or PAS within the context of 
multicultural Malaysia ought to be viewed sceptically by non-Muslims, as this 
could be perceived as a process to Islamise society as a whole. Both parties 
carry with them the agenda of Islam which is essential to Malay Muslims. As for 
UMNO, the agenda of Islam must be championed, since the sustainability of 
Islam means the sustainability of the Malays as the Bumiputra in Malaysia. Under 
the Federal Constitution, Article 160, Malay is defined as Muslim, speaking the 
Malay language and practicing the Malay custom and tradition. Hence, the 
agenda of Islam brought by UMNO is more concerned with the championing of 
Malays specifically. On the other hand, PAS’s agenda for Islam is to establish an
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Islamic state during the Prophet Muhammad pbuh period which signifies the 
harmonious, multicultural, multi-religious set-up (Lee, 2010, p.52).
When the former Prime Minister Badawi took office in 2003, the challenge 
he faced was to balance the idea of building Bangsa Malaysia as a notion that 
would build a multicultural Malaysia, based on the belief of rights to equality, and 
the promotion of Islam as the official religion of the Federation which still allows 
the recognition of minority rights. The promotion of Islam, while recognising 
equality and the rights of the minority, by former Prime Minister Badawi received 
severe criticism from the Malay leaders who argued that such a move towards an 
egalitarian society would cause the indigenous Malays to lose their dominant role 
by surrendering the privileges and rights the latter have enjoyed. For instance, 
the present Chief Minister of Johor, Ghani Othman, clearly commented that 
Bangsa Malaysia is a term applicable to all Malaysians in his words ‘even if 
Bangsa Malaysia is to be used, it must only be applied in the context of all the 
peoples of Malaysia with the Malays as the pivotal race’ (New Straits Times, 
November 6, 2006). As Islam promotes the notion of equality irrespective of 
racial, religious, minority and majority identity, the need to reflect this notion back 
to the majority Malay Muslims is vital as it emphasises that, in multicultural 
Malaysia, recognition of equality is paramount. At the same time, this will reflect 
the moderate side of Islam to the non-Muslims.
As a result of the criticism from the leaders of the indigenous Malays, the 
idea of Bangsa Malaysia was not further promoted as it could be viewed as 
disloyal to the Malay cause and agenda by other members of UMNO. As much
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as the non-Malays hoped that the idea of Bangsa Malaysia would recognise and 
integrate the nation, it has only created frustration that the formation of an 
egalitarian Malaysian society is far from being achieved.
Bangsa Malaysia failed to be accepted by the indigenous Malays as an 
important attempt towards integration and unity. Hence, the then Prime Minister 
Badawi came up with the idea of Islam Hadhari, or civilised Islam, in 2004. Islam 
Hadhari is an approach introduced to create awareness of the true concept of 
Islam, with the hope that it will propel the development of the ummah, or 
community and the nation (Islam Hadhari: An Explanation, 2005, p.4); it is also 
considered to be the main political and ideological element in supporting the 
success of Vision 2020 (Zulhamri in Syed and Ozbilgin, 2010, p.16). 
Furthermore, it is an approach to building a modern, multi-ethnic, multi-faith 
society based on the ten principles outlined:
1. Faith in and piety towards Allah;
2. A just and trustworthy government;
3. Free and liberated people;
4. A rigorous pursuit and mastery of knowledge;
5. Balanced and comprehensive economic development;
6. A good quality of life for the people;
7. Protection of the rights of minority groups and women;
8. Cultural and moral integrity;
9. Safeguarding of the environment; and
10. Strong defence capabilities.
The aim of this approach is to make Malaysia a model Islamic country, an 
advanced nation based on its own indigenous matrix, and which emphasises 
universal development values which do not run counter to the society’s multiracial 
context.
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Under Islam Hadhari, it is clearly stipulated that the protection of the rights 
of minority groups and women must be recognised. By stipulating such a 
principle under the Islam Hadhari approach, it could be argued that the 
government was trying to tone down racial sentiment, especially from the 
indigenous Malay leaders, by diverting the attention to the principles of justice 
and equality propagated by Islam. Such a move could also be viewed as an 
attempt to guarantee to the non-Muslims or non-Malays that Islam, apart from 
being the official religion of the state, has an integrative role that could promote 
national unity and integration. The preservation of human dignity without 
differentiating between the majority and minority groups became the salient point 
under Islam Hadhari. With the promotion of Islam Hadhari, the value of justice, 
rights and equality, as promoted by Islam, is now being thrown back to the 
indigenous Malay leaders; since Islam does not recognise racial or ethnic 
supremacy and is guided by principles of fairness and justice, how would the 
indigenous Malay leaders justify their demand for the promotion of indigenous 
Malay interest? Even though Islam Hadhari had clearly outlined the need for 
promoting the rights of minority groups based on the value of justice and fairness, 
the idea of defending the interests of the indigenous Malays continued to be 
promoted and those of the non-Malays or non-Muslims were glossed over; it was 
unclear the benefit that they would gain as a result of implementing Islam Hadhari 
(Zulhamri, in Syed and Ozbilgin, 2010, p.17). The idea of justifying the need to 
promote the rights of minority groups, as stipulated by Islam, had actually 
benefited the PAS when its slogan of Islam for All during the 2008 General 
Election brought a drastic change of support of the non-Malays.
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2.9 The New Economic Model and 1 Malaysia
The sixth Prime Minister, Prime Minister Najib, launched the New Economic 
Model (NEM) in 2009, upon taking over the office from former Prime Minister 
Badawi. This NEM was launched upon four pillars, namely 1 Malaysia, the 
Economic Transformation Programme, the Government Transformation 
Programme and the 10th Malaysia Plan with an objective of achieving high 
income status, inclusiveness and sustainability. The first pillar identified by Prime 
Minister Najib, 1 Malaysia, or united Malaysia, which transcends ethnic 
boundaries, signifies the move towards attaining inclusiveness (NEM Blueprint, 
2009, p.89) and was launched on 16 September 2008. Under the NEM, the goal 
of attaining inclusiveness by liberalising government policies and focusing less on 
particular ethnic groups is essential, since it would be a prerequisite in fostering a 
sense of belonging, as inclusiveness would enable all communities to contribute 
to and share in the wealth of the country.
In the NEM, it was acknowledged that the excessive focus on ethnicity- 
based distribution of resources had resulted in a growing separation and 
compartmentalisation of society, due to racial consciousness. Hence, the 
government would re-orient its affirmative action programme from being race- 
based to one based on needs, irrespective of racial identity and, as such, would 
be in the interest of distributive justice. Meanwhile, the re-orientation of the 
affirmative action programme under the NEM is still considered relevant and 
desirable, since inequalities still persist. NEM is considered to be targeting the
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lower income group, irrespective of ethnic group, and would enable them to gain 
access to the resources needed for their growth and development.
While the continuation of an affirmative action programme under the NEM 
had been re-oriented to be less race conscious, it nevertheless raised doubts 
about the sensitivity of such an orientation towards the non-Malays. This is 
because the re-orientation of the affirmative action programme under the NEM is 
targeted to assist the 40% of households which earn below RM1500; 77.2% of 
these are from Bumiputra located in Sabah and Sarawak. Since the biggest 
target group are still Bumiputra, such a re-orientation of the affirmative action 
programme could still be argued to be diverted from its original purpose of being 
too race conscious. At the same time, the doubts raised by the non-Malays could 
be further supported with the formation of Pertubuhan Pribumi Perkasa Malaysia, 
or Perkasa, immediately after the launch of 1 Malaysia. Perkasa, with its agenda 
of promoting and protecting the indigenous Malays’ special position, was 
sceptical of the 1 Malaysia idea as it claimed that it would undermine the 
supremacy of the indigenous Malays.
Since the launch of 1 Malaysia, various interpretations have been attached 
to the policy, with the result that a clear cut direction for 1 Malaysia is absent. The 
question here is whether 1 Malaysia’s final objective is the creation of an 
egalitarian society, as was expected from the notion of Bangsa Malaysia. Under 
the NEM, in order to ensure that the goal of inclusiveness of all races is 
guaranteed, the government suggested the creation of an Equal Opportunity 
Commission which would be tasked to deal with cases of unfair treatment and
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discrimination. The creation of such a commission could be said to be timely, as 
there has been an absence of such a commission since the launch of the NEP, 
which could evaluate the progress and development of integration and national 
unity. This is because the fall back position for the continuation of an affirmative 
action programme for the indigenous Malays has been the failure of the former to 
reach the 30% equity ownership, as stipulated under the NEP. Therefore, the 
Equal Opportunity Commission would be one step forward to achieving national 
unity in Malaysia. The establishment of this kind of formal organisation is 
essential if unfairness and discrimination are to be effectively addressed, as this 
authoritative organisation would be accountable for issuing detailed regulations to 
cleanse institutions of their discriminatory elements (Cohen and Sterba, 2003, 
p. 13). Nevertheless, the success of such an arrangement cannot be ascertained, 
as it is yet to be executed.
However, one interesting observation that could be derived from the 
policies formulated to date is the essential role of economic distribution since the 
inception of the NEP. This economic distribution policy formulated by the state is 
an indicator that national unity, integration and nation-building are centred on a 
sound economic distribution. Perhaps the idea of the economy playing a role in 
the process of integration, to quote the statement by the late Tun Razak, the 
former Prime Minister, could be proven when the newly-found confidence of the 
Malay corporate elite accepted the reality that a multi-ethnic and multicultural 
Malaysia is the only basis for nation-building (Kam Hing, in Suryadinata, 1997, 
p. 114). Nevertheless, the question here is how the idea of robust economic 
distribution could be justified if it only addresses the concern of a particular
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racial/ethnic group and thus undermines the aspiration of rights to equality. 
Therefore, the objective of inclusiveness under the NEM must ensure that the 
aspiration of rights to equality is implemented since it is a vital foundation of 
Malaysia’s national unity and integration.
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Chapter 3
3.1 The Politics of Multiculturalism and Nation-Building
As mentioned earlier, one of the challenges of managing a multicultural 
society is to recognise the demands from the various cultural, religious, 
indigenous, immigrant and minority groups that exist within the state polity. 
Initially, these demands will affect the nation-building objective of creating a 
common national identity and, at the same time, challenging the traditional liberal 
notion of citizenship. The traditional liberal notion of citizenship is to ensure that 
all forms of segregation, exclusion and discrimination based on gender, social 
class, race and religion are avoided within the polity of liberal states by 
recognising the equal status of the citizens. Furthermore, such recognition of 
equality by liberal states ensures that political stability is maintained, since every 
individual citizen is equally recognised. Moreover, the idea of nation-building itself 
implies the process of unification of ethnic groups, democratisation and economic 
reconstruction, all of which are vital, by recognising and maintaining the notion of 
equality of all individuals and communities (Etzioni, 2004, p.2). Such recognition 
has led to the adoption of an assimilation approach by liberal states such as the 
United States, Australia and Canada in their initial period of nation-building, while 
some states, such as France, continue to maintain the position that the public 
sphere is defined to be secular and that any form of religious identification is 
prohibited.
This would seem to make liberal societies blind to colour, gender, race and 
religion. Flowever, in the pursuit of ensuring equality, it is impossible for the state
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to be totally neutral since inequality is a fact for almost all societies. In fact, rights 
to equality as a one-size-fits-all concept propagated by liberal democratic states 
has the flaw of failing to recognise significant differences that are valued by 
individuals, and diverse communities that exist within the polity. For instance, the 
idea of recognising the official language of the dominant community indicates that 
a state can never be neutral, argues multiculturalism scholars. Since state 
neutrality is almost impossible, multiculturalism scholars have argued that some 
form of recognition should be extended to cultural, religious, indigenous, racial 
groups and minority groups. Such recognition gives rise to terms such as 
multiculturalism, group rights, multicultural citizenship and differentiated 
citizenship, to mention just a few. Nevertheless, this need for a recognition of 
diversity can be criticised in that it further disintegrates society, since individuals 
and groups are made to recognise their differences instead of adhering to a 
single national identity. This could lead to the argument that the liberal concept of 
citizenship, in its recognition of equality of all citizens, would be hijacked.
However, the argument that the need for recognising diversity within the 
liberal framework could be represented by a form of recognition of minority rights, 
or as a form of recognition of nation-building, to ensure that individual citizens 
who are recognised through their respective cultural identities are not deprived, 
discriminated, suppressed or oppressed because of their identities. 
Multiculturalism scholars are sceptical of the state’s neutrality in which the 
deprivation/non-recognition/misrecognition of certain identities within the liberal 
polity could inflict harm on the members of the communities and, as such, could 
be a form of oppression and suppression which could lead to a lack of self­
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esteem, or devaluation and seclusion of the self. This form of oppression is 
expressed by Taylor (1994) as potentially leading to real damage of the self and 
that due recognition is not just a courtesy but something that should not be 
denied as a vital human need. As a result of this, a more inclusive form of 
citizenship is demanded by multiculturalism scholars which recognises the 
diversity and differences that exist within the liberal society.
Therefore, in responding to the demand for recognition of the cultural, 
social and religious diversity within the liberal framework, a nation-building 
initiative could be viewed by the sceptical as a move towards disintegrating the 
nation by focusing too much on difference rather than similarities and the 
aspiration that is needed for the creation of a national identity. The question 
posed is why such differences should be celebrated and recognised within the 
polity of liberal nation state if all individuals have rights to equality? The argument 
for the recognition of the various identities and minorities is based on the 
philosophical orientation of the liberal concept of glorifying and recognising the 
individual self, equal and free to choose the social, cultural and religious identities 
he/she desires.
Multicultural recognition as part of the nation-building initiative in Western 
liberal societies witnessed the repositioning of the classical notion of citizenship 
to be more accommodating, inclusive and tolerant of diversity and difference, 
without neglecting the universal rights recognised by the liberal framework. This 
realigning towards recognising social, cultural and religious diversity gave rise to 
the notion of multicultural citizenship that recognises group-differentiated rights
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for cultural, social and religious identities. In other words, the liberal framework 
recognises the individual’s freedom and autonomous position to choose whatever 
form of identities that exist within the polity; recognising the chosen identities 
would then witness the flourishing of diversity.
In non-Western multinational societies, especially those postcolonial 
multicultural societies, the colonial legacy that created cultural pluralism posed a 
challenge in determining the way forward in the nation-building initiative. This is 
because states which were subject to colonisation at the time independence was 
granted, are left solely with the infrastructure of the state, rarely accompanied by 
a common identity which could be utilised in the process of nation-building (Hill 
and Kwen Fee, 1995, p. 17). Therefore, the process of recognising the cultural, 
social and religious diversity that exists within the polity is approached rather 
differently. This could be justified by the immigrant status of these communities, 
which are expected to integrate and assimilate to the dominant cultural 
orientation. Nevertheless, these ethnic communities, which do not have a claim to 
the nation as Kymlicka (1995) argues, still want to retain their ethnic and cultural 
identity. Non-Western multinational societies could take the approach of 
recognising these ethnic communities by either assimilating or integrating these 
ethnic communities. The justification for assimilation is very straightforward, to 
ensure unity and national integration of the new nation state; the nation state 
cannot afford to tolerate diversity and difference as it would disintegrate the new 
nation state. An example that could be quoted is the Indonesian experience of 
nation-building. The first step taken in its pursuit of nation-building was to unite all 
Indonesians through its assimilation policy and thus creating Bangsa Indonesia or
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Indonesian Nation. This pursuit of nation-building, is guided by the state principle 
called Pancasila which provided the five principles that would guide the Bangsa 
Indonesia. During this process of nation-building the government eliminated the 
pillars which sustained the Chinese minority namely, the Chinese name, Chinese 
associations and Chinese media, and the minority group was expected to 
indigenise their names, speak the national language and eventually to accept the 
national symbol (Suryadinata, 1997, p.12).
For integration, the cultural, social and religious identity is recognised by 
upholding the notion of citizenship. For instance, as for Singapore, the basis for 
its nation-building is recognising multiracialism or multiculturalism as the political 
philosophy in which the rights to equality became the foundation upon which to 
integrate its citizens. However, at the same time, special recognition of the 
minorities and the special position of the Malays is stipulated in Article 152 of the 
Singapore Constitution, which stated the responsibility of the government to 
protect, promote and safeguard the interest of the minorities, and the Malays as 
indigenous. Singapore’s identification as a multicultural society recognises Malay, 
Mandarin, Tamil and English as the official languages, while the Malay language 
is also recognised as the national language.
3.2 Defining Nation and Nation-building: The Malaysian Context
In Chapter 2, the development taking place in multicultural Malaysia was 
clearly illustrated, in which the transformation of the social, political and economic 
landscape brought by the colonial powers, especially the British, had changed
127
Malaysia into a multicultural society. Unlike some states which adopted the 
assimilation approach, the direction took by the Malaysian government after 
gaining independence to recognise the various cultural, social and religious 
identities in the nation-building process became the manifestation of today’s 
cultural and religious diversity in multicultural Malaysia.
This is evident with the recognition and promotion of its cultural, religious 
and social diversity, guaranteed by the state. Therefore, the immigrants in 
multicultural Malaysia were recognised by their cultural and religious identities, 
even though Kymlicka (1995) argues that immigrant communities do not have 
any significant claim over the land and nation, since these immigrant 
communities have uprooted themselves. But nevertheless, the recognition of the 
cultural and religious identities of the immigrants in multicultural Malaysia would 
nurture the sense of belonging and commitment towards the state.
However, the recognition of these diverse identities is within the context of 
communal or race representation. Such recognition would see race take centre 
stage in the recognition of diversity in multicultural Malaysia. This form of 
recognition is made, since race is claimed to have certain primordial attachments 
for the indigenous Malays; recognising the special position of indigenousness 
creates the indigenous and non-indigenous dichotomy. Such recognition of the 
cultural, social and religious diversity indicates that Malaysia’s multicultural polity 
recognises liberal diversity as a point of departure that offers hope for maximising 
opportunities for individuals and groups to lead lives as they see fit (Glaston,
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1995). However, the focus on racialism or communalism in recognising such 
diverse identities would later pose a challenge to the nation-building agenda.
On the other hand, such recognition of cultural, social and religious 
diversity was reciprocated with the recognition of the indigenousness identity of 
the indigenous Malays through the recognition of the special position. 
Nevertheless, such recognition of the special position, argued by some scholars, 
was made and retained as an extension of the colonial period; a form of 
recognition by the British of the Malays as the indigenous inhabitants of the polity 
whose position is recognised and protected, while the ethnic immigrant 
communities, which did not have any attachment to the state, have to accept this 
arrangement. Apart from that, the extension and retention of such recognition of 
indigenousness was also to ensure that the weaker economic position of the 
indigenous Malays was being addressed by ensuring occupation opportunity in 
the public services, education opportunities, scholarships and businesses, clearly 
stipulated in Article 153 of the Federal Constitution. Hence, Malaysia’s 
multicultural set-up would see the celebration of cultural, religious and social 
diversity through the recognition of communal or race representation, but along 
with the recognition of the special position of the indigenous Malays, which could 
have skewed the multicultural orientation and hence the notion of citizenship.
Until the inception of the NEP, ethnic inequalities were mostly addressed 
indirectly, without any specific policy framework, but focusing on rapid economic 
growth which the state hoped would eliminate inequalities. Hence, when the NEP 
was launched, Malaysia’s nation-building took another jump in terms of firstly
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addressing racial inequalities through a formulated policy framework, and 
secondly, improving inter-ethnic relations towards achieving integration and 
national unity. However, this policy recognises the need for an affirmative action 
policy for the indigenous Malays who were economically lagging behind. This 
continuous effort is evident from the policies which the state has formulated since 
independence, beginning with the NEP up until today with the NEM. The 
formulation of these policies has taken on board the colonial legacy of the 
segregation and compartmentalisation of ethnic groups that resulted in socio­
economic imbalances and disparity, and thus formulated an affirmative action 
stand to rectify the imbalances and disparity. This affirmative action is formulated 
and targeted at addressing the imbalances and disparity faced by the indigenous 
Malays and to ensure that, sooner or later, such imbalances could be overcome, 
creating a level playing field economically and socially within the polity.
However, the question that comes to mind is, for how long would this 
nation-building initiative continue to focus on the need of the indigenous Malays, 
based on an affirmative action approach, before integration and national unity, 
could be achieved? This is because the argument put forward by the state is that 
the imbalances and disparity experienced by the indigenous Malays would be a 
stumbling block towards integration and national unity and hence there would be 
a need for continuous effort to address the imbalances faced by indigenous 
Malays through the affirmative action policy. Until that is achieved, integration 
and national unity would be difficult as there would be dissatisfaction among one 
ethnic group. However, the implementation of the affirmative action policy to
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justify the need of correcting imbalances has been argued by Young (1990) to 
violate the principle of non-discrimination within the liberal polity.
Historical evidence has indicated that Malaysia’s nation-building strategy 
recognised the social, cultural and religious diversity that exists within its polity 
from the beginning. Such recognition brought race to the centre stage of the 
polity. The focus on race was reflected in this process of nation-building when the 
elites from the race-based political parties, namely UMNO, the MCA and the MIC, 
which formed the Alliance and later the National Front, to portray a concerted 
representation of all the ethnic groups but, in reality, each party is focusing on 
championing the interest of their respective communal or racial group.
Constructing a Malaysian identity which would lead to nation-building is a 
daunting task as a result of the various cultural communities that exist within 
postcolonial states, a legacy left by the colonial powers. Meanwhile, this colonial 
legacy is further reinforced when ethnic identity takes centre stage, thus making 
ethnic or racial identification a vital component within the Malaysian polity which 
then sees a division between indigenous and non-indigenous. This division of 
indigenous and non-indigenous is recognised as a continuation of the recognition 
of Malaysia as an indigenous nation state and so a special position is recognised 
for the indigenous population. Consequently, this process witnessed preferential 
treatment for the majority indigenous Malay, to be adopted and justified as an 
essential means to create equality and unity between the ethnic groups. Such an 
approach could be seen as a stumbling block in the process of nation-building,
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since adopting preferential treatment through the special position of a specific 
race could cause uneasiness among the other ethnic groups.
The argument about the need to address the issue of equality arises 
because Malaysia’s multiracial, multi-religious and multicultural set-up, 
contributed to by the colonial ethnic division of labour policy, is argued to have 
resulted in economic disparity among the communities. Moreover, the ethnic 
division of labour during the colonial rule had further strengthened the difference 
in culture, religion and language between the ethnic groups (Syed Husin, 2008, 
p.32). As a result, this policy of ethnic division of labour saw the demographic 
transformation that caused the Malays to be outnumbered in the 1920s and 
1930s, a period of British colonial rule. Such a demographic transformation had 
caused the status of the Malays, as the first nation, to be affected. Consequently, 
the demographic transformation had not only caused the Malays to be 
outnumbered but also economically excluded from commercial activities, which 
were in the hands of the Chinese and Indian immigrants and the British. Hence, 
with the economy and societal composition under siege, the Malays had to fall 
back on their indigenous position as natives, who were recognised by the special 
position.
As a response to such threats from the immigrant groups, the Malay elites 
mobilised the Malays to defend further eradication and dilution of the Malay 
identity. This involved safeguarding of the Malay ethnic primary ties, or parochial 
interest, against the non-Malays (Hussin Mutalib, 1990, p.1 cited by Verma, 2002, 
p.23). As a result of this, Malay nationalist groups were formed, raising the Malay
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political consciousness. Such political consciousness caused the immigrants to 
be viewed suspiciously by the Malays. Meanwhile, for the immigrants, the rise of 
the Malay nationalist group triggered the immigrants to mobilise themselves also. 
Such mobilisation was vital to enable the representation of the immigrants, in 
order to ensure that they would not be side-lined by the British. However, the 
initial objective of this immigrant nationalist movement was directed to the fight 
for the causes which took place in their respective homelands, before shifting to 
Malayan politics. For instance, the Indian immigrants in Malaya mobilised 
themselves in the cause of fighting against British colonial rule. For this reason 
these ethno-nationalist groups became a common feature in the Malaysian 
political scene, all competing to maintain their presence and separate identities in 
the nation, thus undermining multi-ethnic representation.
As mentioned earlier, after independence in 1957, the political leaders 
acknowledged and recognised the need to develop a Malaysian identity. Such an 
identity was necessary to shed colonial identities and replace them with a 
Malaysian identity (Verma, 2002, p.33). Therefore, the political elites formulated a 
model which expanded the idea of cultural pluralism, through the politics of 
accommodation among the communities represented by their respective ethnic 
group. At the same time the politics of accommodation adopted by the political 
elites had to recognise the special protection of the economically deprived 
indigenous Malay population. The basis of citizenship for the immigrants, in 
exchange for the Malays’ special position, was agreed between the Malays and 
non-Malays and is significant; it should to be taken into cognisance in the 
formation of the contested Malaysian identity and the nation-building process.
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Unlike the Western model of nation-building, which recognised a set of 
equal political rights and privileges for all citizens to be assimilated and integrated 
within a national framework, the Malaysian model is facilitated by extending the 
principle of citizenship to the non-Malays with equal rights: preserving ethnic 
lifestyles, organising political parties and forming ethnic schools, but with the 
condition of recognising the special position of the Malays. This indicates that, 
while the constitution prescribed a universal set of rights for all citizens, the 
protection and recognition of Malay interests and traditions were paramount to 
the state interest. This gradually resulted in the undermining of individual liberty 
and the cultural identities of other communities (Verma, 2002, p.34).
Nevertheless, the main purpose of the citizenship provision in the 
Malaysian constitution was immediately to create a specific Malayan political 
community, to stimulate a common Malayan consciousness and the concept of a 
Malayan nation (Ratnam, 1965, p.66 cited by Verma, 2002, p.58). Such vision to 
create a Malayan community was necessary, first and foremost because none of 
the ethnic groups shared any common historical background that could be the 
source of unity. Shifting their loyalties and allegiance to the Federation of 
Malaysia, therefore, became the main objective. Furthermore, it was argued that 
the objective of shifting the loyalties of the immigrants was because these 
immigrants, historically, were seen as having no connection with Malaya. For this 
reason, their loyalty towards Malaya was viewed sceptically by the Malays. 
Hence the Malays, who had enjoyed recognition of the special position 
historically, viewed themselves as being the true natives of the land, needing to
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protect it from the immigrants. Therefore, it was essential that such recognition of 
the Malay indigenousness was incorporated into the Malaysian constitution.
Certainly such preferential recognition of the Malays as indigenous would 
be controversial, since it would be in contradiction to the juridical notion of 
citizenship rights. Even though civil and political rights were granted to the 
immigrants, it was done at the expense of recognising the special position of the 
Malay indigenous population, which was perceived especially by the non-Malays 
as a double standard of treatment. This could therefore indicate the awkwardness 
of the notion of citizenship adopted in Malaysia, resulting in the recognition of 
group-differentiated rights for the indigenous Malays who are in the majority. 
Such a different approach towards the recognition of citizenship rights, which led 
to the controversial claim for special recognition, was argued by the Malays as 
significant to ensure continuous parity among the ethnic groups, and 
consequently leading to national unity or integration (Verma, 2002, p.58). 
Furthermore, such constitutional agreements were made with an understanding 
that the preferential treatment for the Malays should be reduced and eventually 
cease, in order to ensure no discrimination between the races (Vasil, 1979, 
pp.42-3 cited by Verma, 2002, p.59).
Acknowledging the need to recognise the Malay special position and 
granting liberal citizenship rights to the non-Malays produced a form of nation- 
building that respected and affirmed the citizen’s commitment to their ethnic, 
religious and cultural groups. Nevertheless, such an affirmation of the citizen’s 
commitment to their ethnic, religious and cultural identities resulted in
135
ethnocentrism. Such ethnocentrism was encouraged by the very process of 
gaining independence, and thus undermined the multiculturalism that was taken 
as a given fact of Malaysian life (Kee Beng, 2009, p.448 cited from Teck Gee, 
Gomez and Rahman). However, the Malays viewed the need to defend such a 
special position as vital, despite the controversy and suspicion it could stimulate 
between the ethnic groups. This was because the Malays realised that, once 
citizenship provisions were liberalised, their claim as the predominant community 
would have to be relinquished (Verma, 2002, p.60). In addition, the primordial 
identity of the Malays would be further diluted as a consequence of losing the first 
nation status. Moreover, the assertion of the Malays’ special position in the 
constitution was to attest that there was a first nation which possessed a special 
recognition in this ancient land, and a new nation which did not (Kee Beng, 2009, 
p.451 cited from Teck Gee, Gomez and Rahman). On the other hand, the non- 
Malays realised that no single ethnic group would comprise a significant majority 
if citizenship was being recognised, and naturally the non-Malays’ numerical and 
economic strength should assure them a place as citizens of the new nation 
(Verma, 2002, p.60). Nevertheless, the controversial recognition of the Malay 
special position was as a compromise between the ethnic leaders, which led to 
citizenship for the non-Malays granted based on the code of jus soli.
Even though the economic deprivation of the Malays was recognised by 
the need to maintain the special position, no specific policy measure was 
formulated for the Malays upon independence until the formulation of the NEP in 
1971. The failure to recognise the need of the Malays caused the Malays to view 
their special position as ‘weak’ and to a certain extent meaningless, as the
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economy was still in the hand of the non-Malays. The scene after independence 
saw that the Malays were still lagging behind economically, and they were still 
rural people, with the economy still controlled by the non-Malays. The wealth and 
power which was expected from the special position did not materialise, and this 
caused dissatisfaction among the Malays (Alex Lee, 1971-1972, pp.562-63 cited 
by Verma, 2002, p.63). The special position of the Malays was further challenged 
with the formation of the Federation of Malaysia in 1963. The formation of the 
Federation, which involved the merger of Sabah, Sarawak and Singapore, as 
former colonies of the British, with Malaya, could be considered as the first 
challenge to nation-building. This nation-building, however, marked the beginning 
of the controversy about the Malay special position and the notion of citizenship 
rights for the non-Malays, when the arrangement which was agreed by the 
Alliance was criticised by Lee Kuan Yew, former Prime Minister of Singapore.
Lee Kuan Yew, the founder of the People’s Action Party (PAP), had 
questioned the basis for the recognition of the Malay special position, which was 
viewed as discriminating against the non-Malays, who were fellow citizens. Unity, 
it was argued, could only be achieved if the citizens were equally and fairly 
treated, and this would therefore lead to the sharing of the aspiration of nation- 
building. As a result, Lee Kuan Yew proposed the idea of ‘Malaysian Malaysia’ 
which promoted the idea that Malaysia should be a democratic society where 
legitimate differences of views (provided they accept undivided loyalty to the 
Malaysian nation) should be permitted. He saw Malaysia as a place where 
individuals and political parties should have full freedom to persuade citizens, by 
constitutional means, of their particular point of view, and a nation which belongs
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to all ethnic groups and not any particular ethnic group. Furthermore, Lee Kuan 
Yew argued that it was unfortunate that Malaysia had degenerated into a Malay 
Malaysia, where the spirit and essence of Malaysia was identified with the 
interests and norms of one particular community or with the authority of one 
particular political party (Vasil, 1980, p. 156).
This controversial idea, triggered the non-Malays in Malaya to further 
question the citizenship arrangement which was viewed as discriminating. As a 
result of the ‘Malaysian Malaysia’ propaganda, the historic bargain, which was 
earlier agreed by the leaders of the Alliance, was now being challenged by an 
egalitarian notion of nation-building. Nevertheless, the idea of ‘Malaysian 
Malaysia’ had a significant impact on the communal politics adopted by the 
Alliance. The PAP had undermined the ethnic parties in the Alliance, especially 
the MCA, as being ineffective at representing the ethnic Chinese; as a result the 
Chinese were discriminated against in Malaya. After a while, Singapore was 
expelled from the Federation; this was in 1965, after the Alliance felt that the 
demands made by Singapore could not be accepted. It was argued that the spirit 
of the Alliance, which led to the historic bargain, could not be jeopardised by the 
demands made by Singapore for rights to equality under the ‘Malaysian Malaysia’ 
concept.
The departure of Singapore from the Federation did not actually solve the 
problem of the demands made by the non-Malays. As a result of the idea of 
‘Malaysian Malaysia’, the 1969 General Election saw deteriorating support for the 
Alliance, which failed to secure the two-thirds majority for the first time.
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Furthermore, the 1969 General Election also witnessed the defeat of the MCA 
when all its candidates under the Alliance lost their seats. The poor performance 
of the MCA was contributed to by the PAP’s propaganda campaign undermining 
the MCA’s role in representing the Chinese. As a result, the exchange of racially- 
based provocation between supporters of different parties and the inflammatory 
speeches made by candidates heightened the already tense situation between 
the Malays and non-Malays and thus led to the race riot. This resulted in the 
government having to declare a state of emergency and the Parliament was 
hung. However, the 1969 race riot became a turning point for the government in 
the reassessment of its policies on nation-building and citizenship. It was argued 
that it relied on policy which focused more on maintaining multiracialism rather 
than structural changes to remove the interracial poverty (Verma, 2002, p.62).
The reassessment of policies resulted in the formulation of the NEP, along 
with an affirmative action policy for the Malays and other indigenous people, 
including natives from Sabah and Sarawak. This policy reassessment was 
viewed as significant and timely to overcome the disparity, especially in economic 
matters, between the ethnic groups; it also served to further improve and promote 
unity and integration. The deprivation of the Malays was identified as a stumbling 
block in the furtherance of promoting integration and hence required special 
attention from the government, to be carried out through the affirmative action 
policy. However, what had happened with the implementation of the NEP was the 
construction of a state ideology -  Bumiputraism -  whereby identity came to be 
institutionalised to strengthen the ethnic-based state policies (Gomez & Jomo, 
1999, p.23, Zawawi, 2004 cited by Puay Liu, 2009, p.477 in Teck Gee, Gomez &
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Rahman). The term Bumiputra, which includes the Malays, aborigines and 
natives of Sabah and Sarawak, could be said to contradict the objectives of the 
NEP, which was to eradicate poverty and to restructure society in order not to 
attribute economic success to any race.
The implementation of the NEP was justified because it sought not to 
create further divisions in society but to address the issue of the poverty of the 
Malay indigenous population, which was the major cause of social discontent and 
which could have disrupted national unity (Second Malaysia Plan, 1971, p.4 cited 
by Verma, 2002, p.68). Hence the implementation of the NEP was to ensure that 
the Malays could catch up with the non-Malays in economic terms. The strategy 
of the NEP was to ensure that Malays were assisted by providing quotas in 
business licensing, control of corporate ownership, secure employment, 
improvement of educational opportunities and other necessary skills and, finally, 
to facilitate the migration from rural to urban areas, where commercial activities 
thrive. These were all encouraged by the NEP. Accordingly, such a strategy 
would empower the Malays and the other indigenous population to be full and 
equal partners in all aspects of the economic life of the nation (Second Malaysia 
Plan, 1971, p.1 cited by Verma, 2002, p.69). However, such a policy orientation 
was argued to have further created suspicion among the communities, since it 
addressed the issue and concern of the Malays and hence created exclusivity 
and cultural domination of the Malays over other communities. The absence of 
policies to address the economic needs of the non-Malays has left inequalities in 
well-being as well as leaving social injustice unattended to (Verma, 2002, p.81).
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However, along with the implementation of the NEP, the Rukunegara or 
Articles of Faith were also formulated. The objective of the Rukunegara is to 
provide a sense of moral direction guided by five pillars:
i) Islam is the official religion of the Federation, but other religions and 
beliefs may be practiced in peace and harmony without 
discrimination against any citizens on the ground of religion;
ii) loyalty to the King or Agong (the supreme ruler);
iii) the upholding of the Constitution, including such provisions 
regarding the Sultans, the position of Islam, the position of the 
Malays and other natives, and the legitimate interests of other 
communities;
iv) equality before the law and the guarantee of fundamental liberties 
for all citizens; and
v) conduct by individuals and groups must not be arrogant or offend 
the sensitivities of any group and no citizens should question the 
loyalty of another citizen on the ground that he or she belongs to a 
particular community (Rukunegara, 1971 cited by Kee Beng, 2007, 
pp.227-8).
Hence the foundation of the Articles of Faith is to form a bond that is 
shared among the citizens, by recognising the diversity of the communities while, 
at the same time, outlining the form of unity desired, based on the principle of 
loyalty, allegiance and respect.
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Nevertheless, another important development which took place because of 
the race riot was the restriction imposed on the debate of the sensitive issues - 
namely the status and powers of the Malay rulers, the special position of the 
Malays and the citizenship rights of non-Malays, the status of Islam as the official 
religion, and the status of Malay as the sole official national language (Yong, 
2004, p. 104). Such a restriction resulted in amendments to the relevant laws, 
such as the Internal Security Act and Sedition Act, which was used to ensure that 
racial harmony is always checked by restricting debates on these sensitive 
issues. Therefore, with sensitive issues protected from debate, the question of 
special rights and citizenship could no longer be the agenda used for political 
campaign or mobilisation. Such a move could lead to a detention on the grounds 
of causing inter-communal disharmony under the laws mentioned.
3.3 Recognising the Bumiputra and Non-Bumiputra Dichotomy
Prior to the advent of European colonialism, one can speak culturally of a 
Malay world or kingdom covering Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, the Philippines, 
Indonesia and Thailand (Jomo, 1989, p.2 cited by Verma, 2002, p.21). The Malay 
world was divided into kingdoms, led by the Sultans, to whom the ordinary 
citizens gave allegiance, being subjects of the ruler. It is essential to 
acknowledge the strong relationship with, and attachment of, the Sultans to the 
Malays and so, when the British colonised Malaya, the first approach taken was 
the recognition of the special position of the Malays, which acknowledged the 
Malay Sultans to be the primordial symbol of the Malays as indigenous and 
protectors of Islam. The approach taken by the British in delineating a division
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between the natives and the immigrants was guided by the place of origin of the 
ethnic communities in Malaya. The understanding of the British -  Malays as the 
indigenous group -  resulted in the Malays having certain prior claims on the 
colonial government (Enloe, 1970, p.14). Hence, such recognition was extended, 
even today this is clearly stipulated under Article 153 of the Federal Constitution. 
Nevertheless, the recognition of the special position of the Malays and citizenship 
recognition for the non-Malays became the foundation of the formation of 
Malaysia. However, the scenario that could arise from such an arrangement is 
that the recognition of citizenship for the non-Malays at the expense of 
recognising the special position and privileges of the Malays would cause the 
state to face continuous demands for recognition, since citizens viewed 
themselves as not equal to one another. The trade-off between recognition of a 
special position for the Malays, and citizenship for the non-Malays, caused a 
disadvantaged position for some sections of the latter which were heavily 
independent of formal citizenship given by the universal concept (Verma, 2002,
p.82).
In addition, the recognition of the special position of the Malays had 
caused the creation of the term Bumiputra, or indigenous, and non-Bumiputra. 
The term Bumiputra was adopted by the British to imply a term that denoted 
indigenous immigrants from the Malay Archipelago, such as Javanese, 
Sundanese, Bugis and Minangkabau, to be assimilated into the Malay ethnic 
group. Such an assimilation process was not difficult, since these groups share 
similar language, and a religious and cultural orientation. Hence this cumulative 
effect of colonial policy was to promote a category of indigenous persons who
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were encouraged to distinguish themselves from the non-indigenous population 
(Siddique & Suryadinana, 1982, p.667).
The terms Bumiputra and non-Bumiputra were popularised in the 1920s 
and 1930s (Siddique & Suryadinata, 1981-1982, pp.663-4), when the inflow of 
immigrants was at its peak. This resulted in the Malays being outnumbered. As a 
result of this the British had to adopt such a term in order to distinguish 
indigenous from non-indigenous members of colonial society. Such recognition of 
indigenous and non-indigenous could be seen from the policies formulated by the 
British for the Malays, such as recognition of the Malay rulers or Sultans as the 
protectors of Islam and Malay culture, the allocation of land rights through the 
Malay Reservation Land, education, and public employment. Therefore, with 
such recognition, the British viewed the Malays as the rightful owners of the 
country and thus requiring special status and protection (Lim, 1985, p.252).
However, such recognition of indigenous and non-indigenous became a 
major challenge for the British. This was because such a categorisation had 
resulted in the formation of an ethno-nationalist organisation by the Malay 
indigenous population, who were aware of the alarming situation of being 
outnumbered by the immigrants, if the idea of equal political rights demanded by 
the immigrants was recognised by the British. Therefore the idea of Malayan 
Union -  an egalitarian-based society - was totally rejected by UMNO, a Malay 
nationalist group which campaigned for the Malay indigenous rights with the 
slogan Hidup Meiayu or ‘Long Live the Malays’, in mobilising the support of the 
Malays. The mobilisation of the Malay support by UMNO witnessed the rising and
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strengthening of an ethno-nationalist move to trigger the consciousness of the 
Malays to create Bangsa Melayu or Malay nation. This Malay nation was to be 
defined in primordial terms, in which cultural traits were inalienably bound to a 
particular people sharing a single and common origin (Nagata 1981, cited by Hill 
and Kwen Fee, 1995, p.46). Furthermore, this idea of Bangsa Melayu became 
the focal point for mobilising support of the Malays in the political struggle of 
UMNO which is visible today and, since the term Bangsa Melayu signifies 
primordial attachment, it categorically excluded the Chinese and Indians in its 
struggle for the recognition of indigenousness.
As a result, what had actually happened from the creation of the 
indigenous and non-indigenous categorisation was a sense of suspicion among 
the ethnic communities. It was argued that by dividing the population into 
Bumiputra and non-Bumiputra, and setting the former as the protector of the 
Malays, the British had sown the seeds of suspicion and separatism between the 
two communities (Lim, 1985, p.254). For the Bumiputra, or indigenous 
population, the acceptance or recognition of the demand for equal political rights 
of the non-Bumiputra would cause the Malay identity and attachment to the land 
to be diluted. This is because the claim of the Bumiputra as the original 
inhabitants of the land was seen as essential, thus constructing a national identity 
that is strongly based on the dominant ethnic community while, at the same time, 
maintaining the identity of other ethnic groups.
The presence of the non-Malays as transient labour was initially to serve 
the economic interest of the British, and there was no need to integrate with the
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local population. As such, the sense of attachment, allegiance or belonging to the 
country did not exist initially. This was because the concerns of these immigrants 
were primarily about the developments which took place in their respective 
homeland (Verma, 2002, p.44). For instance, the majority of Chinese who came 
to Malaya in the 1930s still regarded China as home, and were politically involved 
with the developments taking place in China while, for the Indians, the anti-British 
colonial movement, which was led by nationalist movements back home was 
likewise supported by the Indian immigrants in Malaya. Such resentment of 
British colonial rule by the Indian immigrants was also visible in Malaya. 
Therefore, the Malays had viewed themselves as being the indigenous 
population enjoying recognition from the British, while the non-Malays were 
merely immigrants who did not have any sense of belonging and connectedness 
to the country, since to be truly indigenous, one must be truly identified with a 
single country (Verma, 2002, p.65). It was only when independence was to be 
granted in 1957 that these immigrants shifted their interest to the politics of 
Malaya. These immigrants were mobilised through their respective ethnic parties, 
namely the MCA and the MIC, and would later cooperate with UMNO in order to 
ensure that the interests of their ethnic groups were promoted and represented.
After independence, the term Bumiputra was further extended to the 
natives of Sabah and Sarawak with the formation of the Federation of Malaysia in 
1963. This Bumiputra and non-Bumiputra dichotomy began to be used frequently 
and, as mentioned earlier, it was a state ideology to further justify race-based 
policies, dividing indigenous and immigrants with the extension of what had 
formerly been Malay privileges to the natives of Sabah and Sarawak
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(Puthucheary, 2008, p. 15). Such a move could be viewed as a strengthening of 
the indigenous claim and position with the departure of the British, whom the 
Malays viewed as their protector against the non-Malays. This was supported by 
a statement made by the late Tunku Abdul Rahman, the first Prime Minister, 
reminding the Malays to safeguard their rights over the land, ‘which is ours for the 
benefit of the future generations’ (Vasil, 1980, p.98). The positioning and 
strengthening of the Bumiputra was further stressed by the late Tunku Abdul 
Rahman:
‘It is understood by all that this country by its very name, its traditions and 
character is Malay. The indigenous people are Malays and while they on the 
whole have been left behind in the economic and professional fields, others have 
been helped along by the understanding and tolerance of the Malays to be 
successes in whatever fields they are in. In any other country where aliens try to 
dominate economic and other fields, eventually there is bitter opposition from the 
indigenous people, but not with the Malays. Therefore, in return, they must 
appreciate the position of the Malays who have been given land in Malay 
reservations and jobs in the Government’ (The Asia Magazine, 1964, cited by 
Vasil, 1980, pp. 98-9).
With the inclusion of the natives of Sabah and Sarawak who are majority 
non-Muslims and defined as Bumiputra, the basis for their indigenousness claim 
was strengthened and extended, not only to Malays. These natives or other 
indigenous population, as defined by the Constitution, consists of tribal people 
who are the original inhabitants, such as Dusuns, Kadazans and Bajau in Sabah
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and the Iban and Bidayuh in Sarawak. Such an extension to the natives of Sabah 
and Sarawak was vital, since the formation of the Federation of Malaysia would 
involve Singapore with its majority Chinese population. Therefore, the recognition 
of the natives of Sabah and Sarawak, together with the Malays and other 
indigenous, as Bumiputra, would act as a strategy to balance the ethnic groups, 
in order that the Malays and other indigenous populations were not to be 
outnumbered by the non-Malays. Furthermore, the creation of the Bumiputra 
category which involved the natives of Sabah and Sarawak would further 
strengthen the indigenousness identity and claim.
Even though the term Bumiputra was not mentioned or defined in the 
Federal Constitution, it was nevertheless coined with the purpose of creating a 
myth of unification in the post-independence period, when the UMNO leaders 
were trying to frame legislation to institutionalise the special position of the 
Malays, enshrined in Article 153 of the Constitution (Brown, 1994, p.254). 
Consequently, the institutionalisation of the Malay special position further 
strengthened the recognition for Bumiputra, which now encompassed the natives 
and other indigenous population. Such recognition of the term Bumiputra could 
be seen when the term was officially used in the Fourth Malaysia Plan, to refer to 
the Malays and other indigenous peoples (Siddique and Suryadinata, 1981-82, 
p.674).
With the Bumiputra category having been expanded to include the natives 
from Sabah and Sarawak, the claim for the recognition of the special position was 
justified, since these natives and other indigenous were also economically
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deprived. The Bumiputra phenomenon was approached on the premise that 
poverty was predominantly a rural phenomenon, and the Bumiputra mainly live in 
the rural area, since the Malays were deprived of the economic activities taking 
place in the urban areas (Verma, 2002, p.69). Hence the NEP was formulated: to 
establish economic parity among the communities and, ultimately, to create 
national unity as its final goal. It is only through redressing the economic 
imbalances amongst ethnic groups that long term unity can be assured (Siddique 
& Suryadinanta, 1981-1982, p.681). However, one effect of recognising the 
special position of a particular ethnic group, and the creation of such a 
categorisation, could be to raise the suspicion of the non-Malays about the 
Malays: that the former are treated or classified as second class citizens while 
the latter enjoy a special position as first class citizens.
Even though such categorisation of Bumiputra and non-Bumiputra could 
be viewed cynically as dividing Malaysians into two unequal classes of citizens 
(Vasil, 1980, p. 169), it has encouraged cultural and religious diversity in the 
public domain (Verma, 2002, p.55), and the protection of the interests of the 
minorities is vital, as the minorities have become an integral part of Malaysian 
society and contributed significantly to the country’s development (Embong in 
Hefner, 2001, p.59). However, the ethnic divisions that exist reflect the 
contemporary concern of the multiculturalists towards liberal democracies, which 
reject the idea of cultural integration and assimilation of the communities as well 
as the idea of one nation, one state (Verma, 2002, p.54). Even though the special 
position of the Bumiputra could be viewed as undermining the concept of 
multiculturalism, it has by no means led to the disappearance of other ethnic
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communities’ cultural and religious identity. Such cultural diversity that exists in 
Malaysia made multiculturalism not just an idealistic ambition; it is, simply, a way 
of life. Therefore, the idea of multiculturalism within the Malaysian context has 
witnessed the maintaining of cultural diversity while, at the same time, certain civil 
and political rights had to be undermined. Such a balancing act of promoting 
diversity on one hand and limiting civil rights on the other is justified as promoting 
the form of Asian value or democracy that adheres to the characteristics of 
communitarianism, authority, dominant political parties and strong states (Neher 
and Marlay, 1995, p.110 cited by Verma, 2002, p.129).
However, recent developments have seen the strengthening of the Malay 
hegemony in which the non-Malays were continuously reminded of the Malay 
special position which led to Malay supremacy or Ketuanan Melayu (Kok Wah, 
2002, p.34). This idea of the Malay supremacy was mooted in order to remind the 
non-Malays of the attachment and the ownership claim of the Malays and the 
indigenous population over Malaysia. Furthermore, the strong sense of ethnic 
solidarity held by the Malays could be contributed to by the sense of victimisation 
over generations of Malay exclusion by the Chinese (Sloane, 1996 cited by 
Weiss, 2006, p. 168). Hence, the non-Malays have to be continuously reminded of 
the Malay as the indigenous group, possessing certain inalienable rights over the 
forms and obligations of citizenship which can be imposed on non-indigenous 
citizens (Mahathir, 1970, p.133 cited by Verma, 2004, p.65). This imagined 
political community of Ketuanan Melayu is aimed at promoting the supremacy of 
Malay cultural identity for all, restricted citizenship rights for non-Malays and for 
some the creation of an Islamic state. On the other hand, the non-Malays
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demanded a ‘Malaysian Malaysia’ based on the rights to equality (Kok Wah, 
2002, p.34). The creation of this supremacy of the Malays as an imagined 
political community was further extended to marking Malay identification, with the 
introduction of the National Cultural Policy in 1971, which emphasised Islam and 
Malay culture as the essential bases of ‘national culture’, and implemented the 
National Language Act and the National Educational Policy, which made Malay 
the sole medium of instruction in secondary schools and universities. All these 
were considered as the beginning of constructing a genealogical Malay political 
community (Kok Wah, 2002, pp.25-6), or a Malay nationhood identity of Malaysia.
With the strong promotion of the Malay identity, any effort or attempt 
made by the government towards a more egalitarian representation would face 
heavy criticism from the ultra-Malays. The idea of forming a Bangsa Malaysia 
was not well-received by some factions of the Malays. Similarly, the recent 
initiative of the government to introduce the idea of 1 Malaysia was heavily 
criticised. These attempts are cynically viewed as establishing an egalitarian 
society that would dilute the special position and privileges of the Malays and 
other indigenous populations. Responses to such an egalitarian move have been 
made: for instance, the recent formation of Pertubuhan Pribumi Perkasa Malaysia 
(Perkasa) in 2010 is a clear example of the challenges and difficulties that the 
government would face in promoting equality and unity, based on an egalitarian 
model. The idea of Perkasa to uphold and protect Article 153 of the Federal 
Constitution would further strengthen the Malay supremacy and maintain the 
Bumiputra and non-Bumiputra division.
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Such a claim, along with the Bumiputra and non-Bumiputra division, actually 
undermined national unity as inspired by the NEP, the NDP, the NVP and the 
NEM. What is actually taking place on the Malaysian political scene is that while 
diversity has been promoted and maintained, unity in the form of nationalism 
across the racial board faces a significant challenge if ethnocentrism is still to be 
embraced. As for the Malays, the suspicion towards the non-Malays and vice 
versa has been further promoted with the division of Bumiputra and non- 
Bumiputra. At the same time, the slogan of Malay supremacy would give the 
impression that a sense of belonging and ownership of the non-Bumiputra is 
continuously being questioned. However, the most significant point at the base of 
this Bumiputra and non-Bumiputra debate is the idea of historic fact of prior 
residence, which carries with it certain rights and privileges for the former that are 
not extended to the latter (Enloe, 1970, p. 14). Naturally, such a debate would 
cause further strengthening of ethnocentrism on both sides, since the idea of one 
Malaysian nation does not exist. In the words of the late Tan Siew Sin:
‘A Malaysian nation does not exist at the moment and may never will and the 
non-Malays therefore have to be communal merely to ensure their survival. As 
such the MCA must hold Chinese interests, first, last and all the time’ (Vasil, 
1980, p. 104).
Certainly, the issue of citizenship and special rights would be taking its toll 
on Malaysia’s nation-building process, since to balance the two demands would 
be a daunting task. This is because, if national unity or nation-building were to be 
achieved, the idea of equal citizenship is central and essential to nationhood
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(Canovan, 1996, p.76). Apart from that, this dichotomy would also be used to 
mobilise ethnic groups, since political leaders are able to rely on profound 
affective factors related to origin (Roosens in Canovan, 1996, p.58).
3.4 The Nation-Building Agenda
When independence was gained in 1957, the special position of the Malays 
had been recognised by the Chinese and the Indian immigrants. The bargain of 
granting citizenship in exchange for the recognition of the special position of the 
Malay was agreed. However, there was no immediate policy or framework 
formulated to bridge the majority-minority divide. Similarly, there was also no 
immediate policy formulated to address the Malayan economic imbalance. The 
Malays were pressing for more programmes that would be able to address the 
economic concern of the Malays, while the non-Malays resented the fact that 
they were being discriminated against (Lim, 1985, p.256). However, what had 
existed during the earlier period of independence was the celebration of 
independence from the British as a joy to be shared and celebrated by all 
Malayans, irrespective of race or ethnicity. This shared mission of gaining 
independence was achieved as a result of the cooperation of the three ethnic 
groups which, at that point in time, transcended racial or ethnic identity. 
Nevertheless, such joy in celebrating independence was not sustained when the 
reality of the issues at hand had yet to be resolved.
Such unity among the Alliance was maintained through the promotion of 
issues which transcended ethnicity, and started with the fight for independence.
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This was followed by the second election campaign in 1959 which once again 
kept the Alliance occupied and united. The 1959 election campaign saw the focus 
shifted to the fight against communist influence, and the Alliance consolidating its 
position as representative of the three major races (Ooi, 2006, p. 186). The 
national security issue of fighting against communist insurgency brought the 
Alliance to a very strong position with support received from the international 
community. Such recognition was an endorsement of the Alliance and 
consequently it gained the support of all the races, since it was agreed that 
communism must be rejected at all costs and this mission transcended racial or 
ethnic orientation.
However, the third General Election in 1964 could be considered as a 
testing point for the Alliance. This was because the 1964 election campaign saw 
tension between the Singapore’s People’s Action Party (PAP) and the Alliance 
(Andaya & Andaya in Ooi, 2006, p. 186). The formation of the Federation of 
Malaysia in 1963 witnessed the merger with Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak. The 
PAP brought with it the idea of ‘Malaysian Malaysia’ which could be seen as an 
attempt towards unity and integration. The idea of ‘Malaysian Malaysia’ proposed 
that minorities should be recognised and accepted equally without being 
discriminated against. The MCA, a member of the Alliance, was accused of being 
inferior to UMNO and of failing to represent the Chinese who were demanding 
greater equality, an essential form of recognition of citizenship. The tension 
between PAP and the Alliance finally came to an end with the expulsion of 
Singapore from the Federation in 1965. However, the impact of PAP’s ‘Malaysian 
Malaysia’ was visible when the MCA candidates lost in the 1969 General
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Election. This indicated the impact that the issue of citizenship and right to 
equality had on immigrants and, with the expulsion of Singapore from the 
Federation, the idea of creating a ‘Malaysian Malaysia’ has been continued by 
the Democratic Action Party (DAP), a multi-ethnic Chinese dominated party.
In the early period of independence, the Alliance was occupied with 
addressing multiracial issues, apart from external issues such as the communist 
insurgency. The attention paid towards such issues led to the Malays feeling 
neglected, since nothing much had been done to address the economic 
imbalance. The demand to rectify the economic imbalance was led by a group of 
ultra-Malays calling for an immediate response from the government in 
addressing the Malay cause. The Malays were sceptical of the late Tunku Abdul 
Rahman, the first Prime Minister, and this resulted in the ultra-Malays labelling 
the late Tunku Abdul Rahman as pro-Chinese. Hence, during the First and 
Second Bumiputra Economic Congresses held in June 1965 and September 
1968 respectively, the government was challenged to implement the Malay 
Special Rights programme with greater speed and zeal (Lim, 1985, p.256).
It was argued that the 1969 election campaign focused more on domestic 
issues such as race relations, language and the special position. This was 
because vital issues related to external threats and national security were absent, 
and hence the ethnic issues dominated the election debate (Milne & Mauzy in 
Ooi, 2006, p.186), unlike previous elections, where issues transcending racial or 
ethnic boundaries had diverted the population from the topic of racial issues. 
However, the 1969 race riot had an enormous impact on the Malays; with this
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incident the ultra-Malays in UMNO had managed to undermine and later remove 
the moderate Malays, who were viewed as weak, having failed to protect Malay 
interests (Ooi, 2006, p.206). The ultra-Malays challenged the Prime Minister 
further and tried to claim that the failure to protect Malay interests would result in 
the absolute domination of one race over the other (Ooi, 2006, p.207). Such 
conflict between the ultra and moderate Malays illustrated the different view that 
each group had of the preferential treatment for the Malays.
The political changes that followed the May riots of 1969 were thus 
profound, and the official understanding of the causes for the violence became 
the backbone for Malaysia’s domestic policy (Ooi, 2006, p.238). Hence the NEP 
was formulated, with a 20 year timeline for the strategy of affirmative action 
programme in place for the Malays. However, the affirmative action programme 
was viewed in full cognisance of its pitfalls and the long-term effect it had on race 
relations and the process of nation-building. The NEP, which has two prongs, 
namely eradication of poverty and restructuring of society, clearly outlined the 
need for the majority to be assisted if national unity was to be achieved. The 
focus of the NEP, even though its objectives were noble in the sense that it 
addressed the concern all citizens, irrespective of race, was viewed as an 
agenda of enhancing Malay supremacy and leading towards greater Malay pre­
eminence in the political system (Kok Wah, 2002, p.25). Nevertheless, the 
timeline for the NEP was stipulated in order to ensure that, if NEP failed after 20 
years of its implementation, then a different strategy would be required.
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Even though NEP ranks as one of the more successful programmes of 
ethnically-based affirmative action of the late 20th century (Hefner, 2001, p.30), 
and was justified in order to promote national integration and national unity, the 
crux of its implementation was still viewed by the non-Malays as being pro- 
Malays. The perception that Malays are the ones who benefited the most will thus 
create suspicion, whatever policy direction is taken; there is a need for this 
perception to be corrected if the government is serious about promoting unity and 
integration.
Throughout the 20 years of NEP’s implementation, the policy managed to 
improve the economic status of the Malays, with the creation of a middle class 
Malays. The creation of this middle class of Malays has, to a certain extent, 
managed to bridge the economic gap between the Malays and non-Malays 
through the implementation of the affirmative action programmes such as quotas 
in business licensing, ownership structure, employment and educational 
opportunities, and the 30% equity ownership allocated to the Malays. However, 
this action was criticised as benefiting a small number of indigenous 
entrepreneurs. For instance, the emphasis of creating a group of Malay 
capitalists under the NEP was viewed as benefiting a handful of the indigenous, 
when funds can better go to projects to relieve unemployment among rural 
Malays (Alatas in Siddique & Suryadinata, 1981-1982, p.682).
With the end of the NEP in 1990, the NDP, which was formulated for a ten 
year period, continued with the twin objectives of the NEP as a form of promoting 
national unity. The affirmative action programme was also extended to include
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the 30% Bumiputra equity ownership target. The justification for such a 
continuation was made because the Malays did not manage to reach the 30% 
equity ownership by the time the NEP ended. However, there was no specific 
timeline for achieving this objective. With the absence of a specific timeline, this 
further aroused the suspicion of the non-Bumiputra towards the Bumiputra. In 
order to assist with the attainment of the Bumiputra equity target, the Bumiputra 
Commercial and Industrial Community (BCIC) was created. The BCIC assisted 
Bumiputra entrepreneurs and businessmen to establish themselves in 
commercial and industrial areas (Jawan, 2007, p.193).
Nevertheless, the orientation of the NDP focused more on producing the 
qualitative aspects of Bumiputra participation (Kok Wah, 2002, p.43). The 
achievement of the NEP in producing a new middle class of Bumiputra would 
now lead to the importance of cooperation between this new middle class 
Bumiputra with the non-Bumiputra entrepreneurs, as stressed under the NDP. 
The introduction of a privatisation strategy under the NDP further enhanced the 
Bumiputra and non-Bumiputra cooperation. Even though there was no specific 
time frame for the equity ownership target, the shift of the NDP orientation, along 
with the privatisation strategy, provided opportunities for both the Bumiputra and 
non-Bumiputra to be involved in the rapid development of the country. NDP 
paved the way for greater cooperation between the Bumiputra and non- 
Bumiputra, and this opportunity was considered as a win-win situation for both, 
even though there still existed the need to address the economic requirements of 
the Bumiputra under the NDP.
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3.4.1 The Bangsa Malaysia Agenda
When the NDP was launched in 1991, a key policy guideline called Vision 
2020 was also launched. Vision 2020 outlined the challenges that would be 
facing the country in its cause of achieving a developed country status by 2020. 
The most important challenge outlined in Vision 2020 is that of establishing a 
united Malaysian nation, with a sense of common and shared destiny, a nation at 
peace with itself, territorially and ethnically integrated, living in harmony, with full 
and fair partnership, made up of one Bangsa Malaysia with political loyalty and 
dedication to the nation. In the words of former Prime Minister Mahathir, ‘this 
bangsa would help the nation to be confident, democratic, liberal, tolerant, caring, 
and instilled with strong moral and ethical values’. As such, the principles 
mentioned in Vision 2020 gave hope to the non-Malays that they would be 
treated as full citizens and their cultural autonomy would be fully recognised 
(Ong, 2004, pp.189-98 cited by Segawa, 2007, p.32).
Even though the NDP was considered as an extension to the objective of 
the NEP, a continuation of affirmative action policy for the Malays, the aspiration 
of forming Bangsa Malaysia by 2020 provided the non-Malays with the hope of 
being recognised as full citizens, whereby equal opportunities and outcomes 
would be achieved. The objective of Bangsa Malaysia is to create an integrated 
and united Malaysian society, thus creating a sense of nationhood. With the end 
of the NDP in 2000, the NVP (2001-2010) was launched, with an objective 
extended from the two earlier policies, the NEP and the NDP. The basis of the 
NVP is guided by the policy of Vision 2020. The aspiration of Bangsa Malaysia as 
the uniting factor could be directed to achieving political loyalty to the state and
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thus fostering unity in diversity (Segawa, 2007, p.34). In fact, the concept of 
creating one cohesive Bangsa Malaysia living in harmony and fair partnership is 
an integral part and ultimate objective of Vision 2020 (Segawa, 2007, p.35).
Although Bangsa Malaysia provided hope for an egalitarian basis of 
society, the fact is that, as long as the orientation continues to provide special 
recognition of the Malays and other indigenous peoples, national unity could 
prove a daunting task. This is because most Malaysians seem to have the 
impression that inter-ethnic peace and harmony is prevailing in Malaysia today, 
but the transformation into Bangsa Malaysia still has a long way to go, as 
harmony prevails on the basis of toleration and not much on civility and mutual 
reciprocity. The unity that Malaysia is currently enjoying is born out of necessity; it 
is unity for survival, unity that is instrumental, calculative and artificial and not 
unity of the heart (Embong in Hefner, 2001, p.77). This illustration by Embong, 
that is sometimes referred to as unity of convenience, reflects the kind of unity 
relations experienced by the various races in multicultural Malaysia. As for the 
non-Malays, the reality in multicultural Malaysia is that the majority Malays are 
categorised as the indigenous group which has certain privileges, clearly 
stipulated in the Federal Constitution which translates into policies in which Malay 
interests are protected. This condition would require the non-Malays as citizens 
to accept the fact that the fundamental notion of citizenship that focuses on rights 
to equality is absent. This could create suspicion in the relationship between the 
races whereby one sees the other as being privileged and one does not. Hence 
such a situation in multicultural Malaysia would not create the unity of the heart,
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as unity of the heart requires the presence of the feeling that all are equally 
treated and equally privileged.
3.4.2 The 1 Malaysia Agenda
Unfortunately, the idea of Bangsa Malaysia was not well-received by the 
indigenous Malays. The idea of creating a Bangsa Malaysia became an area of 
conflict among the Malay leaders which indicated that the aspiration of such an 
idea is not shared by the Malay leaders, and this is evident from the statement by 
the Chief Minister of Johor stated earlier. The aspiration of the Bangsa Malaysia 
idea was misconstrued as surrendering the special privileges enjoyed by the 
indigenous Malays to the non-Malays and this had to be defended since such an 
act would strip the Malays of their identity and ownership of the land. With such a 
cold reception towards the idea of Bangsa Malaysia, the NEM was launched by 
Prime Minister Najib, in which 1 Malaysia became one of the pillars of the NEM.
This idea of 1 Malaysia is based on the fact that Malaysia’s strength lies in 
its unity in diversity and it should act as a mobilising force in order to bring people 
together and to make them feel as one (Muzaffar, 2010). Through 1 Malaysia, the 
orientation of inclusiveness and social cohesion is being given a focus which cuts 
across racial boundaries and such orientation is in line with the Constitution. In 
order to achieve inclusiveness and social cohesion, a re-orientation of the 
affirmative action programme was needed which no longer targeted a specific 
race or ethnic group but all ethnic groups who are eligible for affirmative action. 
However, the targets of such affirmative action programme are more the
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indigenous Malays, especially those indigenous to Sabah and Sarawak, who are 
earning less than RM1500. Furthermore, in order to ensure the realisation and 
success of inclusiveness and social cohesion, an Equal Opportunity Commission 
would be formed. This would be the first time, after more than 50 years of 
independence, that a commission was set up to oversee the implementation of 
policies of inter-ethnic relations.
The question now, after 50 years of independence, is: has the objective of 
national unity or nation-building being achieved? Could the idea of nation-building 
and unity be achieved if the people’s demands, especially from the non-Malays, 
on rights to equality and citizenship are being undermined by policies that 
continue to target specific races? The climax of all these policies would of course 
be the aspiration of Bangsa Malaysia, which would be the unifying factor of 
Malaysians across ethnic and racial boundaries. The idea of creating one 
cohesive Bangsa Malaysia was viewed positively by the non-Malays, as it is the 
concept through which, finally, all Malaysians will be recognised through a 
common and shared destiny, with no Malay and non-Malay divide.
Apart from forming Bangsa Malaysia, Vision 2020 also outlined another 
important challenge, which is establishing a mature, liberal and tolerant society in 
which Malaysians of all colours and creeds are free to practice and profess their 
customs, cultures and religious beliefs, yet feel they belong to one nation. This 
challenge recognised the importance of unity in diversity, in which all Malaysians 
are united by the aspiration of Bangsa Malaysia while, at the same time, have 
freedom of cultural practices and beliefs.
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Looking at the four core policies, namely the NEP, the NDP, the NVP and 
the NEM, the target is still focused on achieving national unity and integration by 
recognising the need to elevate the condition of the Bumiputra. At the same time 
these policies would not undermine the interest of the non-Bumiputra to further 
improve themselves economically. However, the main concern that arises here 
is: how could such orientation be reconciled, since the Bumiputra have in place a 
recognition of their special position, while the non-Bumiputra, who are still 
citizens, have a ‘restricted’ recognition? The question put forward by the 
minorities is: why is such specific protection and promotion of the Bumiputra 
continuously focused upon in all these policies? Even though in general the 
policies stress achieving national unity and integration, the perception of the 
minorities towards such policy orientation is that it is actually detrimental to 
national unity and integration, as this undermines the sense of belonging of the 
non-Malays because there is a lack of commitment from the state to address the 
concern of the non-Malays. Furthermore, the Bumiputra and non-Bumiputra 
division that is being used to show the level of attachment based on 
indigenousness would cause the labelling of the non-Malays as immigrants to 
continue.
There is no doubt that there was a need to address the economic 
imbalances between the Malays and non-Malays during the early period of 
independence. The failure to address such demands from the Malays would have 
caused the already tense relations to escalate further. However, the focus of 
preferential treatment being specifically designed to address the needs of the
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majority would have, to a certain extent, made the minorities feel deprived of the 
rights to equality. The justification was made, based on the view that Malays were 
economically lagging behind and thus being dominated by the economically 
stronger minorities, which has put the Malays at disadvantage. Furthermore, such 
justification would also reflect economic deprivation as a Malay phenomenon, 
and that the non-Malays were all economically better off.
While this preferential treatment may have been justified in its 
implementation for the Malay majority, the deprivation of the non-Malays, 
especially those who were also in need of such preferential treatment, would 
have resulted in the feeling of deprivation as citizens. Hence, there is a need to 
implement preferential treatment across the racial boundaries, to be based on 
needs rather than racial identity, which would have been more accommodating of 
the minorities. This is because, by focusing specifically on the Bumiputra’s 
economic well-being, it treats national unity as an agenda of the majority, thus 
depriving the needs of the minorities. Furthermore, even though the government 
did not take any assimilationist approach in implementing these policies, unlike in 
Indonesia and most Western liberal democracies, and adopted a more 
accommodating position (Siddique and Suryadinata, 1981-1982, p.682), still the 
perception of Malays being the advantaged group continues.
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Chapter 4
4.1 Challenges to Malaysia’s Nation-Building
‘Malaysia recognized the challenge of establishing a mature liberal and tolerant 
society in which Malaysians of all colours and creeds are free to practice and 
profess their customs, cultures and religious beliefs and yet feeling that they 
belong to one nation’ (Vision 2020).
Liberal nation states initially acknowledged the importance of recognising 
the rights to equality of its members in order to avoid any form of suppression or 
oppression of its citizens. The notion of citizenship is vital in order to ensure 
conformity and unity as the foundation of nation-building within the nation state, 
by constructing an identical national identity, shared by all citizens. However, in 
ensuring the equality of its citizens, inequality is something that is inevitable and 
nation states are required to recognise such inequalities. It is argued that a right 
to equality is blinded by the equality of treatment and thus neglects inequalities 
that exist within the polity of liberal states. Nevertheless, the recognition of 
inequalities that exist within the polity of a nation state is to ensure that no 
citizens are left out or neglected in the process of nation-building. In other words, 
it is essential to address the inequalities within the nation state in order to ensure 
the success of the nation-building initiative. This would see cultural, religious, 
ethnic, racial, indigenous and other groups of identities being recognised. 
Nevertheless, there are arguments that such recognition of inequalities and 
diversity would cause the nation state to be distracted from its original intention of
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creating a national identity and the neutral stand of the nation state within the 
liberal context.
Hence, from this notion of citizenship as recognising rights to equality, the 
idea of nation could be defined to exist when a significant number of people in a 
community consider themselves to form a nation or behave as if they have 
formed one (Hugh Seton Watson cited by Canovan, 1996, p.54). This idea of 
nation indicates that the basis for solidarity and unity evolves from a shared 
aspiration. The uniformity of nation-building would be perceived as a process in 
which people feel bound to the state by ties derived from a common dwelling 
place with its associations, from common memories, traditions and customs, and 
from common ways of feeling and thinking which a common language embodies 
(T.H Green, 1941, pp.130-1 cited by Kymlicka, 1995, p.52).
This process of nation-building is undertaken in order to ensure conformity 
and uniformity is developed through the notion of citizenship by ensuring citizens’ 
rights to equality, respect for human dignity and the rule of law. Furthermore, this 
process of nation-building would result in the creation of a national identity that 
identifies the citizen to the nation. However, such a view of nation-building is 
argued by multiculturalism scholars as promoting assimilation and coercion of the 
minorities into the dominant culture. The argument of multiculturalism scholars is 
that, in the pursuit of nation-building, the state has taken the stand that equality 
could only be assured through similar forms of treatment. However, such an 
orientation towards nation-building would be undermining the differences and 
diversity that exist among members of the nation since the idea of nation-building
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has defined equality as the granting of universal rights to all its citizens. Hence, 
nation-building’s quest for uniformity could no longer be argued as feasible since 
it would undermine diversity and difference. Therefore, citizenship has now been 
‘restructured’ or ‘redefined’ to be more inclusive of other social, religious and 
cultural diversity, recognising a multicultural citizenship (Kymlicka, 1995) in the 
process of nation-building.
The dilemma of nation-building in Western liberal democratic states, it is 
argued, is that it involves recognition of cultural, religious and other forms of 
identities within its polity as a response to rights to equality, and this gives rise to 
terms such as differentiated citizenship and multicultural citizenship. This, in turn, 
has been seen to dilute the traditional notion of citizenship and stripped the state 
of its neutrality. Then again, it could be countered that the state was never neutral 
in the first place since a dominant culture or identity has always been recognised, 
consciously or unconsciously.
Meanwhile, in multicultural Malaysia, as a result of the diverse cultural and 
religious communities left by the colonial legacy, it faces a challenging task of 
nation-building to ensure commitment and loyalty towards the state among the 
citizens. Nevertheless, the notion of citizenship granted to the Chinese and the 
Indian immigrants recognises the cultural and religious identity of these 
communities, and does not lead to the justification for recognition of diversity 
such as differentiated citizenship or multicultural citizenship in Western liberal 
societies. The recognition of Malaysia as a multicultural society began with the 
recognition of the Chinese and the Indian immigrants as citizens and these
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immigrants are guaranteed their freedom to cultural and religious identities. 
However, it could be argued that it fundamentally departed from the Western 
experience of recognising the basis of citizenship. As for Malaysia, the 
recognition of the cultural and religious diversity was a significant foundation that 
secured independence from the British Empire and saw racial or ethnic 
assertions become a form of struggle against colonial rule and economic 
exploitation. The recognition of the cultural and religious diversity resulted in the 
transformation of multicultural Malaysia from an ethno-cultural to a political- 
cultural concept of nation (Verma, 2002, p.34).
While the Chinese and Indian minorities are guaranteed their freedom to
their respective cultural and religious identities, the indigenous Malays are
guaranteed their special position and preferential treatment by the state. This
recognition was agreed based on the economic condition of the indigenous
Malays, who were socially and economically lagging behind and required an 
affirmative action programme to improve conditions. Hence, multicultural 
Malaysia witnessed the maintenance of the idea of cultural plurality or diversity 
through the politics of accommodation between the communities, in which 
individual liberties guaranteed in the Constitution are subordinated to this 
arrangement.
Nevertheless, the nation-building initiative by the state had opened up the 
debate of the notion of citizenship to give greater ‘equality’ to the non-Malays in 
order to ensure the success of nation-building. This is because the idea of nation- 
building on the basis of transforming into Bangsd Malaysia has a long way to go,
168
as harmony prevails on the basis of toleration and not much on civility and mutual 
reciprocity (Embong in Hefner, 2001, p.77). Therefore, the nation-building 
initiative in multicultural Malaysia sees a conflict of rights to equality between the 
indigenous Malays and non-indigenous in which racial identification was made 
the crucial point of recognition. In other words, cultural diversity is recognised by 
polarising racial and ethnic identity and this is evident through the political 
representation of the ethnically-based political parties. Instead of culture 
becoming an important marker of identification of diversity, racial or ethnic 
markers were made essential and this would further reinforce any differences.
Secondly, the recognition of cultural diversity, which was reciprocated with 
the recognition of the indigenous Malay special position, gave an indication that 
the nation belongs to the indigenous Malays; non-Malays have to accept this fact 
and that the recognition of its cultural diversity was made as an act of good faith 
by the indigenous Malays. This is evident from the speeches made by the non- 
Malay ethnic leaders after independence, recognising the indigenous Malay 
position. Hence, the notion of citizenship in multicultural Malaysia could be said to 
be skewed in its recognition to rights to equality, but this did not in any way 
infringe the recognition and flourishing of cultural diversity in multicultural 
Malaysia. In fact, what has happened within multicultural Malaysia is that nation- 
building became a point of conflict between the indigenous Malays and non- 
Malays regarding the recognition of rights to equality and recognition of a special 
position for the indigenous Malays.
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Thirdly, in carrying out its nation-building initiative, the government had 
neglected the need for a policy framework or institutional design that would 
support the success of such initiatives such as the Equal Opportunity 
Commission, and the Commission on Racial Equality, to mention a few. The 
formulation of economic growth policies were expected to provide the opportunity 
for national integration and unity to take place within multicultural Malaysia, 
assuming that, once economic imbalances had been rectified, the indigenous 
Malays would be ready for integration. Such assumptions could be proven to be 
misleading; instead of integration and unity forming naturally, policies further 
strengthened racial and ethnic consciousness.
The nation-building initiative in multicultural Malaysia could be argued to 
be faced with a conflict over rights to equality and thus the state may be required 
to unravel its institutional and policy design to ensure the success of the initiative. 
In fact, some claim that inter-ethnic relations in multicultural Malaysia have 
deteriorated (Muzaffar, 2010, p. 181) and hence delayed or hindered the process 
of nation-building. Some respondents commented that inter-ethnic relations are 
now taking on a stronger ethnic consciousness. Policies such as the NEP had 
actually run into the contradiction of trying to eliminate racial consciousness but 
actually encouraging greater ethnic specificity and consciousness. Hence, the 
need to build a common ground is significant for post-independence Malaysia’s 
nation-building, which requires the cultivation of shared values, attitudes and 
institutions that bind people from the various cultural and ethnic backgrounds 
together (Yong, 2004, p.10).
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Therefore, it can be said of the multicultural orientation in Malaysia that 
recognition of cultural diversity is recognised at the expense of limited rights to 
equality and citizenship for the non-Malays. This is because the recognition of the 
cultural diversity of the minorities was made as a trade-off between the ethnic 
groups; a trade-off in which the indigenous Malays were considered as the 
‘rightful’ owner of the nation, based on the recognition of indigenousness. Since 
then, the recognition of Malaysia as a multicultural state continues to witness the 
demand for the recognition of rights to equality and the upholding of the notion of 
citizenship. Consequently, the challenges of nation-building in multicultural 
Malaysia is influenced by firstly, the need to overcome the misguided vision of 
nation-building which had caused the strengthening of ethnic consciousness 
within multicultural Malaysia, and, secondly, recognising the multicultural polity by 
upholding the notion of citizenship rights to equality.
4.2 Malaysia’s Faulty Vision and Contested Nation-Building
Historically, Malaysia’s phase of nation-building started with the struggle for 
independence from the British, which unified the Malays and non-Malays as 
represented by their respective political parties and thus created a brief illusion of 
nationhood (Canovan, 1996, p.108). However, after this brief illusion, the polity 
reverted to a state of conflict over recognition between the indigenous Malays 
and non-indigenous Malays. This could account for the different views held by the 
ethnic communities regarding the idea of the nation; the non-Malays view 
citizenship as the platform for equal recognition, while the indigenous Malays 
argue for the recognition of their special position and preferential treatment. Even
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though the struggle for independence brought the non-Malays and indigenous 
Malays together, the underlying issue of recognition continues. The indigenous 
Malays differentiated themselves from the other ethnic group on the ethnic and 
religious grounds that defined the Malays as having a close attachment to the 
safeguarding of the Malay ethnic primordial identities and parochial interest, and 
this would require certain special rights to be recognised. This transformed the 
Malays into a self-conscious political entity which viewed their position as vital to 
the identification of the indigenous position.
However, the struggle for independence brought the formation of the 
Alliance which paved the way for Malaysia’s nation-building in which cultural 
diversity was recognised and maintained as a result of the historic bargain 
between the ethnic groups. The historic bargain saw cultural diversity being 
legally and constitutionally enshrined in the Federal Constitution and, in return, 
the recognition of the Malay indigenous special position was recognised. This 
historic bargain also agreed to the legal notion of citizenship conferred on the 
non-Malays, but without the non-Malays having to affirm any state-sponsored 
concept or ideology. This reciprocal arrangement became the basis for 
Malaysia’s nation-building process, through which people’s commitment to their 
ethnic groups and religious beliefs is respected and recognised (Verma, 2004, 
p.59).
This arrangement was initially agreed to by the non-Malays since it was 
acknowledged that the Malays’ economic deprivation would be a hindrance to 
unity and integration. However, the resentment from the non-Malays continues
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today. The non-Malays argue that the act or policy of privileging one ethnic group 
over another would indicate that the others are second class citizens, 
consequently undermining the principle of equality in its notion of citizenship 
(Nagata in Henders, 2004, p.235). For the indigenous Malays, such an 
arrangement was made because the Malays were the rightful owners of the 
country and, if citizenship was conferred on other races, this is because the 
Malay consented to it (Verma, 2004, p.65). However, it could be said to be 
viewed differently by the non-Malays, who saw such a move as recognising their 
rights to equality as full citizens (Ong, 2004, p. 192), while for the Malays, such a 
nation-building move was viewed as destabilising their special position or 
privileges by promoting an egalitarian society. Therefore, the basis for the 
recognition of cultural diversity in multicultural Malaysia requires the recognition 
of indigenousness of the polity with the indigenous Malays as the foundation. 
Such an arrangement would pose a challenge to unity and national integration. 
This is because, since the ownership of multicultural Malaysia is viewed as 
belonging to the indigenous Malays, the non-Malays would argue that their 
pledge of loyalty, obedience, commitment and ownership to multicultural 
Malaysia could never be recognised. Hence, this would result in a faulty vision of 
nation-building.
However, Malaysia, like most postcolonial states or even Western liberal 
societies, is left with the challenge of defining a version of nationhood that 
ensures unity and solidarity. This task of defining a nationhood, however, was 
faced with the demographic transformation left by the British which had resulted 
in the unequal distribution of the economic activities and left the indigenous
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Malays side-lined from commercial activities. Another challenge was that the 
number of immigrants almost outnumbered the Malays and was perceived as 
having become a threat to the survival of the indigenous Malay. These two 
significant challenges would become the basis for the justification of the need for 
the protection of the indigenous special position.
As a consequence of the above challenges, the indigenous Malay had 
argued for the recognition of the Malay special position to be maintained and, in 
return, citizenship to be granted to the Chinese and Indian immigrants based on 
the principle of jus soli. Such a trade-off saw firstly the promotion and recognition 
of diverse cultural communities, which guaranteed the rights to equality of all 
communities and, secondly, the recognition of the special position of the 
indigenous Malay through which an affirmative action programme is then justified 
to deal with the economic deprivation of the Malays. What can be derived here is 
the significant difference between Malaysia’s nation-building process and the 
orientation of Western liberal democracies. The notion of citizenship in Malaysia 
includes the recognition of cultural diversity, along with the indigenous Malays’ 
special position which undermines the notion of equality while, in Western liberal 
democracies, the notion of citizenship implies the adherence to the universal 
principle to rights to equality which, it is argued, leads to assimilation into the 
cultural orientation of the majority.
Malaysia’s nation-building after independence can be traced to the 
formation of the Federation of Malaysia in 1963, with the inclusion of Sabah, 
Sarawak and Singapore. This first phase was vital because, firstly, it would
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indicate the end of the British rule in Southeast Asia, with Sabah, Sarawak and 
Singapore, as former British colonies, joining the Federation of Malaysia. 
Secondly, it was an important phase because the formation of the Federation 
triggered the consciousness of recognition of the notion of citizenship granted to 
the non-Malays which was agreed in the historic bargain when Singapore 
introduced the idea of Malaysian Malaysia. The idea of Malaysian Malaysia could 
be seen as an attempt to promote nation-building based upon the universal rights 
endowed upon citizens, irrespective of racial identification. Even though 
Singapore was later expelled from the Federation in 1965, the idea of Malaysian 
Malaysia had left a deep imprint among the non-Malays, in that they viewed the 
notion of citizenship (as it ensures the rights to equality of all citizens) as the 
basis of the Federation as vital for the process of nation-building. However, such 
an idea was rejected by the Malays and this resulted in the racial tension which 
reached its peak in the 1969 race riot.
The 1969 race riot was a turning point in Malaysia’s nation-building as it 
then witnessed the formulation of an official policy, called the NEP, which for the 
first time provided guidance on the way forward for Malaysia’s nation-building 
agenda, and identified that national unity had an economic component; a failure 
to address this could cause disharmony in race relations. This was because, prior 
to the 1969 race riot, the indigenous Malays claimed the government lacked the 
interest to address the issue of Malay economic disparity with other ethnic 
groups, especially the Chinese. The continuous demands of the non-Malays for 
rights to equality resulted in racial tension reaching its peak. Furthermore, since 
independence there had been no official specific policy for nation-building.
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Therefore, the NEP was formulated with the objective of restructuring society and 
eradicating poverty which was considered as vital to creating economic parity 
between the ethnic groups. This objective was to ensure equality and unity. 
However, in order to achieve this general objective, a specific measure was 
formulated, targeting the economic deprivation of the indigenous Malays. 
Therefore, an affirmative action programme was introduced under the NEP which 
was targeted at the indigenous Malays. Even though the general objective of the 
NEP had raised expectations and hopes within the various communities, it 
nevertheless provided the state with an ideological instrument to promote Malay 
hegemony and consequently caused ethnic discrimination to be institutionalised, 
leading to further polarisation of Malaysian society (Nagarajan, in Teck Gee, 
Gomez and Rahman, 2009, p.372).
The affirmative action programme was considered a necessary way 
forward in correcting the imbalances that existed. Hence, the formulation of the 
NEP was considered as a policy response to the special position of the 
indigenous Malays. The needs of the indigenous Malays were attended to 
through the formulation of affirmative action programmes which would finally 
improve the condition of the indigenous Malays and eliminate economic disparity 
among the ethnic groups. This affirmative action programme was justified as a 
temporary measure to address the needs of the indigenous Malays through 
which the Malays would be able to compete with the economically dominant 
Chinese on a level playing field. Even though the NEP’s final objective was to 
restructure society in which the racial identification with economic success would 
finally be eliminated, the steps taken to address the needs of a particular ethnic
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group, the indigenous Malays, resulted in the further strengthening of the racial 
identification or consciousness which would lead to ethnocentrism. Such an 
orientation would prove to be in contradiction to the objective of the NEP and this 
was evident when the non-Malays viewed such policy implementation as being 
lopsided in that it benefits only the Malays. This would further undermine the ideal 
of an equal society, as envisaged by the NEP, in which the needs and concerns 
of all communities must be addressed based on class rather than the status of a 
particular ethnic group (Embong in Hefner, 2001, p.71).
Even though the need to address the economic concerns of the 
indigenous Malays was recognised by all communities, the policy orientation 
ended up further strengthening racial identification or ethnocentrism (Jomo, 2004; 
Osman Rani, 1990; Puay Liu, 2007). The NEP, which was to be implemented 
over a period of 20 years, could be said to have instilled a stronger racial 
identification and, at the same time, diluted the sense of belonging, especially of 
the non-Malays. The institutionalisation of ethnically-based politics and the 
skewed implementation of the NEP further reinforced ethnic identity and 
increased polarisation. This is evidenced when the only unity in Malaysia is that 
which was tolerated and formed out of necessity and not unity based on fellow 
beings (Embong in Hefner, 2001, p.77).
Therefore, the perception of nation-building in Malaysia is oriented towards 
recognising rights to equality which is a vital source of unity. However, there 
exists some conflict over the idea of nation-building in Malaysia. On one hand the 
nation-building argument in Western liberal democracies is viewed as
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undermining diversity and difference. Therefore, multiculturalism was justified in 
Western liberal societies by the need to ensure that cultural communities, 
especially minorities, are recognised for their cultural, religious and linguistic 
backgrounds in a stable and morally defensible way, thus ensuring non­
discrimination (Amy Gutmann, 1993 cited in Kymlicka, p.26). In order for such an 
accommodation, the recognition of the basic principle of juridical citizenship is 
necessary, which ensures the protection of the civil and political rights of 
individuals (Kymlicka, p.26). Therefore, the foundation for cultural communities 
being recognised is the constitution of a state or in a bill of rights; certain states 
have sought to accommodate this by allocating special legal or constitutional 
measures, above and beyond the common rights of citizenship (Kymlicka, p.26). 
Such an orientation is key, since nation-building is an integrative revolution 
formulated by the state to incorporate its subjects as citizens of a modern 
national community (Canovan, 1996, p. 109).
Malaysia’s nation-building process started with the reinforcing of ethnic 
identities which, to a certain extent, undermined the notion of citizenship. Such 
recognition was further strengthened with the formulation and implementation of 
policies which recognised the importance of ethnic identification rather than a 
class orientation which would cut across ethnic boundaries. This is evident as the 
NEP targeted the issue of poverty eradication and the restructuring of society 
based on ethnic groups, and had failed to acknowledge such issues across 
race/ethnic boundaries. Moreover, this recognition of ethnic group over the notion 
of citizenship was made on the basis of the indigenousness claim of the 
indigenous Malays over the non-Malays. Such politicisation of ethnic groups,
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together with the claims on indigenousness would make it difficult to build a 
nation, causing a twisted orientation. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the claim of 
indigenousness became the basis for the recognition of the term Bumiputra and 
thus legitimising the claim for special recognition. Bumiputra promotes the 
ideology that members of the group have a primordial attachment to the land, 
hence a legitimate claim for special position and preferential policies (Puay Liu, 
2007).
Although Malaysia’s nation-building process could be traced to the 
beginning of independence, an official policy orientation towards the nation- 
building process was only made in 1971 when a specific policy was formulated to 
achieve such a goal. Together with this policy, a set of National Principles was 
also launched which outlined the principles that would be the source of unity for 
nation-building. However, the irony is that the policy implementation had a 
contradictory effect. Instead of withering away, the race issue has been 
highlighted, further strengthening a race-based claim for special recognition, 
especially of the indigenous Malays. The formulation of an affirmative action 
policy for the indigenous Malays means that recognition of the non-Malays as 
citizens is being undermined. The argument of the non-Malays is that, as citizens, 
they possess certain inalienable rights to be treated equally and have equal 
opportunity to enjoy all the benefits equally (Puay Lin in Teck Gee, Gomes and 
Rahman, 2009, p.471). The continuous nation-building agenda in Malaysia is 
evident through the promotion of policies such as the National Vision Policy to 
create Bangsa Malaysia by the year 2020, and the recent 1 Malaysia initiative 
under the New Economic Model which focuses on inclusiveness and social
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cohesion. Nevertheless, the biggest challenge for these policies is to overcome 
the status quo of the race-based affirmative action policy which is evidently 
putting constraints on the nation-building agenda.
With the ethnic consciousness being continuously reinforced through 
policies which focus on the indigenous Malays, the nation-building agenda in 
Malaysia is posed with the challenge of mobilising a sense of belonging among 
its citizens; this leads us to the question of what form of nation-building is the 
state trying to propagate if the question of the primacy of the indigenous race is 
continuously being echoed. Furthermore, what form of nation-building is the state 
looking at if the question of indigenousness and the rights of a specific ethnic 
group is still being emphasised, instead of the issues and rights of all citizens?
4.3 Recognising and Strengthening the Notion of Nation-Building
As mentioned in the earlier part of this chapter, Malaysia’s nation-building 
agenda has further reinforced the ethnic identity of communities through the 
policies implemented. Such reinforcement of the ethnic identities contributed to 
the recognition given to ethnic identity over the notion of citizenship. 
Nevertheless, this recognition of the ethnic identities also contributed to the 
recognition of diversity and difference that exist within the Malaysian polity. 
However, the promotion of such ethnocentrism claims that diversity is 
recognised, resulted in the reinforcing of the ethnic claim of indigenousness 
which further divides the nation, not only along ethnic lines but also along 
indigenous and non-indigenous lines. This creation of an indigenous and non-
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indigenous categorisation was to affirm who possessed a special position in this 
ancient land and new nation and who did not. Therefore, the claim of 
indigenousness led to the additional Article 160 of the Federal Constitution which 
defines the characteristics of a Malay (Kee Beng in Teck Gee, Gomes and 
Rahman, 2009, p.451). Nevertheless, the recognition of the special position of 
the indigenous Malays was done cautiously by the constitutional commission 
drafting Malaysia’s constitution:
‘citizenship must be open as of right but on somewhat different terms...those to 
whom this recommendation applies are very numerous, and in order that a sense 
of common nationality should develop, we think that it is important that those who 
have shown their loyalty to the Federation and have made it their permanent 
home, should participate in the rights and duties of citizenship.’ (Constitutional 
Commission Report, 1957, p.2 cited by Vasil, 1980, p.36)
Such divisions were further strengthened with the promotion and 
formulation of affirmative action policies which were targeted at certain race or 
ethnic groups. The argument for the adoption of the affirmative action approach 
was that it was part of the nation-building agenda, but it only proved to segregate 
and compartmentalise citizens. This is because this segregation and 
compartmentalisation created by the adoption of an affirmative action policy 
would further entrench people in being more conscious of their group differences 
and thus more resentful of other groups (Kymlicka, 1995). Affirmative action in 
the Malaysian context of nation-building is to ensure that the majority indigenous
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Malays, who are economically deprived, are given an advantage in order to 
operate on equal footing with the economically dominant non-Malays.
Affirmative action, which identifies the need to address the situation of the 
indigenous Malays, entrenched ethnic identities into a juxtaposition of the 
privileged indigenous Malays and the underprivileged non-Malays and, as a 
result, dividing citizens of the country. Furthermore, the adoption of the 
affirmative action approach further entrenched societal divides by creating an 
insider and outsider stigma. Even though the adoption of affirmative action was 
generally intended as a temporary measure in creating a colour-blind society 
(Kymlicka, 1995), it veered from this original objective in the Malaysian context, 
as such an approach was perceived to be the right of the indigenous Malays. 
Initially, the adoption of an affirmative action approach was necessary in 
addressing the issues of discrimination which had taken place for years and 
resulted in the displacement of certain communities. The adoption of an 
affirmative action programme is evident from the experience of the United States, 
where the historical injustice suffered by African Americans over the years 
resulted in the adoption of affirmative action to rectify these injustices. Similarly, 
India also adopted an affirmative action approach towards historically 
marginalised tribes. However, the target of such an affirmative action approach is 
a particular ethnic group, which would undermine the notion of citizenship that 
ensures rights to equality.
Malaysia’s adoption of the affirmative action approach in the long-term 
resulted in the view that the affirmative action was part and parcel of the special
182
position of the indigenous Malays. Again, the argument of indigenousness had 
superseded the notion of citizenship which ensured rights to equality of all 
citizens. This argument of indigenousness, together with the special position 
meant that the non-Malays were continuously questioned about their loyalty and 
sense of belonging to the state. The adoption of an affirmative action approach 
would act as a protection shield for the indigenous Malays. The belief that 
descendants of migrants have little or no sense of loyalty to the country of their 
birth and that their loyalty and allegiance is only to the homeland of their 
forefathers seem to be erroneous (len, 2001; Louie, 2004, cited by Gomez, 2009, 
p. 173) This misleading belief could be contributed to by the form of political 
mobilisation of the non-Malays, not as citizens but merely as an ethnic group. 
Such an orientation of recognition of ethnicity as superseding the notion of 
citizenship continued to create suspicion of the indigenous Malays by the non- 
Malays. Recognising ethnicity over the notion of citizenship resulted in some 
difficulty in creating a united Malaysian nation. The aspiration of creating a 
Malaysian nation would remain an illusion as long as ethnic identity continues to 
be given priority over the notion of citizenship (Puay Lin, 2007). This was the 
main concern highlighted by the interviewees; if citizens received different 
treatment, this would result in undermining unity and integration as it would 
eliminate the sense of belonging among citizens. Among other concerns 
highlighted by the interviewees was that the affirmative action programme for the 
indigenous Malays had caused the Malays to lack skills; progression would be 
undermined with a mind-set that there is always preferential treatment to fall back 
on. This kind of mind-set, argued the interviewees, is no longer suitable in today’s 
globalised world of competitiveness.
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The first interviewee highlighted that the law or constitutional arrangement 
made the non-Malays feel that there was an unequal form of recognition among 
the citizens. As a party member of one of the coalition parties, the interviewee 
claimed that the feeling of attachment or sense of belonging is being undermined 
by this unequal recognition of the non-Malays and, as such, the laws need to 
recognise the rights to equality of all citizens. Nevertheless, Malaysia, as a 
multicultural society, does recognise the diversity and difference that exist within 
its polity, according to the interviewee. This is evident through the recognition of 
each community’s cultural festivals which are designated as public holidays to 
allow such celebrations. Furthermore, the respect and tolerance towards the 
religious, cultural and beliefs of the communities in Malaysia, according to the 
interviewee, is the main principle of unity in Malaysia’s multicultural set-up. Again, 
the policies which address only the needs of a particular ethnic group has 
undermined the nation-building process as the perception of the need of the 
indigenous Malays is being religiously promoted and thus ignoring the non- 
Malays.
However, the interviewee highlighted a worry of the non-Malays over the 
dominant role of the Malays, which could be a destabilising factor in the country’s 
unity and which could potentially lead to another race riot type incident. This is 
because, according to the interviewee, the political scene post-1969 is showing a 
stronger racial consciousness among the communities, unlike the pre-1969 
period where unity was true in meaning and spirit. For instance, the promotion of 
strong racial sentiment by the respective ethnic groups could cause these ethnic
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communities to view one another with suspicion and thus could easily trigger a 
racial clash as the ethnocentric sentiment mounted. According to the interviewee, 
this stronger racial consciousness is attributed to the affirmative action 
programme which is only formulated for the indigenous Malays who, ironically, 
are in the majority. Furthermore, the idea of affirmative action for the indigenous 
Malays had caused the non-Malays to feel neglected and treated as a second 
class citizen. However, even though the non-Malays did not benefit from the 
affirmative action programme, unity still exists, according to the interviewee, since 
people can still earn a living as a result of economic growth and therefore people 
want to maintain peace.
Nevertheless, the interviewee was also sceptical about the future of 
Malaysia’s unity as the non-Malays were feeling that too much focus is being 
given to address the concerns of the indigenous Malays, thus neglecting the 
needs and concerns of the non-Malays. For instance, the interviewee commented 
that the poverty level among the Indians is not being addressed by the 
government and this causes the Indians to feel side-lined and neglected. The 
most important point highlighted by this interviewee is that the non-Malays admit 
the government needs to address the issue of Malay poverty and economic 
deprivation but, at the same time, not at the expense of the concerns, interests 
and rights of the non-Malays. In the words of the interviewee, ‘we are not 
questioning the Malay rights but what about our rights as citizens’. As a 
consequence of this dissatisfaction with the lack of activity to address the issues 
of the non-Malays, especially the Indians, the Indians mobilised themselves in the 
Hindraf (Hindu Rights Action Force) demonstration in 2007.
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Finally, the main stumbling block to unity in Malaysia, according to this 
interviewee is the failure of the government to recognise the needs of the minority 
by being too concentrated on the indigenous Malays. The interviewee quoted the 
example of the equity distribution under the NEP which allocated a 30% 
ownership target but, to date, had only managed to achieve 19%. This indicates 
the failure of the NEP itself and therefore a new policy initiative is needed, 
claimed the interviewee. Secondly, according to this interviewee, the non-Malays 
feel that their rights have not been fully addressed and this would erode the 
sense of belonging of the non-Malays.
The second interviewee, who is also the President of one of the coalition 
parties, highlighted the significance of understanding the history of Malaysia. 
According to this interviewee, Malaysia’s multicultural set-up is unique since it 
was formed with the arrival of the Chinese and the Indians 100 years prior to 
independence. As a result of this, a blend of culture existed while each cultural 
community could maintain their distinctive identity, and this gave birth to a 
multicultural Malaysia, according to the interviewee. In addition, the multicultural 
polity of Malaysia today was formed by these three ethnic groups after 
independence and this is somehow different from the polities in Western liberal 
societies, where the polities have already existed and these polities now have to 
accommodate the new challenges of migration, claimed the interviewee. The 
interviewee further illustrated Malaysia’s multicultural set-up as three railway 
tracks, separate but moving in the same direction while not diluting the various 
cultural identities that exist. This is evident through the recognition of the various
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cultural celebrations by the state which is a significant feature of Malaysia’s 
multicultural set-up.
With regard to the policies or steps taken by the state to ensure the 
integration of the minorities, these have been lacking and this could undermine 
national unity or integration. This interviewee made a comparison with the post- 
1957 period where unity was at its highest level and this was evident even when 
there was no formal document formulated to manage ethnic relations. This 
unwritten agreement or understanding between the ethnic leaders, claimed the 
interviewee, became the basis of a unity and integration based on respect and 
tolerance. The period post-1969, in the words of the interviewee, ‘witnessed 
Malaysia becoming a more racist country to the extent it practiced subtle 
apartheid’. This resulted in the deviation from the true spirit of the constitution as 
it was not respected, and undermined as a result of the move to establish Malay 
political pre-eminence (Vasil, 1980, p.50). Instead of removing communal 
barriers, integrating and uniting the people, and creating patriotic Malaysians, 
post-1969 witnessed further segregation as claimed by the interviewee. This 
orientation sadly infiltrated into the civil service and resulted in the civil service to 
entertain the interest of one particular race or ethnic group, argued the 
interviewee.
Dr Chandra Muzaffar (NST, 2010) had a similar view on the absence of 
equality in the civil service. Such unequal representation in the civil service is an 
example of a contradiction to the objective of the NEP, which is to reduce ethnic 
identification. Therefore, in order to overcome the domination of one particular
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race in the civil service, the interviewee suggested that allocation of civil servants 
to reflect the composition of the population. A similar concern was also 
highlighted by the first interviewee, in which the civil service was perceived as 
being dominated by one ethnic group which caused it to be viewed with 
suspicion. This domination of the civil service resulted from the special position 
guaranteed for the indigenous Malays in the civil service, as stipulated under 
Article 153 of the Federal Constitution.
The interviewee further provided examples of the frustration that the non- 
Malays felt, even though they are considered as citizens but were subject to 
different policy treatment. This difference of treatment would definitely cause the 
non-Malays to view themselves as second class citizens as a result of these 
policies. For instance, the interviewee quoted a classic example of the Bumiputra 
policy that provided discounts for Bumiputra to purchase properties, which was 
designed for lower income Bumiputra but not for lower income non-Bumiputra or 
non-Malays. Such policy benefited the Bumiputra as a group, irrespective of the 
economic background of that particular Bumiputra and this would cause the non- 
Bumiputra from the lower income group to feel discriminated against. Therefore, 
such policy preference, argued the interviewee, would not further promote 
integration or unity as the ethnic groups would view each other with distrust and 
that the indigenous Malays would always think that they are privileged compared 
to the non-Malays.
Consequently, this kind of orientation would cause the idea of Bangsa 
Malaysia or 1 Malaysia to be viewed differently by the Malays and non-Malays; for
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the Malays, such an idea would mean the surrender the privileges which are 
considered as their rights. With regard to the aspiration of Bangsa Malaysia, the 
interviewee claimed that there exists a contradiction between aspiration and 
actual political conduct. Again the example of unity or integration is being 
portrayed through slogans by political leaders but, in actual reality, politics 
focuses on the promotion of respective ethnic groups. This promotion of the 
interest of groups is further compartmentalised by the leaders of the political 
parties which rely on the support of their respective ethnic group, thus 
undermining unity and integration and, in the words of the interviewee, ‘many 
streams of integration have started to flow into the sea where integration 
completes, but politicians and political will should not be an impediment and block 
these streams’. This compartmentalisation, claimed the interviewee, had created 
animosity and hatred among the citizens. As described by Cohen and Sheba 
(2003, p.117), when preferential treatment is allocated to a particular ethnic group 
or race, every member of that group is readily identifiable as one who is likely to 
have received this treatment, whether or not that person actually did, and 
whatever the person’s true level of talent or achievement.
Therefore, in order to break away from the compartmentalisation of the 
ethnic groups, the interviewee suggested a revamp of the education system, 
where one education system for all should be the way forward. However, this one 
education system, suggested the interviewee, should recognise the vernacular 
languages which should be made compulsory. The present education system 
arrangements had further compartmentalised the ethnic groups, claimed the 
interviewee, because, by having a vernacular education system, the student is
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being compartmentalised from an early age. One education system is a vital 
component that would shape unity and integration and this is something that 
should be nurtured from a young age. This is where education comes in and, in 
the words of the interviewee, ‘coming together is a beginning, keeping them 
together is progress, growing together will be a success and working together is 
Bangsa Malaysia or 1 Malaysia on the principle of equality, justice and 
trustworthiness’.
The interviewee quoted the example of the United States Civil Rights Act 
which forbade ethnic preference in American public life. Such an affirmative 
action in the United States was put in place for the minorities but it was later 
criticised as a result of its failure to address the issue of discrimination and the 
contradiction it produces in addressing the issue of discrimination. In fact, what 
happened was the aim of eliminating discrimination had resulted in the 
discrimination against another group which was not privileged by the affirmative 
action programme. It is argued that, in the United States, race-based preferential 
treatment had resulted in the extension of a right or benefit to a minority which 
had the effect of depriving persons who were not members of that particular 
group. Affirmative action, as described by Cohen and Sterba (2003, p.203), has 
immediate goals of outreach, remedying discrimination and promoting diversity, 
targeting minority groups with its ultimate goal of creating a colour-blind society. 
For some countries, the adoption of an affirmative action programme is targeted 
at social classes rather than race and India is an example of this, where 
affirmative action is designed for the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes.
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However, as in the case of Malaysia, the design of its affirmative action 
programme targets the majority indigenous population which is argued to have 
been economically neglected and deprived, and this is viewed by the minority 
non-indigenous population with suspicion. Furthermore, the adoption of the 
affirmative action programme to remedy discrimination against, and the economic 
deprivation of, a particular ethnic group, could further cause societal 
discrimination to exist within the society. Hence, the adoption of an affirmative 
action programme in Malaysia, which was supposed to be a temporary measure 
to eliminate disparity, had now been accepted to be part and parcel of the rights 
of the indigenous Malays. Such a misconception of the term ‘special position’ to 
be interpreted as special rights among the Malays in the words of the late Ghazali 
Shafie, former Minister of Home Affairs is ‘frightening’ (National Unity Convention, 
2001).
This mind-set of not wanting to surrender the affirmative action 
programme, commented the interviewee, would be a stumbling block to unity and 
integration. Furthermore, the argument of both interviewees was that, if 
affirmative action has deviated from its original intention, such affirmative action 
programmes should be eliminated. Unfortunately the essence of the NEP — to 
eradicate poverty and to restructure society in order to eliminate the identification 
of economic success to ethnic groups and the implementation of affirmative 
action programme targeting specifically the indigenous Malays -  continued to be 
retained in other new policy initiatives of the government. This would lead to the 
question of why such a specific target for the indigenous Malays is maintained if 
the main objective is to eliminate racial identification. This is where Cohen and
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Sterba (2003) argue that the term affirmative action initially designed to eradicate 
or eliminate racial preference is now used to refer to policies that focuses on race 
itself and would therefore create confusion and contradiction. Even though the 
justification for an affirmative action in Malaysia was to achieve unity and 
integration, unfortunately such orientation has undermined citizenship rights to 
equality. At same time ethnocentrism has been heightened among the ethnic 
groups as result of the mutual suspicion.
The interviewee was concerned that, if Malaysia continues to maintain its 
present compartmentalised set-up with one ethnic group being preferred over the 
others, this would result in a lack in a sense of belonging and would therefore see 
the migration of the best talent from Malaysia. This interviewee’s view could be 
supported by the observation made by Hefner (2001) that such policy orientation 
so antagonised the non-Malays that it prompted the emigration of the best brains, 
especially among the non-Malay youth. Hence, Malaysia needs to move from 
recognition of race or ethnic group to that of citizenship. This is because the 
notion of citizenship develops commitment and a sense of belonging which both 
complement one another, and both have to be nurtured simultaneously. As 
Bhikhu (2008) argued, the commitment of the political community to the citizen is 
vital; unless that happens, the citizen does not belong to the political community 
and the political community could not expect its members to develop a sense of 
belonging unless it, in turn, belongs to them. It is essential that the political 
community values all its members equally in its structures, polities, and conduct 
of public affairs through granting equal rights of citizenship.
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The third interviewee expressed a sceptical view of the idea of nation- 
building that the government is formulating. The interviewee claimed that such 
ideas are mere political rhetoric to create the ‘feel-good’ factor, especially among 
the non-Malays, to create the impression of equal recognition. However, the 
reality is that the breakaway from the indigenous Malay supremacy identity would 
face difficulties as such an act would be considered as a betrayal of the 
protection and promotion of the Malay primordial identity. The present 
arrangement, commented the interviewee, does not discriminate nor does it 
assimilate the non-Malays since freedom of religious and racial identification is 
recognised and respected by the state as stipulated in Article 11 of the Federal 
Constitution.
Furthermore, the interviewee said that the maintenance of the indigenous 
Malay identity is to ensure the identification of the state as a Malay-dominated 
state which, at the same time, recognises the existence of other culture, beliefs 
and religion and vernacular education within its polity. This maintenance of the 
Malay identity is at the insistence of Malay leaders that the state belongs to the 
Malays and, as the sole owners, the Malays are seen to be tolerating the non- 
Malays and hence undermining equal rights and citizenship (Parekh, 2006, 
p.232). Since the state itself was colonised for more than 400 years, the process 
of nation-building thus needed to be defined in indigenous term, and a model of a 
national language, national symbols, national education and national institutions 
was vital (Suryadinata, 1997, p.6). The interviewee cautioned that the non- 
Malays’ continuous demand for recognition of rights of equality could further lead
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to the dissatisfaction of the Malays with the non-Malays and racial tension could 
be inevitable.
Therefore, the idea of ethnic supremacy based on the recognition for the 
need to promote indigenous Malays’ interest could undermine the rights to 
equality and citizenship. The application of the affirmative action programme in 
Malaysia is unique because it was formulated to assist the dominant indigenous 
Malay majority. Here is where the conflict lies, since indigenous Malays 
interpreted the demand for rights to equality would deliberately lead to the 
surrendering of their special privileges. Hence, this has undermined the rights to 
equality and the notion of citizenship in Malaysia.
The fourth interviewee was quite cautious about the issue being 
addressed but nevertheless admitted that it was more comfortable to discuss the 
issue outside Malaysia. Such lack of discussion and dialogue on these issues 
highlighted that the multicultural set-up in Malaysia is facing the challenge of 
stereotyping among the ethnic or racial groups whereby each ethnic group views 
the other with suspicion, claimed the interviewee. For instance, the interviewee 
gave the example of how the non-Malays view the indigenous Malays as laid 
back, since the indigenous Malays are protected and recognised by the state, 
specifically quoting the issue of scholarships. According to the interviewee, the 
non-Malays have the perception that scholarships are always guaranteed for 
Malays while, for the non-Malays, they require a lot of sacrifice and hard work. 
The same goes for the non-Malays’ supremacy in terms of economic dominance 
and lack of ownership towards the state which is viewed suspiciously by the
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Malays; such a sentiment will continue to be the biggest challenge to unity and 
integration.
Apart from compartmentalisation, the stereotyping of ethnic groups, 
especially by the non-Malays towards the Malays, is contributed to by the special 
position, together with the affirmative action programme for the indigenous 
Malays, argued the interviewee. There is no doubt that the multicultural set-up in 
Malaysia is based on the pillars of tolerance, respect and consideration, claimed 
the interviewee, but principles alone would not be able to counter the 
stereotyping between the ethnic groups. However, the younger generation, 
according to the interviewee, has a different perspective in that they are more 
open and that race is no longer a limitation or a stumbling block. This generation, 
claimed the interviewee, would like to see transformation taking place by 
upholding the democratic virtues and citizenship rights. The interviewee 
concluded that, while Malaysia’s multicultural set-up recognises diversity, it lacks 
the element of integration which is a sufficient condition of democratic reciprocity 
(Crowley in Benda-Beckmann and Verkuyten, 1995, p.163). As a result of this, 
the interviewee brought to mind the brain drain, especially among the non- 
Malays, due to a lack of sense of belonging.
The idea of a nation and, in this case, the Bangsa Malaysia, has provided 
hope, especially for the non-Malays, for the first time. Even though cultural 
diversity is recognised in multicultural Malaysia, such recognition is only possible 
by recognising the special position of the indigenous Malays. This could be 
argued to have resulted in the skewed multicultural orientation of recognising
195
rights to equality and the nation-building initiative. There is no doubt that the 
government wanted to ensure that the economic deprivation of the indigenous 
Malays was being addressed by implementing an affirmative action programme 
in order to ensure unity and integration. However, in carrying out such a 
programme, it only has strengthened or reinforced ethnic or race consciousness. 
Such a reinforcement of ethnic or racial consciousness has forced each ethnic 
community to be more conscious of their status and position. This development 
could be argued to be in total contradiction to the aim or objective of the idea of 
nation-building as envisaged by the policy formulators. Instead of eliminating race 
or ethnic consciousness, such policies have only strengthened the stigmatisation 
of all ethnic or racial communities; Malays, as the indigenous people, have the 
right to a special position and special privileges, but the non-Malays are still being 
doubted in terms of their loyalty to the state and thus will never have rights to 
equality recognised.
Hence, when the idea of building a united Malaysian nation or Bangsa 
Malaysia was mooted, the underlying challenge of eliminating racial or ethnic 
consciousness (which was supposed to be overcome by the policies formulated) 
was still present and, in fact, was even more of a challenge since the policies had 
actually strengthened the racial and ethnic consciousness. Therefore, the nation- 
building initiative is seen by many, based on the interviews, rather differently by 
the non-Malays and indigenous Malays; ethnic or race consciousness continue to 
dominate the nation-building initiative and, at the same time, the stigmatisation of 
the communities also continues, whereby one community sees the other being 
preferentially treated. In fact, the underlying argument that could be put forward is
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that the nation-building initiative, as formulated by the government, is faulty as, 
firstly, there still exists racial identification which could lead to the strengthening 
of ethnocentrism and, secondly, the underlying issue of rights to equality as 
citizens are not being recognised.
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Chapter 5
5.1 Policy Recommendations: Recognising Multiculturalism in Nation-Building 
- the Way Forward for Malaysia
The first of these is the challenge of establishing a united Malaysian nation with a 
sense of common and shared destiny. This must be a nation at peace with itself, 
territorially and ethnically integrated, living in harmony with full and fair 
partnership, made up of one ‘Bangsa Malaysia’, with political loyalty and 
dedication to the nation’.
The fifth challenge that we have always faced is the challenge of establishing a 
mature, liberal and tolerant society in which Malaysians of all colours and creeds 
are free to practice and profess their customs, cultures and religious beliefs, and 
yet feeling that they belong to one nation’ (Vision 2020 Policy, 1997).
‘If people are to have a sense of belonging to society as a whole, to have a sense 
of sharing a common fate with fellow citizens and nationals they must be able to 
feel that their own flourishing as individuals and as communities is intimately 
linked with the flourishing of public institutions and public services’ (Commission 
on Multiethnic Britain, 2000).
The above statements from Malaysia’s Vision 2020 policy framework and 
the report of the Commission on Multiethnic Britain clearly outline the most 
significant challenge faced by multicultural states; the creation and formation of 
national unity and social cohesion. The increasing prevalence of multiculturalism
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has created the need to recognise the divisions, diversity and differences that 
exist within the polity of multicultural states. In order to face this multicultural 
challenge, it requires multicultural states to formulate a framework which would 
ensure that a united and integrated multicultural state is formed. The formulation 
of such a framework, which would include a legal framework and policy measures 
which would enable integration and cohesion to succeed, is vital for national unity 
to develop and avoid internal segregation and compartmentalisation.
As described in the earlier Chapters 3 and 4, the challenge facing 
multicultural states is to balance the demand between rights to equality and the 
recognition of difference, or what Taylor (1992) argues as equal dignity and equal 
respect that should exist within the polities of multicultural states. The essence of 
recognition is vital to creating the interconnectedness and sense of belonging of 
members of the polity, irrespective of their background and identity. In order to 
encourage this sense of belonging, the notion of democratic citizenship was 
made the foundation for multicultural states, in which members of the 
multicultural polity are equally recognised. However, this notion of democratic 
citizenship was said to have undermined difference and diversity and hence a 
framework of multicultural citizenship (Kymlicka, 1995) or integrative citizenship 
(Modood, 2007) is required.
In general, multicultural states are faced with the challenge of interpreting 
or modifying the liberal and democratic citizenship model which has been the 
foundation of these states. This is followed by the formulation of a policy 
framework that recognises the differences and diversity that exist within the polity
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of multicultural states. This is essential since this would create a sense of unity 
and belonging of members of various backgrounds within the polity of 
multicultural states.
Nevertheless, the opinion that the polities of multicultural states have to 
recognise and accommodate diversity and difference is usually faced with a 
backlash. The argument is that recognising difference and diversity as a 
significant part of creating national unity and social cohesion is, to an extent, 
unacceptable, since such recognition would actually make these communities 
more conscious of their differences. Hence, the idea of universal rights is to 
ensure that all citizens are equally recognised as citizens, minus the various 
identities attached to them.
The multicultural project was initially faced with a backlash in some 
countries, mostly in Western liberal democratic societies such as Germany, 
France and Great Britain to mention just a few. The backlash against the 
multicultural project was prompted by the view that it diluted the liberal tradition 
which has been the foundation of these societies. The idea of a liberal and free 
society must not be allowed to be influenced by certain minority, religious or 
cultural demands. Nevertheless, the multicultural project was undertaken in these 
countries; even though faced with opposition, the idea of constructing a 
multicultural identity is still an ongoing debate. The idea of what it means to be 
British, French or German, for instance, has raised issues that the recognition 
rendered to the various demands from minority, religious and cultural identities 
would undermine the liberal, free and value-oriented society.
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This is because such a recognition of diversity and difference, as the right 
wing of the political spectrum would argue, has the consequence of disintegrating 
the nation state. This is because, instead of focusing on uniformity and 
conformity, the recognition of diversity and differences would further 
compartmentalise and segregate the nation state. Furthermore, such recognition 
would undermine the neutrality of liberal states, which should hold a position 
which recognises the equality of all without promoting any specific culture, 
religion, ethnicity or minority. However, the response to such diversity and 
differences could no longer be ignored, and hence has to be recognised as an 
essential element for the development of individuals and communities, since 
each individual is embedded with certain cultural or religious values which make 
their existence meaningful to them.
Hence, the response to the recognition of these diversities would require 
the formulation of policies that would support and recognise such multicultural 
polity existence while, at the same time, ensuring the unity of the nation state. 
This is evident from the approach taken by countries such as Great Britain, 
Canada, Australia and Sweden, which have policies or institutional designs in 
place to support the aspiration of multiculturalism. This would further support, 
promote and protect the flourishing of diversity in cultural, religious, ethnic or 
minority groups. The importance of multicultural policies in these Western 
societies is to ensure and facilitate the integration process of the various 
communities, ethnic, race, cultural and religious groups into the nation state. The 
formulation of multicultural policies would also indicate the states seriousness in 
recognising the cultural, religious and ethnic diversity as vital for the flourishing of
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the individual and the communities, and also to recognise the rights to equality, 
which imply that equal does not simply mean similar treatment, and hence liberal 
democratic societies have to recognise diversity and difference.
Therefore, in order to overcome the challenge, continuous dialogue and 
engagement is required; the Commission of Multiethnic Britain is a good example 
of a platform formed by the state in order to engage citizens of various 
backgrounds and deliver a multicultural framework for the country. Such an 
establishment would also be an avenue for continuous dialogue and engagement 
between members of the multicultural societies to discuss and provide 
recommendations as to a way forward for the flourishing of multiculturalism. For 
some multicultural states, the multicultural project should not in any way influence 
the public polity and recognition of its multicultural identities should only be 
recognised in private. For instance, the French government decision to ban the 
headscarf for Muslim female students in any education institution is an indicator 
that the public polity should be free from the influence of any cultural or religious 
identities.
Hence, the multicultural project in these Western liberal democratic 
societies has had to overcome the hurdle of modifying or re-interpreting the 
notion of liberal and democratic citizenship by recognising the various cultural, 
religious and minority demands.
For non-Western multinational countries, especially postcolonial states, 
multiculturalism or multiracialism has been recognised as a doctrine or a political
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philosophy that promotes equal rights of all ethnic groups, and is propagated by 
the state. This could be attributed to the cultural pluralism experience during 
colonial rule, which resulted in these societies recognising the diversity and 
difference that exist within their polity. However, the significant difference of the 
basis of multiculturalism to be recognised and defined between the Western and 
non-Western societies is the focus on culture in the former, and race or ethnicity 
in the latter. Therefore, the identification or classification of individuals belonging 
to one ethnic or racial group is obvious. This also indicates that the recognition of 
racial or ethnic identity is a vital basis of multiculturalism in non-Western 
multinational states, especially the postcolonial states such as Singapore and 
Malaysia, for example.
Malaysia, being a multicultural state, has outlined nine strategic challenges 
under the Vision 2020 banner to achieve a developed multicultural nation status 
in which national unity is a key factor. Out of the nine, the above two challenges 
clearly indicate that accommodating and recognising a multicultural polity has 
been a challenging task for almost all multicultural states, including Malaysia. 
While Malaysia’s Vision 2020 framework has clearly indicated the strategic 
challenges facing Malaysia’s pursuit of a developed nation status and that 
Bangsa Malaysia is to be the desired national identity, multicultural states 
including Malaysia have to come to terms with the general challenges for 
multiculturalism to flourish. Firstly, the framework has to uphold and recognise 
the notion of democratic citizenship and rights to equality, followed by the 
formulation of policies across the racial identity and, finally, formation of an
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institutional framework or commission on inter-ethnic relations to further explore 
and improve inter-ethnic relations.
5.2 The Notion of Democratic Citizenship and Rights to Equality
Without a doubt, democratic citizenship is the foundation for the flourishing 
of various religious, cultural and other forms of identities in multicultural states. 
Democratic citizenship ensures that citizens in the political community are given 
equal rights and equal recognition. As Modood (2007) stated, the practice of 
citizenship could be used to highlight how any challenge to the idea of equality is 
being addressed. Furthermore, the practice of citizenship in multicultural states 
would reflect the relationships between fellow citizens with regard to the idea of 
equality, respect, integration and accommodation. Nevertheless, it is this form of 
equality that multiculturalism scholars are concerned about, as it could eliminate 
the characteristics of various identities in the name of equality. What equality 
implies here is sameness. Hence, equality in multicultural states would require 
the polity to be equally accessible to all cultural, religious and racial identities.
The foundation of any multicultural society lies in the notion of democratic 
citizenship which upholds the rights to equality, equal recognition and equal 
treatment. However, the difference in a multicultural society is that equal does not 
necessarily mean the same or similar treatment applied to all citizens. 
Nevertheless, this notion of democratic citizenship in multicultural states would 
require the state to be accommodating of and sensitive to the divisions and
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diversity that exist within the polity and hence ensuring the flourishing of these 
differences and diversity.
Multicultural Malaysia has recognised multiculturalism or multiracialism as 
the foundation of its nation-building initiative since independence. This is evident 
from the recognition of the status of the different cultural communities that existed 
within the polity upon independence, which is stipulated in the Federal 
Constitution. Article 8 and Article 11 of the Federal Constitution clearly guarantee 
the recognition of rights to equality of all citizens irrespective of race, ethnicity, 
culture or religion and, at the same time, freedom of religion is guaranteed, even 
though Islam is the religion of the Federation. However, while recognition to 
multiculturalism or multiracialism is acknowledged, the protection and 
preservation of the indigenous Malays, along with the legitimate interest of the 
non-Malays or other communities, is clearly stipulated under Article 153 of the 
Federal Constitution. The recognition of the indigenous Malays through reserving 
careers in the public service, scholarships, and permits and business licences, 
was made with the understanding that it was to operate as a means of achieving 
equality, since the indigenous community was economically lagging compared to 
the other non-indigenous communities. With the focus on the indigenous Malays, 
it was anticipated that unity and national integration would be achieved. What 
could be concluded is that the nation-building initiative in multicultural Malaysia is 
supported by a policy that recognises the need to promote national unity and 
integration, but at the expense of rights to equality. However, the undermining of 
the rights to equality did not in any way suppress or oppress the other minority 
cultural communities, and cultural diversity flourishes.
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Nevertheless, since independence, the road to building the nation has 
been paved by recognising the cultural and religious diversity that exists within 
the polity. Even though there were no specific policies formulated for integration 
and unity, the goal of achieving independence from the British held the ethnic 
groups together. This is evident from the cordial relations between the ethnic 
groups, including cooperation, compromise and peaceful bargaining. However, in 
1963, Singapore joined the Federation and this triggered a new perspective on 
the historic bargain which had been agreed earlier by the ethnic group leaders. 
Even though there was some dissatisfaction with regard to the outcome of the 
bargaining, which saw the recognition of the indigenous Malays, this was 
overcome with the spirit of compromise among the ethnic leaders. The idea of 
multiracialism or multiculturalism as a political philosophy, brought by Singapore, 
expressed the desire for the ideal of according equal status to the communities. 
This resulted in tense relations between the indigenous Malays and Chinese in 
Singapore, and certain parts of Malaya, which finally led to the 1969 race riot.
It was not until 1969 that a specific policy measure was formulated to 
address the issue of disparity among the communities, especially that of the 
indigenous Malays. The focus on overcoming the disparity included an affirmative 
action policy for the indigenous Malays but, at the same time, this policy 
orientation did not lose sight of the vital agenda of national unity and integration. 
However, this policy framework of recognising the indigenous Malays, which 
continues today, caused the non-Malays to argue that citizenship rights had been 
undermined.
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Therefore, the biggest challenge facing multicultural Malaysia today is how 
the nation-building initiative can reconcile the recognition of the status of the 
ethnic communities with a universal doctrine of equal opportunities, equal 
recognition and equal rights. As is clearly stipulated in one of the challenges in 
Vision 2020, the need to establish a mature, liberal and tolerant society in which 
Malaysians, irrespective of colour and race, are free to practice and profess their 
customs, cultures and religious beliefs and, at the same time, feel a sense of 
belonging to one nation, could be said to be the ideal multicultural model. 
However, the question that arises is: what are the vital elements and values that 
would nurture this sense of belonging and commitment?
With the introduction of the nation-building initiative of Bangsa Malaysia, 
conflict has opened up between the indigenous Malays and the non-indigenous 
minorities regarding the foundation of Bangsa Malaysia itself as a multicultural 
identity envisaged by the state. While the government is introducing this nation- 
building initiative as an identity to mark the sharing of the nation by all 
Malaysians, the underlying challenge is that the concept of nation is viewed 
differently by the communities, especially the non-Malay minority, as a result of 
the state’s unequal recognition of different groups. In fact, this developed into a 
challenge; while cultural and religious diversity is recognised in multicultural 
Malaysia, the nation-building initiative has been viewed by the ethnic minorities 
as an opportunity to demand greater equality. Meanwhile, the Malays viewed the 
nation-building initiative as an attempt to challenge the indigenous identity, and 
remove the special position of the Malays, by recognising the rights to equality.
207
Even though the policies have the objective of creating unity and 
integration, the focus on the indigenous Malays is said to have skewed the 
objective of nation-building. This has resulted in the view that national unity is 
being seen through the lens of racial lines. It has resulted in the perception that 
national unity can only be achieved once the issue of Malay jobs, Malay 
graduates, and Malay economic deprivation (Muzaffar, 2010, p.32) is settled, 
these being seen as conditions for national unity and integration. At the same 
time there are issues of concern relating to the poor, underprivileged and 
underachieving non-Malays which, it is argued, have been overlooked. This 
would further cause discontent among the non-Malays, who are also in need of 
such recognition to overcome their social and economic deprivation and, at the 
same time, need to be treated equally as citizens in order to face the challenges 
of national unity and integration. On the other hand, the continuing focus on the 
ethnic indigenous Malays will only further strengthen ethnic consciousness and 
compartmentalise the polity, thus skewing the multicultural orientation in 
Malaysia.
The focus on ethnicity has actually led to further compartmentalisation or 
segregation of the ethnic groups in Malaysia. Along with policies which focused 
on the indigenous Malays, multicultural Malaysia is facing the greatest challenge 
to national unity and integration. The focus on ethnicity, according to Sardar 
(2008), fuels an insatiable desire for difference, and it leads to dissatisfaction, 
frustration and animosity, and thus would ignore the focus on common values. 
The consciousness of difference, represented through these ethnic identities
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would be further reinforced if selective preferential treatment is accorded to 
certain ethnic groups.
The key question, therefore, is how the indigenous Malays could be 
influenced or convinced to accept the idea of multiculturalism in realising the 
nation-building initiative. While disagreement might appear between the Malays 
and non-Malays with regard to the minority rights, Bangsa Malaysia - as a nation- 
building initiative - must prioritise the need for recognition of the rights to equality. 
In order for Bangsa Malaysia to achieve its vision there has to be space made for 
the cultural, political and social demands to be fulfilled; these are an essential 
element in constituting and strengthening the notion of citizenship and the 
formation of an institutional design or framework that would support the nation- 
building initiative.
5.3 Policies across the Racial Identity
The notion of citizenship is a vital component of the nation state; it 
ensures the participation of individuals and groups in the political community, 
since it provides citizens with civil, political and social elements. It is necessary 
for these three elements to be recognised in order for individuals to participate 
effectively and efficiently in the political community. The vital role of the notion of 
citizenship provides firstly, the status and rights of the individuals and groups 
and, secondly, the basis for inclusion or exclusion by the government. 
Furthermore, the notion of citizenship also points towards the existence of the 
nation state, in which individuals and groups are perceived as identifying with the
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state when it comes to the relation between states. However, the recognition of 
citizenship also has an overall impact on the individuals and groups within the 
state. This could be determined by how the government applies or recognises the 
notion of citizenship among individuals and groups in the state. This contributes 
to the fact that the notion of citizenship should nurture a sense of belonging and 
commitment, if the state could prove to be providing the space for such 
commitment and sense of belonging. This signifies the importance of the notion 
of citizenship in the nation-building initiative. While the notion of citizenship could 
be viewed as a platform that would integrate and unite all citizens, this notion of 
citizenship could also be an area of conflict (Barbalet, 1988).
Nevertheless, each nation state has its own way of expressing the model 
of citizenship. For Western liberal societies, the liberal notion of citizenship was 
initially viewed as the foundation for creating uniformity in and conformity to the 
nation state. The idea of the nation state is that all citizens are treated equally 
and the neutral role of the state is expected. However, such conformity and 
uniformity was argued to be undemocratic and illiberal to the other racial, cultural, 
religious minorities that existed within the polity of these liberal states. As a result 
of immigration into these Western liberal societies, the national identity now used 
to constitute the nation has had to be realigned, in order to recognise the various 
identities brought in by the immigrants. For instance, the definition of Britishness 
now needs to create a space for other individuals to be identified as British. As 
Modood (2007) argued, being British does not necessarily means subscribing to 
a prescribed list, but instead recognises the cultural, religious, ethnic and racial 
identities of the person.
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Based on the analysis gathered from the interviewees, the most significant 
transformation needed for multicultural Malaysia would firstly be political will to 
change the present multicultural polity to be more focused on rights to equality 
and citizenship. The argument is that the recognition to rights to equality is still 
being undermined because of the need to promote and protect the special 
position and preferential treatment for the indigenous Malays. This resulted in the 
non-Malays feeling that the political community, which they are part of, does not 
fulfil their legitimate interests or demands as citizens. It is important to focus on 
the recognition of the rights to equality and the notion of citizenship in 
multicultural Malaysia, since it is from this premise that a sense of loyalty, a 
sense of belonging, and ownership of the nation state is being nurtured, and vice 
versa. As Parekh (2008) reiterated, a sense of belonging and commitment can 
only be nurtured if the state shows commitment to its citizens. Therefore, what 
has happened in multicultural Malaysia is that the notion of citizenship has, to a 
certain extent, been undermined by the need to recognise the concerns of the 
indigenous Malays. The argument of indigenousness put forward suggests that 
the Malays, as the original inhabitants, are entitled to certain political and 
economic state in perpetuity (Muzaffar, 2010, p.40). The different forms of 
recognition accorded to the indigenous Malays and the non-indigenous has 
resulted in the notion of citizenship being racially structured, and hence ignores 
the vital civic notion of citizenship which is the common foundation of the modern 
nation state.
In Malaysia, the notion of citizenship became an area of conflict between 
the indigenous Malays and non-indigenous immigrants. This could be traced to
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the colonial immigration policy which affected the social, political and economic 
landscape of Malaysia. This is triggered by what Parekh (2006) described as a 
contest between those who think the country is theirs and those who want to 
share its ownership. Such a contest, together with the recognition of race-based 
representation, caused the notion of citizenship to be viewed, not as promoting a 
platform for common identification, but as a site for bargaining and trade-off. This 
failure of the notion of citizenship to nurture a sense of belonging, unity and 
integration is evident when, after more than 50 years of independence, it is 
unfortunate that remarks such as telling the Chinese and Indians to go home to 
their respective motherlands are still being echoed, without realising that these 
Chinese and Indians know no other motherland except Malaysia.
Therefore, as a result of these differences in opinion, the notion of 
citizenship in multicultural Malaysia became a bargaining tool between the ethnic 
group leaders. This witnessed the recognition of the Chinese and Indian 
immigrants as citizens, and the indigenous Malays were assured of their special 
position and preferential treatment. However, this arrangement, of an indigenous 
group having exclusive ownership, is plainly a transgression of the contemporary 
concept of citizenship, and to continue with such special privileges ad infinitum, 
would mean that those who do not belong to the community but share the polity 
would be treated unequally (Muzaffar, 2010, p.41).
Nevertheless, this need to reconcile the demands of the indigenous 
Malays with a universal demand of citizenship was even acknowledged by the 
drafters of the Malaysian constitution as being awkward in its representation and
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ambiguous in its implementation, and hence caused the notion of citizenship to 
be skewed in its orientation. This is because the notion of citizenship is said to be 
the vital foundation of nation states, which allows individuals to be recognised 
and to participate in the political community as equals. Ironically, the notion of 
citizenship recognised in multicultural Malaysia had to be negotiated to recognise 
the concern of the ethnic indigenous Malays, of not wanting the dilution of the 
indigenous identity of the nation state. Such an orientation created a perception 
of the state as belonging to the ethnic indigenous Malays, while the Chinese and 
Indian minorities had to recognise such an arrangement in return for recognition 
of their citizenship.
Here, it could be argued that, even though the indigenous Malays were 
willing to share ownership of the nation with the non-indigenous immigrants, 
some form of privileged ownership should be retained to avoid the dilution of the 
indigenous identity, and that the multicultural space created needed to reflect the 
ownership of the Malays. Nevertheless, after more than 50 years of 
independence, the challenge facing multicultural Malaysia today is how to 
reconcile the demand for recognition of the indigenous Malays’ special position 
with the manifestation of the multicultural, multi-ethnic demands for rights to 
equality and the notion of citizenship.
The idea of sharing the Malaysian nation must be founded on the notion of 
citizenship and rights to equality, which would ensure the non-Malays, as 
citizens, have equal rights and responsibilities. This is because, after over 50 
years of independence, the non-Malays in present day Malaysia want to be
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accepted as equal partners in the nation-building process, and the non-Malays’ 
quest for equality and justice can no longer be denied. Unless this is nurtured, the 
conflict over the claim of ownership to the state will continue, and gradually dilute 
the sense of belonging and commitment of the non-Malays, since the political 
community has failed to recognise the significance of all citizens. A similar 
concern is highlighted in the responses provided by the interviewees, who argued 
that the sense of belonging and commitment is actively denied, because of the 
commitment shown by the state only towards the indigenous Malays. Instead of 
nurturing equal rights and responsibilities, such a commitment by the state could 
be argued to be stratified along racial lines. Therefore, what needs to be done is 
the nurturing of consciousness towards the principles of a democratic society by 
the political actors, through an understanding that, with these rights and 
responsibilities, one has to appreciate the non-Malays’ position. They, too, want 
to be treated as citizens, according to the principles of equality and justice which 
must be accorded to all citizens (Muzaffar, NST, 2010). Azly (2009, p.438) 
stressed the importance of civilising the Malaysian nation, which requires the 
detribalising of the citizens into a polity that would be able to learn to share the 
wealth of the nation by accepting the land as the earth of mankind, rather than as 
a land belonging to this race or that race.
Scholars have argued that the construction of the Malaysian nation is 
complicated by the problem of ethnic differences, rooted in and nurtured under 
colonial rule (Nair in Teck Gee, Gomes and Rahman, 2009, p. 78; Kreuzer, 2006, 
p.5), and policies which have been formulated since the NEP have actually 
further reinforced ethnic consciousness, even though the objective of these
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policies was to promote unity and integration at the end of the day. As Nagata (in 
Henders, 2004) clearly described, Malaysia’s ethnic divisions - as the focus of 
state policies - have kept the goal of unity and integration ever on the horizon and 
yet never quite achieved. This is further supported by the idea of formal equality 
of citizenship being subjected to a series of affirmative action policies favouring 
the Malays, which would consequently mean that there must be second class 
citizens (Nagata, in Henders, 2004, p.245). These policies would have 
contributed to the skewed balance of equal citizenship, favouring the Malays. As 
a result of this, policies promoting integration to reduce ethnic differences have 
not been actively implemented since it is argued that ideas such as multicultural 
policies are not feasible, due to cultural and religious differences and 
incompatibilities between the Malay Muslims and Chinese Confucianist 
communities (Gomez, 2009, p.192).
While Malaysia’s definition of citizenship recognises the rights to equality 
and freedom of religious and cultural beliefs, it is with an understanding of the 
reciprocity of recognising the indigenous Malays’ special position, and hence 
strengthening the ethnic consciousness. This arrangement caused the non- 
Malays to seem stripped of their equal rights, compared to the indigenous 
Malays, because national citizenship was exclusively defined with the Malays 
given more rights. Hence, the need to balance or compromise this demand 
continues until today. The question is: for how long would such a compromise or 
balance be maintained? How could the agenda of Bdngsa Malaysia, which 
promotes liberal and democratic principles, and 1 Malaysia, which promotes
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social cohesion and inclusiveness, justify a need for the recognition of a 
preferential treatment for the indigenous Malay?
As a result of the bargaining and reconciliation of the notion of citizenship, 
the racial and religious issues have been politicised and used by the political 
parties, especially to mobilise the support of the respective racial groups. Instead 
of focusing on the rights to equality and citizen rights, racial and religious 
mobilisation has become the prime mover in the politics of multicultural Malaysia. 
This form of mobilisation highlights that the bargaining which is said to have been 
agreed at the expense of the indigenous Malays having to share the ownership of 
the country which should be reciprocated by the non-Malays, even though some 
form of inequality exists. Therefore, even though UMNO, through Barisan 
Nasional or the National Front, wants to portray its liberal, tolerant, democratic 
and open approach in recognising the rights to equality of all citizens as the goal 
of the nation-building initiative, UMNO itself has maintained its communal or 
ethnic status in its representation and hence seeks to strengthen ethnic 
consciousness among the indigenous Malays. This is evident when the need to 
protect Malay interests is often being discussed, every time that the government 
introduces policies or initiatives that would promote integration and national unity.
Such focus on the indigenous Malays has undermined the needs of the 
legitimate interest of the other ethnic communities, as stipulated in Article 153 (1) 
of the Federal Constitution. What has been lacking during the pursuit of 
recognising the needs of the indigenous Malays is that the rights and legitimate 
interests of the Chinese and Indian minorities have been undermined. The
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argument is that the recognition of the Chinese and Indian minorities as citizens 
is considered to have been based on a reciprocal arrangement, and thus such an 
arrangement has to be maintained. The failure of the policies formulated to 
recognise the legitimate interest of citizens of other communities, especially the 
Chinese and Indian minorities, has resulted in the indigenous Malays feeling that 
the current citizenship arrangement confirms the recognition of the Malays as 
indigenous, having recognised their special position and provided preferential 
treatment. Hence this has given rise to a term such as Ketuanan Melayu, or 
Malay supremacy, and the infamous ‘social contract’, which was agreed to by the 
ethnic or racial groups and thus became the foundation of the present inter-ethnic 
arrangement.
The most significant effort required to ensure the success of the nation- 
building initiative in multicultural Malaysia is the gradual shift from race-based, or 
communal politics, to a more ideologically based politics. For this to be achieved, 
the need to dismantle race-based politics is vital. While there is no doubt that the 
existence of communal politics in multicultural Malaysia has, to a certain extent, 
contributed to the recognition of cultural and religious diversity - as a result of the 
political rights based upon the cultural and religious communities - such 
communal orientation has actually strengthened ethnic and racial consciousness 
in multicultural Malaysia. This is because the notion of citizenship was viewed 
merely as a bargaining point that accommodated and recognised the Chinese 
and Indian immigrants as citizens, in return for the special position of the 
indigenous Malays. Instead of the notion of citizenship being the foundation of the 
nation state, a clear recognition of indigenous against the non-indigenous
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community in certain areas of education, economics and administration 
appeared. Hence, the politicisation of such forms of recognition between 
indigenous and non-indigenous would prove to be a stumbling block to the 
nation-building initiative.
In the recent 2008 General Election, the opposition coalition of the 
National Justice Party (KeADILan), the Democratic Action Party (DAP) and the 
Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS or the Islamic Party) managed to block the two- 
thirds majority required to rule which the National Front had hoped for. The 
coalition of these three parties, which were ideologically oriented, managed to 
provide an alternative to the voters, based on the issues that were introduced. 
The issues brought forward by the opposition coalition, called Pakatan Rakyat or 
People’s Alliance, were about social justice and human development, transparent 
and genuine democracy, and sustainable and equitable economic growth. The 
focus on issues, especially on promoting social justice, has, to a certain extent, 
caused the swing of votes to the People’s Alliance. Such issues as social justice 
were also supported by the Islamic Party, which propagated the belief that Islam 
does not segregate mankind based on race or ethnicity. The universal, inclusive 
and all-embracing principles of Islam resulted in the support of the Islamic Party 
by the non-Malays.
The issues of citizenship recognition and recognising the preferential 
treatment of the indigenous Malays has, over the years, been utilised in order to 
mobilise the votes of the indigenous Malays, hence creating the racial trap. The 
mobilisation of the Malay support through the idea of strengthening the Bangsa
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Melayu had caused the promotion of ethnocentrism, not only among the Malays 
but also among the other communities. Hence, what has happened has been that 
ethnic consciousness and suspicion were instilled through political manoeuvres 
or politicisation of race sentiments, resulting in the stigmatisation between the 
ethnic groups in which the Bangsa Melayu needed to be recognised of its 
position, so that no community, especially the minorities, could question such an 
arrangement. Instead of championing the need to uphold liberal and democratic 
principles in its nation-building agenda, geared towards national unity and 
integration, racial sentiments were further strengthened with the perception that 
such a nation-building agenda would dismantle the special position of the 
indigenous Malays. This was clearly evident when one of the interviewees 
claimed that suspicion and stigmatisation of the ethnic groups, either the non- 
Malays towards the indigenous Malays or vice versa, had resulted in a bleak 
future for integration and national unity. Another significant example is the 
formation of Malay-centric organisations such as Pertubuhan Pribumi Perkasa 
(Perkasa), which continues to lobby the government to preserve and recognise 
the special position of the indigenous Malays. As a result of this, the affirmative 
action or preferential policy for the indigenous Malays further contributed to the 
strengthening of the stigmatisation between the ethnic minorities, thus sowing the 
seeds of suspicion and distrust.
Therefore an open-ended dialogue and constant engagement would be 
the way forward in improving inter-ethnic relations and thus strengthening unity 
and national integration. What has happened since the 1969 race riot is that 
issues regarding the citizenship of the non-Malays and special position of the
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indigenous Malays have been removed from the political debate, since such 
issues would incite racial tension. As a result of this, issues regarding citizenship 
and rights to equality are hardly debated, since it could result in the detention 
without trial under the Internal Security Act or Sedition Act, as causing racial 
tension. Hence, these issues and arrangements after the 1969 race riot came to 
be accepted as they are, whereby citizenship has been recognised for the non- 
Malays while indigenous Malays have their special position, without having the 
opportunity for a discussion or debate on the fulfilment, duty and obligation of the 
notion of citizenship between the government and the citizens.
It cannot be denied that the present arrangement of the recognition to 
citizenship in Malaysia is skewed towards the multicultural orientation that 
recognises rights to equality based on the notion of citizenship. This is because 
citizenship for the non-Malays became a bargaining tool for the recognition of the 
special position of the indigenous Malays. Over the years this bargaining of 
recognising citizenship and the demand for recognising the special position 
further created a perception that such bargaining or recognition was made at the 
expense of the indigenous Malays, and hence there is a need to maintain and, 
for the non-Malays, to agree to such an arrangement of preferential treatment for 
the indigenous Malays. This is evident through the responses towards Bangsa 
Malaysia and the 1 Malaysia agenda introduced by the government, in which 
Malaysians are still unclear as to what either Bangsa Malaysia or 1 Malaysia 
implies. The indigenous Malays viewed such an egalitarian policy as an attempt 
to dilute and confiscate their identity and special position, while for the non- 
Malays, such a nation-building initiative is a window of opportunity to be equally
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recognised. What could be argued is that these ‘grand design’ initiatives of 
nation-building should not be developed top-down. Instead, such nation-building 
initiatives should be developed out of a vigorous democratic debate so that it 
could represent the widest range of views, articulate the deepest aspirations of its 
citizens, and be endorsed by all (Parekh, 2008).
Therefore, what has happened in multicultural Malaysia is that, while such 
a nation-building agenda by the government championed the move to national 
unity and integration, in actual reality, it lacked the political will to uphold the 
democratic and liberal principles as envisaged by Vision 2020, which inspired the 
creation of Bangsa Malaysia and 1 Malaysia. This resulted in such nation-building 
being viewed as a political rhetoric, and the reality of achieving an egalitarian 
society is still far from sight. What has actually transpired over the years since 
independence has been the reluctance to do away with the preferential treatment 
for the indigenous Malays, which has resulted in the undermining of the nation- 
building agenda. In fact, the attempt to achieve the nation-building agenda has 
opened up what Harper (1996) calls many old lines of enquiry, and potentially 
gives vent to old kinds of divisions.
5.3.1 Socio-Econom ic Transformation and Realigning the Affirmative Action 
Program m e
The inequalities that exist within the polity of multicultural Malaysia are 
said to have been caused by the colonial legacy of depriving the indigenous 
Malays of economic and commercial participation. This has resulted in the 
indigenous Malays being economically weak and lagging behind, compared to
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the Chinese and Indian ethnic minorities. In fact, this economically weak and 
lagging state seems to have been a feature associated with the indigenous 
Malays since the colonial period. Even though the special position of the 
indigenous Malays was recognised by the British, the majority of the indigenous 
comprise the bulk of the poor in Malaysia. Hence, when independence was to be 
granted - provided that inter-ethnic peace was guaranteed - the ethnic leaders 
came to a compromise that resulted in the special position and preferential 
treatment for the indigenous Malays being retained, while the Chinese and Indian 
ethnic minorities were granted a conditional citizenship which meant having to 
recognise the indigenous Malays as indigenous.
The social inequalities and imbalances between the ethnic groups had 
caused the state to intervene to assist the indigenous Malays, since poverty is a 
feature associated with the Malays. The significance of social rights in the notion 
of citizenship lies precisely in the tendency to remove illegitimate inequalities 
from society (Barbalet, 1988, p.91), without which integration and unity can never 
be achieved. However, what has transpired is that the recognition of the 
indigenous special rights and preferential treatment, which was supposed to be a 
temporary measure, continued and became politicised. Hence this has resulted in 
the argument that Malaysia’s recognition of its diversity and difference is skewed 
regarding the rights to equality, which is a vital element for nation-building.
Nevertheless, after the 1969 race riot, a more coherent strategy and policy 
was formulated to ensure that the issue of the indigenous Malays economic 
weakness and deprivation was being addressed. An affirmative action
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programme that was ethnically or racially oriented was introduced, with an 
objective that such a policy would gradually promote national unity and 
integration. This was to be done by eliminating poverty and restructuring society. 
The elimination of poverty was to focus across the racial board, while the 
restructuring of society would involve the elimination of racial identification with 
the economic success of a particular ethnic or racial group. Initially, such a 
racially oriented policy was viewed as vital to remove the imbalances and 
disparity. However, what has transpired is that such policy orientation has further 
strengthened ethnic and racial consciousness over the years. This is evident, in 
that any move to dismantle the special position and privileges would be retaliated 
against and argued as an attempt at undermining the Malays as an indigenous 
nation.
Therefore, the affirmative action programme has been adopted in order to 
firstly overcome economic inequality and poverty elimination, and thus reduce the 
disparity between the indigenous Malays and non-Malays. Secondly, the 
affirmative action programme has been utilised to address the concern of the 
indigenous Malays, through an interventionist effort by the government in the 
socio-economic development, by ensuring that the indigenous Malays share is 
secured and protected. Hence, this would illustrate the affirmative action tool as 
being exclusive for the indigenous Malays. This could be supported by the 
observation made by Parekh (2006) over such policy orientation as perpetuating 
ethnic consciousness (especially if the policy is open ended) homogenising 
ethnic communities, establishing a preference over the other communities, 
setting up rigid quotas and ignoring wider social and economic inequalities, even
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though Parekh was optimistic of group sensitive policies being more about 
positive action rather than positive discrimination.
As has been mentioned, the implementation of the affirmative action 
programme over the years has gradually been interpreted and reaffirmed to be 
part of the historic bargain that was agreed between the indigenous Malays and 
the non-Malays. The question is: how did this happen? How did such a racially 
oriented policy, which was supposed to be a temporary measure, become 
perceived to be a permanent right of the indigenous Malays? This formulation of 
the affirmative action programme, which became a policy document under the 
NEP, was made through a government directive for the need to ensure that the 
indigenous Malays’ economic deprivation was rectified through the allocation of 
equity ownership, education, business opportunities and licences. The 
interventionist role of the government, that determines the formulation and later 
the execution of the affirmative action policy, could be argued to have resulted in 
the perception of state-sponsored discrimination. This perception, held by the 
non-Malays, is supported by the view that the civil service, which is dominated by 
the majority Malays, together with the political power held by the Malays, was 
instrumental in institutionalising discrimination, and had ignored social rights and 
undermined racial justice.
Furthermore, the formulation of these policies was implemented from a 
top-down approach, which resulted in the implementation and execution of such 
a policy being made without having a mechanism that would provide the checks 
and balances. This created suspicion and mistrust. The lack of checks and
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balances on the implementation and execution of the affirmative action 
programme resulted in the policy being misunderstood or misinterpreted, since 
there was no commitment to confirm to what extent the affirmative action would 
continue. For example, the affirmative action formulated during the NEP allocated 
a 20 year timeframe for the policy to eliminate poverty and restructure society, 
but the NDP, which was introduced after that, continues to adopt the affirmative 
action policy without stating any timeframe for the objective to be achieved. This 
resulted in the perception among the indigenous Malays that such a policy is the 
right of the indigenous Malays which could not be questioned or dismantled, 
while, for the non-Malays, the perception is that such a policy measure is part 
and parcel of the features of the indigenous Malays as being the privileged ethnic 
group.
Hence, what is needed is a re-orientation of the affirmative action 
programme, focused on needs across the racial boundaries, rather than targeting 
the indigenous Malays. This is because, over the years, the lack of focus on the 
non-Malays for the need of an affirmative action has resulted in the objective of 
the policy being side-tracked. This is because the specific focus on eliminating 
poverty among the indigenous Malays had resulted in the perception that such 
features were solely confined to the indigenous Malays, without realising that 
such orientation had distracted actions away from the objective of national unity 
and integration. This is because poverty also exists within the non-Malays and by 
focusing solely on the indigenous Malays it would seem to suggest that poverty 
only exists among the Malays. Therefore, the indigenous Malays need to be 
made to understand that the poor Chinese and Indians would require a similar
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form of needs-based affirmative action programme, rather than racially oriented 
policies. Furthermore, such promotion of needs-based affirmative action would 
not dilute or affect the special position of the indigenous Malays in any way. In 
fact, the application of a needs-based affirmative action programme would ensure 
that the state duty towards the Chinese and Indians as citizens is executed in 
fulfilling the legitimate interest of the other communities, as stipulated under the 
Federal Constitution. Unfortunately, the politicisation of the affirmative action 
programme, especially among the indigenous Malays, could prove to be a 
challenge too far. Furthermore, the extension of the timeframe after the NEP 
ended in 1990 is an indicator to the non-Malays that the affirmative action policy 
is here to stay, since the policies after NEP did not specify any timescale for the 
affirmative action policy to end.
Flowever, this effort could prove to be challenging, since this affirmative 
action policy has been considered to be part and parcel of the indigenous special 
position, instead of a policy formulated as a tool to minimise economic disparity. 
This misleading perception of the affirmative action programme needs to be 
overcome. Unfortunately, the politicisation of the issue of preferential treatment 
and affirmative action programme by the political parties, especially by UMNO, 
has caused the attempt to review the programme as being challenging to the 
Malay special position.
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5.3.2 Formation of an Institutional Framework: The Commission on Inter-Ethnic 
Relations
The recognition of multiculturalism in Western liberal societies witnessed not only 
the formulation of policies which supported the multicultural cause, but also 
institutional designs or frameworks that would oversee and monitor the 
development and implementation of these policies. For instance, the Race 
Equality Commission, Race Relation Act and Equal Opportunity Commission are 
some of the examples of the framework that has been formed to ensure the 
success of multicultural policies in Great Britain. The formation of such 
frameworks and designs is to actually assist and facilitate improving inter-ethnic 
relations, through constructive engagement and recommendations.
As for Malaysia, since independence, the government has formulated 
policies to focus on the need to improve the economic condition of the indigenous 
Malays, without at the same time neglecting the other communities. This is to 
ensure that the objective of achieving parity, especially in the economy, between 
the ethnic communities is achieved. The NEP, the NVP and the NEM clearly 
stated the need for economic development as the engine of growth to ensure 
equitable growth among the ethnic communities. While such objectives are 
desired by the government, the question that could be posed here is: how does 
the government determine the success of such policies, and what kind of 
mechanism has been set in place to evaluate the need for further improving such 
policy orientation?
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Therefore, as a way forward, what is required is to form an independent 
commission that would monitor the implementation and outcome of these 
policies, in order to avoid these policies being side-tracked from their actual 
objective; then, national unity and integration would be achieved. The formation 
of such a commission would be to firstly, provide recommendations to the 
government on the way forward in improving inter-ethnic relations and suggest 
improvements on the policies formulated. The independent role of the 
commission would provide recommendations on improving inter-ethnic relations. 
This involves eliminating racial stereotyping, social and economic prejudice, and 
upholding universal ethical values in the nation-building process. Secondly, the 
formation of the commission would also provide a forum for the citizens to voice 
their views and opinions on nation-building, in a manner that is not politicised. 
This would also provide room for constructive engagement and discussion, and 
hence create better understanding of the needs and concerns of all communities, 
instead of a particular ethnic group. However, what has been put in place since 
the 1969 race riot is a framework that firstly limits the discussion of the principles 
of rights to equality and citizenship, by applying repressive laws such as the 
Internal Security Act - a preventive detention law - the Sedition Act, and a law 
which was inherited from the British, the Printing, Presses and Publication Act, 
just to mention a few. Such laws shun constructive discussion or dialogue 
towards improving inter-ethnic relations, and this is contradictory to the spirit of a 
liberal democratic state, and to the idea of freedom of expression and being 
engaged in a continuous dialogue. As Ang (2009) said, multicultural societies 
should be engaged in intercultural dialogue without guarantees, as a means 
towards national unity.
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Secondly, the implementation of such an independent commission would 
provide a foundation of trust, especially from the non-Malays, in the seriousness 
of the government in promoting national unity and integration. This is because the 
independent recommendations and suggestions provided by the commission 
would be free from any political influence, and hence provide confidence, 
especially to the non-Malays.
Finally, the implementation of anti-discrimination laws or equal opportunity 
laws could be a viable measure to be considered. This is because even though 
the recognition of all citizens is equally recognised, the result of the ‘citizenship 
for special position bargain’ agreed by the ethnic leaders of the coalition is that 
the notion of rights to equality has been undermined. Furthermore, the special 
position of the indigenous Malays is viewed with suspicion and fear by the non- 
Malays, and this could be overcome if such an anti-discrimination and equal 
opportunity act could be put in place. This is because the formulation and 
implementation of policies would be more effective if supported by a legal 





As we could observe, multicultural, multi-religious and multi-ethnic are 
common characteristics in most societies; even those which were once a 
homogenous and close society, could no longer remain as such. Various factors, 
past or present, have caused or contributed to such a transformation. Earlier, 
colonisation was identified as the vital agent that brought change and 
transformation; more recently, the era of globalisation, in which the migration of 
people from around the world contributed to the formation of these multicultural, 
multi-ethnic and multi-religious societies. This resulted in Glazer (1997) 
concluding that we are now all multiculturalists. Therefore, the multicultural 
phenomenon is a challenge that each society has to face and can no longer be 
treated as an isolated issue that will wither away.
It is the reaction and response of nation states toward the multicultural 
phenomenon that interests multiculturalism scholars. How a society responds to 
the challenge is being debated and discussed by multiculturalism scholars who 
conclude that recognising the multicultural phenomenon is essential and in line 
with a liberal notion of rights to equality. Recognising differences, such as culture, 
is key for the development and growth of individuals and communities. Failure to 
respond to cultural, religious and ethnic identities would have a detrimental effect 
on the development of these individuals and communities, especially the 
minorities, argue the multiculturalism scholars. At the same time, these nation 
states are confronted with the question as to how to ensure this recognition of
230
diversity does not cause disunity or compartmentalisation within the polity of 
these states; recognising such differences might create separation and 
compartmentalisation.
Hence, this challenge pose by the multicultural phenomenon could either 
be viewed positively or negatively. One could argue that the negative effect of the 
multicultural phenomenon is that it could result in the disintegration of the nation 
state if the various demands for recognition are being entertained. At the same 
time, recognising the multicultural phenomenon would result in further 
compartmentalisation to an extent labelled as systematic segregation. 
Furthermore, this would also cause the notion of liberalism as upheld by liberal 
democratic states to be side-tracked from its original aspiration of a free, secular, 
egalitarian, civic and neutral society.
Those who view the multicultural phenomenon positively would argue that such 
recognition would ensure all citizens would prosper, since the recognition of 
cultural, ethnic and religious identities is vital. Such recognition would nurture a 
greater feeling of loyalty and sense of belonging to the nation state which are 
essential for integration.
We have seen various strategies and policies formulated and executed by 
the state in responding to the challenges poses by the multicultural phenomenon. 
The policies and strategies, however, became a subject of debate since they 
could further create separation and compartmentalisation, hence undermining the 
integration and solidarity of the liberal democratic nation state. It is difficult to see
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how could equality be maintained if difference is being recognised through 
specific policies such as affirmative action and positive discrimination.
The response to the challenge posed by the multicultural phenomenon is 
reflected through the policies formulated and the organs formed. This can be 
seen from the experiences of liberal democratic societies such as The 
Netherlands, Australia, Great Britain and Malaysia to mention a few. For 
instance, the Ethnic Minorities Policy in the Netherlands, the Commission for 
Racial Equality in Great Britain, and the affirmative action policy in the United 
States are examples of policy initiatives implemented by the state to address the 
challenges brought by the multicultural phenomenon. These policy documents or 
statements provide the milestones in these countries in overcoming the challenge 
posed by the multicultural phenomenon. However, the biggest question is how far 
are these policies successful in nurturing multiculturalism and, at the same time, 
promoting national integration in these nation states?
However, the biggest challenge faced by multicultural societies around the 
world, I would argue, is to reconcile a national identity which would have been the 
foundation of these societies, grounded by certain characteristics, principles or 
attributes, with the need to accommodate, recognise and accept the various 
cultural, religious and ethnic identities that exist within the polity, especially of 
minorities. The concern is that these multicultural societies which once upheld the 
notion of equality and neutrality have to accommodate, recognise and accept that 
culture, religion and ethnic identities have now become a visible feature in these 
societies. In other words to become a multicultural society, one must not lose
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sight of the majority or dominant identity which has been the foundation of the 
society.
As for Malaysia, the colonial experience has had a significant influence in 
the formation and transformation of Malaysia’s political, social and economic 
landscape. This contributed to the existence of its multicultural, multi-religious 
and multi-ethnic identity. Nevertheless, these multicultural identities are retained 
and recognised by the state to the extent that such identities are explicitly visible, 
recognised and celebrated. For instance, recognition of the vernacular education 
and the celebration of the festivals of each community, to mention a few, are 
explicit examples of multicultural celebration and recognition in Malaysia. The 
celebration of these pertinent features of each society or ethnic group in Malaysia 
marked the recognition towards multiculturalism itself.
However, after 54 years of independence, multicultural Malaysia is still 
grappling with the challenge of national unity and integration and the question is 
why such challenges continue to exist? This is evident from the early period of 
independence when a multi-ethnic party was mooted to replace UMNO as a race- 
based political party, echoed today with the idea of Bangsd Malaysia and 
1 Malaysia. Does this imply that the multicultural recognition had further 
compartmentalised the communities? In order to face the challenge of national 
unity and integration, the state formulated Bangsa Malaysia and 1 Malaysia as a 
policy initiative or strategy. This clearly indicates that these collective identities 
are discussed in order to create a sense of commonality, a sense of belonging 
and acceptability. It is here where multicultural Malaysia is at a crossroads. The
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idea of an inclusive nation state under the banner of Bangsa Malaysia or 
1 Malaysia as its national identity, is confronted with the idea of an exclusive 
Malay Bumiputra identity linked to the identification of the nation state and 
privileges of affirmative action. The most significant confrontation is on how to 
complement the idea of Bangsa Malaysia and 1 Malaysia as a national identity 
that should be recognising rights to equality with the idea of Malay Bumiputra as 
the privileged identity which has been used for ethnic political mobilisation and 
ethnic compartmentalisation to date.
While the celebration of a multicultural and multi-ethnic Malaysia is visible as 
a result of the pragmatic and accommodationist approach adopted, the basic 
foundation of the nation state, such as the notion of citizenship that presses for 
rights to equality, many, especially among the minorities, would argue to be 
lopsided. This is evident from the strategies and policies undertaken by the state 
which focused or concentrated more on the majority Malay Bumiputra who are 
economically lagging behind compared to the Chinese and Indian minorities.
Hence, what is required in multicultural Malaysia is to move away from the 
ethnic compartmentalisation and ethnic political mobilisation since these cause 
adverse effect to the aspiration of Bangsa Malaysia or 1 Malaysia. Furthermore, 
the idea of Bangsa Malaysia and 1 Malaysia as being inclusive of all should not 
further promote ethnic political mobilisation since this would trigger ethnic 
exclusivity especially among the Malay Bumiputra. This would interpret the idea 
of 1 Malaysia in the broadest sense which mean all the races in the nation
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working and interacting as one people, as opposed to continuing to look at 
everything through the prism of race.
However, looking at multicultural Malaysia’s development the road to an 
ideal multicultural set-up would be long and winding. This is evident when race 
takes a centre stage in recognising the existence of a multicultural feature. While 
an ideal multicultural set-up is still far away, Malaysia has managed to retain and 
recognise its multicultural celebrations with the celebration of various festivals 
and also the vernacular education system that is retained and recognised while, 
at the same time, with an exclusive recognition of the native Malay Bumiputra 
identity. Perhaps one of the arguments for multicultural states is to recognise the 
celebration of various cultural, ethnic and religious identities but at the same time 
maintaining or retaining the features of the original identity of that particular 
nation state.
By way of conclusion, while multicultural Malaysia continues to celebrate 
and recognise the various cultural celebrations and religious identities, the need 
to nurture a sense of belonging continues and remains challenging. In the 
Malaysian multicultural scenario the argument that the recognition of various 
cultural and religious celebrations is sufficient does not necessarily nurture a 
sense of belonging. Hence the promotion of a national identity will prove to be 
challenging until the barrier of racial difference is eliminated and the promotion of 
social justice take centre stage. While ethnic or racial consciousness continues a 
sense of belonging and nation-building will be an arduous task.
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